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This study examines the technoscientific knowledge-practices of adolescent 
psychotherapy. Employing an interpretive, feminist version of grounded theory, 40 
interviews with psychotherapists were analyzed. Building on Science and Technology 
Studies and the Sociology of Health and Illness, the following research questions are 
asked: How are adolescent mental illnesses defined a d approached within and across 
social worlds? How do practitioners negotiate social processes of diagnosis? In what 
ways does the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) as a technology, shape the 
diagnostic and treatment work of mental health practitioners? In what ways does 
Managed Care (MC) shape adolescent mental health care?  
 Social worlds define psychotherapy as an art and science, resist biomedicine and 
embrace eclectic theoretical orientations to treatmnt. Psychotherapists utilize Evidence 
Based Practices (EBPs) in their treatment plans but critique how EBPs privilege scientific 
evidence over patient subjectivity, social contexts and the therapeutic relationship.  
 Psychotherapists challenge the cultural authority f the DSM and downplay its 
significance for clinical work. While the DSM is a socially-scripted technology, its 
significance is interpretively flexible. Psychotherapists employ work-arounds to the 
problems posed by biomedical and bureaucratic standardization, and participate in 
processes of cribbing. Cribbing signifies the collective knowledge building and 
translation work necessary to learn the codes that facilitate therapeutic service 
authorizations and minimize denials. The DSM technology and MC privilege a 
therapeutic focus on surface level symptoms and behaviors whereas psychotherapists 
  
 
focus on communication, relational and emotional issues. The assemblage of the DSM 
and MC creates diagnostic dissonance for psychotherapists—a conflict between their own 
theoretical orientations and the biomedical model. Biomedicalization processes are 
uneven and actively resisted. 
MC governs the clinical practices of psychotherapists. For-profit MC companies 
have shifted care from intense psychodynamic therapy towards short-term surface level 
medications and behavioral programs. MC policies limit services, over-manage treatment 
and harm the therapeutic relationship. MC stratifies providers and patients by 
encouraging seasoned professionals to leave public forms of insurance. The least 
experienced practitioners care for those with the most intense mental illness while those 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Review of the Literature 
This dissertation is an examination of the definitions of, and responses to, the Mental, 
Emotional and Behavioral (MEB) disturbances of adolescents in the United States (U.S.) 
in the 21st century. The scientific and clinical professions that take adolescent mental 
disorders as a key object of scientific study and clinical intervention are diverse in their 
disciplinary training, professional socialization, models of illness and therapeutic 
approaches. In addition, mental health care work is accomplished in diverse contexts 
situated within a larger political economy that is, it elf, full of countervailing forces. This 
study examines the discursive and material practices hat together co-constitute how 
society currently defines and intervenes in adolescent mental illness.  
Four questions guide this study. First, how are adolescent mental illnesses defined 
and approached within and across interdisciplinary psychotherapeutic communities of 
practice (social worlds)? Second, how do psychotherapeutic practitioners negotiate social 
processes of diagnosis? Third, in what ways does the DSM as a biomedical technology, 
shape the everyday diagnostic and treatment work of mental health practitioners? Fourth, 
in what ways does the political economy, specifically, managed care, shape contemporary 
adolescent mental health care? 
In this introductory chapter I provide a review of the historical background of the 
rise in the emergence of adolescent mental disorders as a significant object of scientific 
study and clinical intervention as well as a review of literatures relevant to understanding 
the contemporary mental health arena. In chapter two, I set up key theoretical 
frameworks, analytic concepts, and methodological procedures employed in chapters 




disorders are defined and approached within and across psychotherapeutic social worlds 
of practice. I examine how psychotherapy is understood as an art and a science through a 
set of knowledge-practice tensions that are salient in contemporary mental health care 
practice. Chapter four examines the social processes of diagnosis, including practitioner 
negotiations of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) and the ways in which the 
DSM as a biomedical technology shapes the diagnoses and therapeutic interventions 
adolescents receive. Chapter five examines the largr macro political economy of the 
adolescent mental health field and the meso level institutional forces shaping the 
conditions under which screening, diagnosis and treatm nt of adolescent disturbances 
occur. For instance, in out-patient expert mental he lt  professional settings, managed 
care is a major social force that shapes the everyday care work of practitioners. Finally, in 
chapter six, I theorize what the empirical data and alysis from this study suggest about 
adolescent mental health and illness in contemporary U.S. society.  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter begins with a historical telling of the emergence of Adolescent 
Medicine and the ascendance of adolescent mental disorders as an object of scientific 
knowledge and clinical practice intervention from 1980 to the present. In addition, I offer 
a brief background review of the social construction of adolescence, including a review 
of developmental and life course understandings of ad lescence and adolescent health. 
Emergence of Adolescent Medicine and Mental Disorder 
In 1968, the Society for Adolescent Medicine (SAM) was founded along with 
other professional organizations and committees, demarcating adolescents as a social 




it has been over four decades since advocates secured a professional organization, 
adolescent medicine is a fairly recent development in the history of medicine. In A 
Doctor of Their Own: the History of Adolescent Medicine, historian Heather Munro 
Prescott notes that it was not until 1991 that Adolescent Medicine’s parent specialty – 
Pediatrics, formalized the sub-certification of Adolescent Medicine within Pediatric 
Medicine (1998).  
Prescott’s study demonstrates how the emergence of the specialty of Adolescent 
Medicine reflected larger developments of specialization in U.S. medicine at the time yet 
encountered unique professional resistance due to its scientific focus on a social group 
rather than a procedure or technological innovation (Prescott 1998). Due to its outright 
social component, there were problems of legitimacy for Adolescent Medicine as a 
specialty from the start.  It was the first specialization to spotlight a social age category 
rather than a disease, new technology, or technique to distinguish itself from other 
specialties. The founders of Adolescent Medicine asserted a holistic model that examined 
the “whole” patient (as opposed to an organ or a particular part of the body and its 
functioning). This holistic model and its openness towards intervening in emotional, 
behavioral, psychosocial (as opposed to purely biomedical) as well as physical problems 
marked Adolescent Medicine as a soft or unsystematic specialty, leaving professional 
dilemmas for decades to come (Prescott 1998). This history is noteworthy because it 
highlights the social facets of the professionalization of scientific medicine in general, 
and Adolescent Medicine in particular. The consideration and inclusion of emotional, 
mental and behavioral components of health and illness and the focus on a social group 




specialization. This holistic approach to health and ill ess and the social construction of 
adolescent health issues as distinct from child and adult health, opened the door for the 
interdisciplinary emergence of scientific and professional knowledges and practices of 
that have developed across the past four decades.  
 Despite early professional disputes, in 1979 the Task Force on Pediatrics 
recommended that medical school educational programs in Pediatrics increase their 
emphasis on adolescent health. In the mid 1990s, the medical establishment began 
including Adolescent Medicine as a one-month requirement for residency education 
(Irwin 2004).1 Intersecting social forces propelled the field of Adolescent Medicine 
forward throughout the 1990s:  
During the 1990s, there was a major coming together of several sectors of society in the 
U.S.: private foundations began to pay attention to ad lescents, the professional medical 
organizations demonstrated concern about their members’ expertise in caring for 
teenagers, certifying organizations embraced Adolescent Medicine with subspecialty 
certification and the federal government issued a major report. (Irwin 2004:308)  
 
This growing widespread concern for adolescents resulted in important 
publications on adolescent health and the development of subspecialty examination and 
certification process standards. The first certifying examination was given in 1994 to 465 
medical students; by 1996 there were 39 training pro rams in Adolescent Medicine; and 
by 1998, the Accreditation Council on Graduate Medical Education accredited 16 new 
adolescent medicine fellowship training programs (Irwin 2004; Rieder, Alderman and 
                                                           
1
 While the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) had formally recognized adolescence as a distinct social 
group in a policy paper published in 1938, it wasn’t until 1978 that they established a professional section 
on Adolescent Health sometime during the 1980s that the Society of Adolescent Medicine created the 
Journal of Adolescent Health care along with several textbooks for medical education on adolescent 




Cohen 2005). In 2002, Family Practice joined with Pediatrics and Internal Medicine 
specialties to offer sub-specialty training in Adolescent Medicine (Irwin 2004). 
The historical emergence of Adolescent Medicine as its own specialty and sub-
specialty of general medical training illustrates the inherent interdisciplinarity of the rise 
of adolescent health and illness as an object of scientific study and clinical intervention. 
The scientific ascendance of medicine tailored for adolescents reinforced parallel 
developments in other scientific and social fields interested in understanding or 
intervening in adolescence and/or emotional, behavior l and mental disturbances. Thus 
across the latter half of the twentieth century, adolescent health in general, and adolescent 
mental, emotional and behavioral health in particular, emerged as an object of social 
concern, scientific study and professional clinical ntervention. By the 1980s, multiple 
scientific and professional disciplines viewed adolescent mental health and illness as an 
area of specialty under their jurisdiction. Each of these professional domains has relied on 
its own set of disciplinary expert knowledges to define the problems and provide 
solutions in the form of health care practices. I conducted a bibliometric exercise to 
demonstrate the drastic ascendance of adolescent mental disorder as an object of 
scientific knowledge.   
Using the PubMed database with the search terms adolescent, mental and 
disorder, I charted its the significance as an object of scientific study from the 1950s to 
the present. Beginning in 1950, the Pub Med database reveals a steady rise in citations 
devoted to the scientific study of adolescent mental he lth and illness. From 1950 to 1959 
only 59 studies mention adolescent mental disorder; across the 1960s the number of 




– 22,797 citations; in the 1990s there were 32,217 studies and finally from 2000 through 
2009 there were over 50,000 studies on adolescent mtal disorder.  
Table 1. Ascendance of Adolescent Mental Disorder as Scientific Object of Study 








This accelerating attention to adolescent mental illness signals a marked 
emergence and ascendance of a set of knowledges and practices specifically focused on 
the social age of adolescence and what medical fields t rm mental disorders. The 
contemporary result is a complex interdisciplinary ssemblage of medical and mental 
health professions, professional societies, academic journals, theoretical orientations, and 
a vast industry organized around the treatment of mental, emotional and behavioral 
disturbances in adolescents.  
In addition to the growing scientific and clinical focus on adolescent health, there 
has been a gradual increase in the focus on the intersections of health and the life course 
(also referred to in peer-reviewed literature as life-span or human development). 
Originally, Adolescent Medicine focused on the uniqe environments and experiences of 
adolescents and how those contributed to their health and illness status. Across the past 
decade, adolescence has increasingly been constructed as a period in the life course that 
is significant not only for the health of young peole but for the influence it has on the 




and adolescent health are embedded in conceptualizations of adolescent mental health 
and illness, and therefore shape how we as a society define and intervene in adolescent 
mental disorders. For this reason, the next section reviews the social construction of 
adolescence and developmental or life course health scholarship. 
The Social Construction of Adolescence 
The contemporary Western idea of adolescence as a period in the life cycle marked by 
conflicts and disturbances is viewed by many historians as a creation of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. . . Hall’s emphasis on the peculiarities of the 
emotional experiences of adolescents contributed to the picture of psychological storm 
and stress. (Fabrega and Miller 1995:883) 
 
In the 21st century, the notion of Adolescence is embedded in the social fabric of 
our everyday lives, something we take for granted as a normative part of life experience. 
However, adolescence is a fairly modern social category that emerged in response to 
compound economic and cultural conditions across the 19th and 20th centuries.  Multiple 
historical scholars have demonstrated the ways in which adolescence was a modernist 
product of the industrial revolution that in turn led to key social and cultural changes in 
the 20th century (Fabrega and Miller 1995; Kett 1977; Lesko 2001; Prescott 1998).  
Industrialization brought about innovative social po icies that created new 
contexts and opportunities for adolescent development. These new social policies, 
including compulsory education and child labor laws; a minimum school leaving age and 
limits on hours of employment for 14 to 16 year olds, established a social space for the 
category of adolescence within the legal institution (Kett 1977; Lesko 2001). In addition 
to the changing contexts and conditions in the legal and educational system, demographic 




New social trends of having fewer children and spacing hildbirth closer together 
resulted in a novel family form where all children in a house were teenagers; thereby 
further distinguishing a teenage experience (Kett 1977), raising the salience of adolescent 
problems and creating more opportunity for intergenerational conflict (Fabrega and 
Miller 1995). Further, the industrial capitalist economy of this time period caused 
changes in American relationships of social class, race/ethnicity, gender and age that 
piloted increased stratification of youth experienc a ross these social status 
characteristics (Prescott 1998). For example, the growing age segregation in schools and 
the concomitant rise in peer friendship and activity groups postponed societal 
expectations of adult responsibilities and therefore, the necessity of an adult identity 
(Fabrega and Miller 1995).  
In Act Your Age!: A Cultural Construction of Adolescen, Lesko (2001) critically 
illustrates how the social construction of adolescence perspective emphasizes social 
contexts, institutional arrangements and differential experiences of youths from stratified 
class, race and gender backgrounds but fails to interrogate the physiological and 
biological paradigm underpinning the dominant view of adolescence.  Similarly, Joseph 
Kett (1977) argues that while late 19th century middle class values universalized and 
democratized the concept of adolescence in the early 20th century, biological processes of 
maturation were (and still are) foundational for the social definition of this age group.  
Multiple emerging academic disciplines had an influence on the early 
conceptualizations and governance of adolescence and adolescent health but early 




adolescent personhood and adolescence as a distinct group became understood as a 
natural biological, emotional, and cognitive period of “storm and stress”.  
In a survey of the published literature on adolescence in the first half of the 20th 
century, Sociologist A. B. Hollingshead (1949:5) showed that most prior studies had 
focused on physical and psychological aspects of adlescence, and argued “of the 
millions of words written on the subject, most had a worried tone.” This emphasis on 
adolescent problems can be traced back to G. Stanley Hall who published a 
comprehensive two volume study on Adolescence in 1904, popularizing the phrase “of 
storm and stress” to denote this stage of the life course. Throughout the first half of the 
20th century, adolescence continued to be associated with “storm and stress” despite the 
lack of empirical evidence for a causal connection between physical manifestations of 
adolescence and social behavior (Hollingshead 1947). Psychologist Stanley Hall (1904) 
is best known for how he influentially defined adolescence in psychological, moral and 
developmental (life stage) terms. Halls’ seminal definition of adolescence as a 
biologically based stage of inevitable upheaval grounded future studies of adolescence 
and adolescent health in biological reductionism and  deficit paradigm (Lerner and 
Steinberg 2009). Similarly, Erik Erikson (1970, 1968) pathologized adolescence in 
psychological terms through his claims of a universal adolescent identity crisis and 
struggle for independence from parents. 
A prominent figure in the parent education movement, Lawrence K. Frank (1953) 
echoed Hall’s anti-modernist fears about the future of American society by positioning 
adolescents as a focal point for the nation’s concerns about ills of  modern society. Lerner 




essentializing theories about adolescent behavior and development or empirical studies 
that were descriptive rather than analytical. A. B. Hollingshead’s (1949) sociological 
ethnography stands out as one of few early scientifc studies that examined adolescence 
and adolescent behavior empirically in social context. 
Hollingshead argued that, contrary to popular perception, adolescent behavior is 
transitional and wholly dependent upon socialization and the position the individual 
adolescent and his/her family occupies in the social structure, rather than upon biological 
phenomena such as puberty connected with this age (1949).  While Hollingshead 
acknowledged anatomical, physiological and psychological facts have some bearing on 
behavior during adolescence, he asserted their importance as being shaped and defined by 
culture (1949). He hypothesized “the social behavior of adolescents appears to be related 
functionally to the positions their families occupy in the social structure of the 
community,” and his evidence demonstrated that class culture shapes the behavior 
patterns of adolescents (Hollingshead 1949:439).  Thus, he argued that what is important 
about adolescence is the way that society, its institutions, and the social contexts 
surrounding the adolescent regard him/her, including the roles, expectations and 
opportunities for social action they provide.  
While Hollingshead’s (1949) ethnography stands out among early studies of the 
social aspects of adolescence, in the last half of the 20th century there was a significant 
increase in research on adolescence across a growin number of disciplines, and this 
increase has continued across the past few decades (Dornbusch 1989; Fursetenberg 
2000). Sanford Dornbusch (1989) describes a great increase in scientific research on 




founded. He argues that there was a significant shift in the focus of scientific studies from 
examining individual adolescents and developmental tasks towards examining research 
on adolescents situated in social contexts. Frank Furstenberg (2000) notes that the 
scholarly culture set forth by Hall’s (1904) seminal study was surprisingly persistent in 
psychological and sociological studies of adolescence throughout the 20th century. 
Scholars have continued to reproduce notions of adolescence as a time of “storm and 
stress” and as a “problematic life stage in modern society” (Furstenberg 2000:897). Thus 
while adolescence was increasingly studied in multiple ways, and increasingly situated 
within social contexts, there continued a theme of focusing on adolescence and youth as a 
problem: 
As indicated earlier, the vast majority of articles and studies on youth are focused on the 
problematic features of adolescence and explicitly on problem behavior. A review of the 
leading journals on adolescence indicated that at least half of all articles were principally 
about youthful misbehavior and maladjustment; delinquency and violence, substance 
abuse, school problems, mental health, and the like. (Furstenberg 2000:900)  
 
Jeffrey Arnett (1999) also examines the validity of the view of adolescence as 
“storm and stress.” He examines three key aspects: (1) conflict with parents, (2) mood 
disruptions and (3) risk behavior (Arnett 1999). He concludes that in all three of these 
areas, scientific evidence supports a modified “storm and stress” view that accounts for 
individual and cultural variations.  
The claim that that adolescent storm and stress is characteristic of all adolescents and that 
the source of it is purely biological is clearly false. However, evidence supports the 
existence of some degree of storm and stress—at least for adolescents in the middle-class 
American majority culture—with respect to conflict with parents, mood disruptions, and 
risk behavior. Not all adolescents experience storm and stress in these areas, but 






How adolescence is defined in the scientific literatu e is important for this study because 
these discursive practices shape larger societal definitions and responses to the emotions 
and behaviors of adolescents. Adolescent mental health and illness is coproduced by 
assumptions about adolescence itself. 
 Beyond persistent constructions of adolescence as problematic in modern society, 
there have been a number of other important developments in the literature that provide a 
fuller picture of how we think about adolescence in co temporary society. For example, 
scholars have continued focus on the way youth gain autonomy from their families and 
develop peer group relations (Furstenberg 2000). There also was a shift in attention from 
the social class of adolescents and their families to that of racial, ethnic and gender 
differences in experiences and outcomes (Furstenberg 2000). Finally, in looking forward 
to what sociological studies of adolescence and youth could do better in the 21st century, 
he urged scholars to begin exploring multiple rather an just single social contexts, in 
order to gain a fuller understanding of “when, how and why different contexts shape the 
trajectories of development” (Furstenberg 2000:904). Scientific scholars have l rgely 
used the developmental and/or life course theoretical frameworks to reach a better 





Developmental and Life Course Understandings of Health and Illness 
Normative benchmarks for adolescent moods and behaviors are still largely 
shaped by conceptualizations of developmental psychologists. However, the study of 
human development throughout the life course has becom  an even more 
interdisciplinary endeavor across the past half century, especially within studies on health 
and illness. “The fastest growing research area in life course sociology and related 
fields, especially epidemiology, concerns the trajectories of health outcomes and the 
mechanisms responsible for age-specific exposures to health risks and the age-specific 
differentials in the impact of such risks” (Mayer 2009:421). Within sociology, the life 
course framework is commonly used to study the way early life experiences and events 
impact future life conditions (health status, morbidity and mortality), and how life course 
trajectories vary based on one’s early and cumulative social class, education and income 
statuses (Mayer 2009).2 For instance, adolescents have repeatedly been shown to have 
intersecting trajectories of poverty, mental, emotional and behavioral disorders, and 
education that have consequences for their future life xperiences and pathways (McLeod 
and Fettes 2007; McLeod and Shanahan 1996, 1993; Wickrama et al. 2008). “Early life 
course events and experiences are the seedbed for lifel ng human development, and life 
course scholars are bringing fresh insights into how negative conditions during 
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 The term trajectories is a life course principle concerned with patterns of stability and change over time 
that are impacted by the duration, sequence and timing of various transitions or movements in and out of 
roles and statuses (George 2003; Pearlin et al. 2005). While movements in and out of roles and statuses 
occur throughout all phases of the life course, some research suggests that transitional events that are 





childhood and adolescence compromise adult well-being”  (Schafer, Ferraro and Mustillo 
2011:1053).3 
Sociological life course studies employ a set of pers ctives that focus on the 
following four principles: (1) time and timing of patterns of stability and change 
(conceptualized as trajectories), (2) intersections of social context and personal biography 
or the connections between the macro social environment and micro personal situation, 
(3) linked lives or how individuals are interdependt on each other in various networks 
of social support and obligation across multiple domains of life such as family, school 
and work, and (4) human agency or the notion that although social and historical contexts 
shape individual lives, individuals can act to modify the relationships and institutions in 
their own lives (George 2003).  
While there is a significant degree of overlap between developmental and life 
course frameworks, developmental psychological research focuses on measuring 
biological, psychological and social changes over time such as pubertal, cognitive, 
emotional and relational indicators, with explicit at ention to standards of development. 
In comparison, examining adolescence within the life course requires an understanding of 
how “adolescence is linked to developmental processes in the years before and after 
adolescence in ways that are shaped by broader patterns of social change” (Johnson, 
Crosnoe and Elder 2011:273). Thus, contemporary studies of adolescence from a life 
course perspective also draw on lessons from the dev lopmental perspective but attend 
more explicitly to social contexts and change over time.  
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One developmental research article on adolescent metal health argues “. . . youth 
is not a tabula rasa on which new psychiatric disorders emerge. Rather, biological and 
psychosocial risk and resilience factors from childood continue to interact to influence 
life events and outcomes throughout adolescence and youth into adulthood. This process 
begins in childhood” (Birleson and Vance 2008:23). The utility of using a developmental 
perspective in understanding adolescent health and illness is that the adolescent stage of 
development “is a critical period for the establishment of lifelong positive and risky 
health-related behaviors” (Holmbeck 2002:409).  
Therefore, both life course and developmental perspectives examine changes or 
trajectories across the life course, but sociological research emphasizes the ways in which 
social structures and stressors are stratified across different social groups within society 
and how these differences result in cumulative advantages or disadvantages. In 
comparison, developmental psychology focuses on defi ing and studying normal versus 
abnormal developmental processes and benchmarks acro s the life course. 
In examining the scientific and clinical knowledges and practices of adolescent 
mental health and illness, it is important to deconstruct the ways that recent and historical 
context contribute to contemporary conditions and conceptualizations of “normative” 
emotional and behavioral standards. In addition to understanding constructions of 
adolescence and adolescent mental health through a life course perspective, it’s important 
to understand the manner in which adolescent mental health and illness is defined as a 




Adolescent Mental Health and Illness as a Contemporary Social Problem 
While there have been significant declines in most medical problems that afflict children 
and adolescents across the past century; mental, emotional and behavioral problems now 
comprise one of the most common disabilities of this population.4 The majority of 
lifetime Mental, Emotional and Behavioral (MEB) disorders begin to develop during 
childhood and adolescence – over half of all persons who ever experience an MEB 
disorder report that onset occurred by age 14 (Kessler et al. 2005).  
Given that the most seriously impairing and persistent adult mental disorders are 
associated with child-adolescent onsets and high comorbidity, increased efforts are 
needed to study the public health implications of early detection and treatment of initially 
mild and currently largely untreated child-adolescent disorders” (Kessler and Wang 
2008:115).  
 
National data show that 20-25 percent of youth have symptoms of emotional 
distress and one in ten has moderate to severe symptoms that indicate significant 
impairment (Knopf, Park and Mulye 2008). The National Comorbidity Survey 
Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A), a nationally representative face-to-face survey of 
10,123 adolescents aged 13 to 18 years of age in th U.S., recently assessed lifetime 
prevalence of DSM-IV mental disorders with and without severe impairment, 
comorbidity and their sociodemographic correlates (Merikangas et al 2010). They found 
that anxiety disorders were the most prevalent (31.9%) but behavior disorders (19.1%), 
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 Major increases in rates of psychosocial disorders among youth in many Western nations have been 
found in the past half century (Rutter and Smith 1995), raising serious questions about the cause of these 
increasing rates of mental health problems and the methodological challenges involved in accurately 
implementing and estimating accurate time trend data in child and adolescent mental health (Maughn, 
Lervolino and Collishaw 2005). The U.S. lacks a data registry that can account for time trend data across all 
of the different types of disorders. Therefore prevalence and incidence rates are difficult to interpret 
given there is confusion about the extent to which rising rates of disorder are due to increased public and 
professional awareness and outreach which have led to increases in referrals in diagnoses, or whether the 




mood disorders (14.3%) and substance use disorders (11.4%) were also common 
(Merikangas et al 2010). As expected, the NCS-A also revealed that comorbidity, the 
condition of experiencing symptoms that meet diagnostic criteria of more than one 
disorder, was common (40%).5 Further, almost a quarter (22%) of adolescents surveyed 
had disorders with severe impairment and/or distres (Merikangas et al. 2010). The 
median age of onset for these disorder classes was urprisingly early: six years of age for 
anxiety, 11 years for behavior, 13 years for mood an  15 years for substance use 
disorders. This finding is important because early onset of mental, emotional and 
behavioral disorders is predictive of lower school achievement and increased burden on 
the child welfare and juvenile justice systems (IOM 2006).  
While some scientific estimates suggest that between 20 to 45 percent of youth 
who need mental health services go without, others claim the problem is actually much 
worse; that four of five children and adolescents face unmet mental health care needs 
(Burns et al. 1995). Less than half of youth with mental health problems get professional 
treatment, services or support; and only one in five gets treatment from a mental health 
worker with special training to work with youth (American Psychological Association). 
Some researchers argue the high rates of unmet mental health treatment is a result of 
systematic defunding of specialized mental health services in the United States in the past 
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 High rates of comorbidity have been found in both community (Bird, Gould & Staghezz 1993) and clinical 
samples (Jensen & Weisz 2002). Comorbidity is a significant concern in mental health research because it 
is one of the major differences between therapeutic interventions carried out in research (trials often 
have a singular disorder focus and exclude participants with co-occurring symptoms) and therapy carried 
out in everyday contexts (tend to be heterogeneous in patient and symptom type) (Doss and Weisz 2006; 
Weisz, Donenberg, Han & Weiss 1995; Westen, Novotny & Thompson-Brenner 2004). A frequent 
complaint of clinical practitioners is that therapeutic treatments listed as Evidence Based have not been 




two decades (Appelbaum 2003). In fact, Appelbaum claims that while he is cautious in 
using the term crisis, financial cuts in public sector mental health services and the 
withdrawal of many private practitioners from managed care networks have resulted in a 
definite crisis in access to mental health services (Appelbaum 2003:110).  
However, Appelbaum is not the only research practitioner to cry crisis. Jane 
Knitzer (1982) garnered the nation’s attention with her book Unclaimed Children: The 
Failure of Public Responsibility to Children and Adolescents in Need of Mental Health 
Services three decades ago. Tolan and Dodge (2005) argue the situation has gotten much 
worse since then. All one has to do is look at the numerous reports that demonstrate the 
gap between needs and services in childhood and adolescent mental health: the U.S. 
Public Health Service (2000), the President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental 
Health (2003), the American Psychological Association’s (APA) Working Group on 
Children’s Mental Health (Tolan et al. 2001) and many more lay bare this gap. 
Cumulatively, these studies demonstrate that in the United States, childhood and 
adolescent mental health are severely neglected despite an abundance of evidence of the 
importance of mental health for childhood and adolescent development, the significance 
of early intervention in general and the efficacy of intervention with at-risk youth in 
particular (Tolan and Dodge 2005).  
In addition to these governmental and professional society studies, a recent  
National Research Council (NRC) and Institute of Medicine (IOM) scientific consensus 
study titled Preventing Mental, Emotional and Behavioral Disorders Among Young 
People: Progress and Possibilities (2009) concluded that our nation devotes minimal 




The report details the high psychosocial and economic costs of MEB disorders and how 
the normative national response is to wait for their emergence and then attempt to treat or 
limit the damage caused. The scientific consensus committee that produced this report 
argued that the current national response neglects efforts focused on preventing future 
disorders such as curtailing the environmental exposures that increase risk (NRC/IOM 
2009). 
This crisis in national response to youth mental helt  and illness, widespread 
lack of access to professional mental health servics and evidence demonstrating that 
many children and adolescents with MEB disorders have their only mental health related 
service contact with non-specialty mental health providers begs important questions 
about childhood and adolescent mental health services research, the mental health 
workforce and institutional contexts within which care is provided. 
Contexts of Adolescent Mental Health Care 
Adolescents primarily receive mental health services in one of the following 
contexts: inpatient and outpatient specialty mental he lth settings (mental health experts 
such as psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, scial workers), school-based 
educational settings (school counselors, psychologists, social workers or special 
education teachers), and general medical settings (pediatricians or family practice 
providers) (SAMHSA 2009). The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) 
Report found that in 2007, one in eight (12.5%) adolescents aged 12 to 17 years received 
treatment or counseling in a specialty mental healt se ting, 11.5% received services in an 
educational setting and 2.8% received services in a general medical setting (SAMHSA 




provide care will be explored in chapters three and five, respectively. Child and 
adolescent mental health services research has demonstrated significant flaws in the 
larger service delivery system: 
The clinicians are resistant to change, agencies are avoiding accountability, governments 
are mired in their own bureaucracy and regulations, a d the consumers haven’t figured 
out they need to be demanding quality services not just more access. The researchers, 
well they are just happy publishing and winning grants. But the bottom line is what are 
we doing to make life better for children and their families who have mental health 
problems. (Bickman and Hoagwood 2010:4) 
 
In a review of the state of childhood and adolescent mental health field across the 
past 25 years, Kimberly Hoagwood acknowledged that significant scientific progress had 
impacted science and practice communities working on diagnosis, treatment, prevention, 
early identification, education and support for families; but progress in the system of 
service delivery had lagged behind: 
Similar advances in the system and delivery – in the conveyance infrastructure for getting 
better services (or for that matter any services) out into communities and to families – 
was foundationally flawed. The mechanisms, structure, o ganization and fiscal 
accountability of the public mental health system was antiquated and out of step with the 
changes in the broader world of healthcare. (Bickman and Hoagwood 2010:5) 
 
The recognition of a scientific research-clinical practice gap isn’t unique to the field of 
adolescent mental health but I suspect the research-practice gap may be particularly acute 
in adolescent mental health due to the complexities that arise from the sheer 
interdisciplinarity of both researchers and practitioners that take adolescent mental 
disorders as their object of scientific study and/or clinical practice intervention. Previous 
CEO of United Behavioral Health, Saul Feldman (2003), similarly agrees that the gap 
between what is known and what is done in the mental he lth field is perplexing given 
the proliferation of evidence-based guidelines intended to serve as vehicles of 




In his book Managed Behavioral Health Services: Perspectives and Practices, 
Feldman (2003) argues that while there was a time wh n it was necessary and important 
for psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric social workers and nurses to have their own 
schools, disciplines, professional associations, journals, licensing and certification 
procedures and professional norms and identities, that time has long passed. He claims 
that disciplinary training promotes unhealthy rivalry between professions, discourages 
interdisciplinary learning and thus is a major barrier to positive change in the field of 
mental health (2003). Feldman calls for discipline-less, evidence-based curriculum in 
which professionals earn degrees in mental health cre and yet can still specialize within 
it (2003). His book was one of few studies that even addressed the research-theory gap in 
science and practice on mental health and the role that the proliferation of separate 
disciplines, models and therapeutic approaches plays. M  study also addresses the 
research-theory gap and interdisciplinarity of adolescent mental health services. 
Some research has focused on how the field of childhoo  and adolescent mental 
health services can make quality improvements to the multiple existing service systems in 
order to tackle the gap between knowledge and practice. One recommendation is that in 
order to identify targets for change in mental health service systems, we need a better 
understanding of both effective and current routine clinical practices (Garland, Bickman 
and Chorpita 2010). They claim there is a dearth of research on routine or “usual care” of 
childhood and adolescent mental health providers, and that psychotherapeutic practice in 
particular is a “black box” (Garland, Bickman and Chorpita 2010).  
Sexton and Kelley (2010) argue that the field of mental health can better transfer 




relevance of different types of treatment evidence, (2) identification of the core 
mechanisms of change implicated in various therapeutic practices, and (3) a 
reconceptualization of what Evidence Based Practices (EBPs), means. 
Like this research, my study examines the gaps between the scientific research 
and clinical practice communities (social worlds) in their definitions and approaches to 
adolescent mental health and illness. Also, my study focuses on gaining a better 
understanding of the current state of adolescent meal health services from practitioners 
themselves. Opening the “black box” of adolescent psychotherapeutic practice – the 
models or mechanisms of change and multiple approaches to intervention and contexts of 
routine care – is at the heart of this dissertation. My interview data speak to the 
perceptions practitioners have of Evidence Based Practices (EBPs) and reveals how 
practitioners’ real-world expertise with diverse thrapeutic practices and populations has 
much to contribute to contemporary debates about problems of the mental health 
workforce, organizational contexts of care and the research-clinician gap in EBPs. 
Political Economy of Mental Health Care in the U.S., 1980-Present 
All health and illness is shaped by historical context and culture. In order to 
understand contemporary definitions and responses to adolescent mental health and 
illness, it is critical to understand the larger social currents that shape the systems and 
contexts in which mental health care is delivered an  received. A growing set of 
contradictions and paradoxical social currents regarding the framing of and response to 
mental health and illness has developed within the U.S. across the past few decades. 
These discordant trends are interrelated and complex, but also serve as threads that tie 




There are a number of different but interrelated political, economic and social 
forces that colluded in the 1980s and since in shifting societal definitions and responses 
to mental health and illness. These forces have created the contemporary 
incommensurability between biomedical and psychosocial paradigms of mental health 
and illness. Noteworthy transformations in the United States health care system in the 
past few decades include the close of the deinstitutionalization movement, the rise of 
managed care organizations, the biomedicalization and commodification of health care, 
advances in technical and technological apparatuses and ervices, increasing disparities in 
access to and quality of health care services across the population, declining trust in and 
power of physicians, a consumer movement that has resulted in more active and 
knowledgeable health care patients and a blurring between public-private health 
distinctions (Cook and Wright 1995; Rosich and Hankin 2010; Stevens 2007).  
I provide historical context through a review of the political economy from 1980 
to the present in order to set the stage for my analysis of the contemporary arena of 
adolescent mental health care in the U.S. in the 21st century. My dissertation situates 
adolescent mental health and illness in historical context by focusing on the significant 
shifts that have occurred since 1980. First, the 1980s marked a major shift in the way 
mental health care was delivered from primarily institutional or in-patient contexts of 
care to ideals of assertive community treatment (out-patient care), and the ensuing 
emergence of managed care. Second, 1980 was the year the American Psychiatric 
Association published the DSM III, which dramatically changed the entire ethos of 
mental health and illness in society. Third, not only was there a paradigm shift in the 




a simultaneous paradigm shift in the larger political economy of society. This was an 
ideological shift from social welfare as a national and community obligation to neoliberal 
ideals of individualism. Other important societal shifts that occurred include the 
pharmaceutical revolution, insurance policies requiring diagnostic codes for 
reimbursement for mental health treatment, dramatic shifts in the funding policies of 
mental health research at major research sites such as the National Institute of Mental 
Health, and finally, the increasing attention paid to adolescent mental disorders in the 
DSM and across the larger scientific, governmental and industry communities.  
Paradigms of Mental Health and Illness: The Rise of Biopsychiatry 
There has been a dramatic shift in attitudes towards nd culture of mental health and 
illness in this country. It is now common sense or taken for granted knowledge that 
mental illness is caused by a chemical imbalance or brain disease. Only a few decades 
ago, it was common sense that mental illness was a psychosocial phenomena rooted in 
family origin, childhood and adolescent experiences, dy functional relationships and/or 
unconscious repression. Medical historian Matthew Smith received a call for papers for a 
conference billed as the first ever conference in the U.S. on the “Social Determinants of 
Mental Health,” scheduled for June 3-4, 2010 in Chicago. In a paper published later on 
the impact medical historians can make in which he details his experience of the 
conference he writes: 
I re-read the blurb again, and the phrase about the conference being the first such 
convened in the United States. Hold on, I thought, that’s not right. Maybe it was the first 
such conference convened in years, decades even, but it was certainly not the first in any 
historical sense. Social psychiatry had been a major force in inter- and post-war 
American psychiatry, threatening to supersede both psychoanalysis and biological 
psychiatry if President Kennedy’s 1963 ‘Message to Congress on Mental Illness and 




forgotten, monographs had been written about social psychiatry. . . Perhaps no 
psychiatrist had uttered the phrase social psychiatry in 30 years, but that didn’t mean that 
its history should be forgotten, particularly now, given its apparent resurgence. (Smith 
2011:144)6 
Smith’s (2011) account shows that even among contemporary professionals committed to 
hosting a conference with the intention of facilitating action on the social determinants of 
mental health, the not too distant history of psychosocial and psychodynamic professional 
dominance has receded from view. Smith’s narrative meaningfully demonstrates that 
historical context is more important than ever during a time of discordant paradigms of 
mental illness, especially because “perhaps the history of how social psychiatry fared in 
the past could help its advocates be more successful today” (Smith 2011:145).  
While the first biological theory of psychiatric disorder was published in 1965, it 
wasn’t until the 1980s that a consolidation of several forces led to the triumph of 
biological and displacement of psychoanalytic and psychosocial explanations of mental 
health and illness. “Biological psychiatry’s dominance of the profession t day belies the 
interdisciplinary competition that raged during the 1960s between it, social psychiatry 
and psychoanalysis” (Smith 2008:544).  
Prior to WWII, several different models of mental illness were influential but 
following WWII, psychoanalytic and psychosocial models preeminently guided social 
and professional definitions and responses to mental health and illness (Menninger 1948; 
Pearlin, Avison & Fazio 2007; Wilson 1993). In fact, WWII is commonly cited as a key 
historical event that sparked the integration of disparate theories and approaches to 
mental illness into a larger psychosocial paradigm (Wilson 1993). “The fundamental 
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assumptions of the psychosocial model were given compelling legitimacy by American 
psychiatric experience in WWII. Human exposure to combat situation was the clearest 
and most telling instance of what Karl Menninger called the “personality-environmental 
struggle” (Wilson 1993:400).  The 1950s and 1960s represent a time of theoretical and 
empirical pluralism with regards to scientific studies of mental health and illness. During 
the 1960s, psychoanalysis was beginning to be question d, yet at the time, the majority of 
journal editors, department chairs and professional leaders were psychoanalytically 
trained (Smith 2008). “By the 1970s, psychoanalysis seemed anachronistic in an
American society that consistently looked to technology to solve its problems” (Smith 
2008:551).  
Each paradigm or model of mental health and illness has its own definition, 
attribution and approach to diagnosis and therapeutic intervention. In addition, every 
theoretical model or paradigm of thinking comes with its own set of tenets and 
assumptions that may shift based on context of use, but are discernible from contrasting 
models and paradigms. Models of illness are a defining feature not only of approach to 
diagnosis and goals of therapeutic treatment, but of the different types of mental health 
professionals and their diverse educational and training backgrounds (Luhrmann 2000).  
A psychoanalytic model of illness largely follows theoretical insights of Sigmund 
Freud. However, psychoanalysis, like most sub-disciplines of thought, is eclectic and 
while significantly shaped by Freud and depth or psychodynamic psychology, is equally 
shaped by early theorists who deviated from Freud such as Jung, Adler and Reich 




Biological models of mental health and illness are dominant today, but several 
disciplinary backgrounds of the mental health professions continue to be 
psychoanalytical, psychosocial and psychotherapeutic in focus. The following 
assumptions are embedded in a psychosocial framework of mental health and illness (1) 
mental health and illness is a fluid boundary –individuals who are healthy mentally can 
become ill if exposed to enough negative life events or a trauma; (2) mental illness is a 
continuous phenomena – there exist a wide range of experiences of mental health and 
illness, from mild disturbance to extreme psychosis; (3) multicausality – mental illness is 
caused by an interaction of a noxious environment and psychic conflict; and (4) 
manifestation of mental illness is personally mediated – the mechanisms through which 
mental illness presents itself is mediated psychologically (Wilson 1993: 400). Evidence 
of the dominance of the psychosocial model is found in the first publication of the DSM-I 
in 1951, “in which all “functional” psychiatric diagnoses were characterized as 
“reactions”” (Wilson 1993:401).  
Whereas psychoanalytic orientations focus on the connections between one’s past 
and current psychological problems, biopsychiatry locates the cause of mental illness 
within the biological substrata of the body, specifically, the brain (Pearlin, Avison & 
Fazio 2007). Less than 50 years ago, psychosocial etiologies of mental health and illness 
were dominant and biological theories of mental illness hadn’t even emerged in the 
professional literature yet. In the 1940s and 1950s, the demand for psychoanalytic 
psychiatric treatment in the U.S. expanded and the term psychiatrist became synonymous 
with psychoanalyst in the public imaginary (Barber 2008). In 1961, the Atlantic did a 




on medicine and academic departments but the arts, entertainment, family, child 
socialization and other normative spheres of daily interaction (see Barber 2008:74).   
Dynamic psychiatry found common sources for both neurotic and normal traits in the 
persisting unconscious influences of repressed chilhood emotions and experiences. This 
blurred the boundary between ordinary and pathological conditions, greatly expanding 
the range of behaviors the mental health profession might treat. (Horwitz 2002:1) 
In the 1960s and 1970s, psychodynamic or psychoanalytic psychiatry continued to 
dominate the mental health profession. Charles Barber (2008) argues that the fall of 
psychoanalytic and triumph of biopsychiatric theoris can be boiled down to two major 
developments: the discovery of drugs that work (for some people), and brain imaging. 
Similarly, neuropsychiatrist Nancy Andreasen argues that the “scientific study of mental 
illnesses is now occurring in the era of the genome and the golden age of neuroscience. 
The powerful tools of molecular genetics, molecular biology, neurobiology, and 
Neuroimaging have only been used to understand the causes of mental illnesses for a few 
years” (Andreasen 2001:x-xi).  
While Andreasen frames her book Brave New Brain: Conquering Mental Illness 
in the Era of the Genome in the spirit of both a warning and a hope; she warns that 
society should not lose the human face of psychiatry and must recognize the perils of 
false dichotomies such as mind vs. body and gene vs. n ironment, she also frames her 
book out of hope. She hopes that in the near future, with the tools of molecular biology, 
genetics, neuroscience and neuroimaging, our society w ll be able to build a brave new 
brain (2001:4).  Andreasen was and is not alone in her spirit of hope for the capability 
that biological, genetic, neurological fields of sciences and technologies will be able to 




and the former President George Bush labeled the 1990s as “The Decade of the Brain.” 
This proclamation was in response to a larger politica  and economic effort of the Library 
of Congress, the National Institutes of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health “to 
enhance public awareness of the benefits to be derived from brain research” 
(Goldstein1994; Jones 1999).  
The biopsychiatric paradigm of mental illness posits that mental disorders are the 
cause of biochemical imbalance or dysfunction in the brain and its circuits. “Biological 
models seek the primary causes of mental diseases in genetic and biochemical factors 
and so locate the pathological qualities of psychological conditions in the physical 
properties of brains, not in the symbolic systems of minds” (Horwitz 2002:3). Attempts to 
find the biological basis of mental processes in the brain is now widely understood as the 
biopsychiatric understanding of mental illness. 
The emergence of U.S. biopsychiatry in the last deca s of the twentieth century signals 
the consolidation of one particular mass approach to problems of psychic distress. . . . 
biopsychiatry had become all but inseparable from the funding and financial structures, 
research agendas, advertising and marketing campaigns, globalizing ambitions of the 
transnational pharmaceutical industry. (Orr 2010:354) 
In the next few sections, I focus on contextualizing how the larger political and economic 
environment in U.S. society, social processes of prfessionalization, the publication of 
the DSM-III in 1980, the pharmaceutical revolution, the rise of neoliberal ideologies and 
governance, and research and insurance company finacing have each played and 
continue to play a dynamic role in the dominance of bi psychiatric definitions and 




The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Disorders (DSM) 
The DSM-III published in 1980 largely solidified a turn to biological psychiatry that has 
taken off and become legitimated in the institutional knowledges and practices of 
scientific professions, government and research agencies, and the consciousness of public 
communities in the U.S. After an anti-psychiatry backl sh during the 1960s and 1970s 
wherein psychiatric asylums and treatments were exposed as inhumane and unscientific, 
the profession of psychiatry needed to re-establish itself as a medical specialty based on 
science. The development of the DSM-III was an attempt d solution to the intensifying 
crisis of legitimacy suffered by the profession of psychiatry in the 1970s.  
In order to understand why psychiatry repositioned its’ professional boundaries 
along a medical axis it’s important to understand the criticisms lodged during the 60s and 
70s. The psychosocial and psychodynamic models of pychiatry increasingly became a 
focus of attacks from within and outside the profession throughout the 60s. Within the 
profession, biologically oriented psychiatrists critiqued the lack of research progress 
generated by the psychosocial model and called for a return to a medical model of 
psychopathology (Wilson 1993). Psychiatry was attacked by professional outsiders on the 
basis that if mental illness is psychosocial, than psychiatric problems are social, political 
and legal rather than psychiatric (Wilson 1993). Thus, across the 1970s, jurisdictional 
disputes within the psychiatric profession occurred over a rising struggle to redefine their 
work activities and expertise as based in medical science.  
In addition to professional boundary-work, in the 1970s, psychiatry was 
practicing in a context of decreased funding for research and clinical practice via federal 




As a response, the profession of American Psychiatry inc easingly became interested in 
issues of diagnostic reliability, reimbursement for clinical services and treatment 
outcomes (Wilson 1993). The DSM-III became a strategic technological apparatus of 
professional jurisdiction for the American Psychiatric Association (APA) that 
transformed not only the profession of psychiatry, but the entire field of mental health 
(Kutchins and Kirk 1997). 
The psychiatric profession presented the DSM-III as a neutral guide based on 
scientific evidence rather than social values. However, in two different books that 
examine the social processes involved in the making and remaking of versions of the 
DSM across time, Kutchins and Kirk show that political and personal negotiation, 
advocacy and interest play equally significant roles as do the fragility of the science that 
informs these processes (1992; 1997). While American Psychiatry was transformed 
because of multiple internal and external forces, and through several on-going political 
negotiations, much of the transformation can be traced back to one man, the elite group 
of colleagues he handpicked for the DSM-III task force, and the first meeting convened 
by this small group of like-minded biomedical research analysts in which a set of guiding 
principles for the DSM-III and the future of psychiatry (and unfortunately, the entire field 
of mental health) was decided (see Wilson 1993).  
Robert Spitzer was a leading character in transforming the DSM manual in the 
1970s from a spiral notebook of about 150 pages to the almost 500 page DSM-III in 
1980. The DSM-III became regarded as a scientific instrument carrying a significant 
degree of cultural authority (Spiegel 2005). Spitzer had devoted his career to the 




development of the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Wilson 1993). Since a primary 
goal of those in the ranks of the psychiatric profession was to improve diagnostic 
reliability through the DSM-III, Spitzer was chosen as task force chairman. While during 
the 60s the majority of psychiatric research and writing focused on clinical work, 
psychoanalysis and social psychiatry, a research group at Washington University had 
been developing descriptive, rational rule-driven diagnostic criteria with the goal of 
inventing a reliable assessment tool (Wilson 1993). This group published what became 
known as the “Feighner criteria.” Their paper was the most cited in the psychiatric 
literature through the 70s and 80s (Wilson 1993). The fact that this paper was so popular 
is, in itself, evidence of the fall of the psychodynamic model of illness as the dominant 
model because psychodynamic and psychosocial approaches to mental illness exclusively 
focused on the meaning behind symptoms and disregard d diagnostic criteria and the 
diagnostic label itself as a key aspect of therapeutic practice.  
Spitzer collaborated with this Washington research group on the RDC that was 
published in 1975. As the chairman of the DSM-III task force, Spitzer handpicked other 
psychiatrists that like him, embraced biomedical research and rejected the 
psychodynamic model. Half of the psychiatrists he appointed to the task-force had 
current or past affiliation with the Washington University research group (Wilson 1993). 
By the close of their first task force meeting, this small group of like-minded psychiatrists 
traded the psychodynamic clinical couch for a biomedical laboratory. During the first 
meeting, these scientists came to consensus on three guiding principles: 1) that etiology 
would be removed from a classificatory principle since it was unknown; 2) that the DSM-




enhance reliability, the manual would be descriptive and emphasize visible symptoms 
(Wilson 1993).  
Each of these guiding principles would become the focus of social controversy 
during the revision process, but Spitzer was adept at quelling protestors and criticism 
from the start.7 After hearing several criticisms of the significant transformations the 
small group of psychiatrists on the task-force were single-handedly making for the 
profession, the APA appointed a Liaison Committee, who proceeded to attack each of the 
guiding principles of the task force (Wilson 1993). For example, the Liaison Committee 
questioned the removal of etiological understandings of illness, claimed the task force 
had been ignoring evidence presented in the literature regarding clinical practice, and 
noted the key distinction between a classification system and diagnostic manual.  
A classification system is used for research purposes and the gathering of aggregate data; 
a diagnostic manual should aid in the understanding of psychiatric disorders and their 
treatment. Because DSM-III would have a strictly behavioral orientation and make little 
attempt to relate the syndromes it described to etiology or treatment, its relevance to 
clinical work would be minimal. (Wilson 1993:406) 
The underlying goal of Spitzer and the 25 committees h  established to create 
descriptions of mental disorders was to turn the DSM into a manual that followed 
scientific evidence and addressed problems of reliability. Reliability refers to the 
likelihood that different practitioners using the same manual and seeing the same patient 
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 While Spitzer would often make recommendations under a veil of compromise in order to silence 
protestors, several of the recommendations were never adopted. One such example is the companion 
manual to the DSM that was to focus on models of illness and approaches to treatment. This manual 
called Project Flower; was supposed to include chapters about each of the major types of psychiatric 
models or therapeutics. This planned manual was the result of conflict between research and clinical 
interests, especially between psychoanalysts and the rising biomedical investigators that championed the 
new DSM-III. While the dedicated work on the manual had started by 1978, it was never finished, and 





will arrive at a similar diagnosis. The problem, argues Spiegel (2005), is that the 
scientific studies hadn’t been conducted yet. Further, while the introduction of the DSM-
III made claims of being more scientific in comparison to earlier versions – i.e., that it 
enhanced diagnostic reliability, it also included the following disclaimer: 
It should be understood, however, that for most of the categories the diagnostic criteria 
are based on clinical judgment, and have not yet ben fully validated by data about such 
important correlates as clinical course, outcome, family history, and treatment response. 
Undoubtedly, with further study the criteria for many of the categories will be revised. 
(DSM-III: 8)  
However, in the DSM-IV, the admonition that the diagnostic criteria were largely 
based on clinical judgment and had yet to be validated by scientific evidence was 
removed, instead adding a “cautionary statement” that claimed the diagnostic criteria 
were based on knowledge and consensus in their evolving field (Kutchins and Kirk 
1997). This seems problematic because studies have shown that neither the DSM-III nor 
more recent editions have greatly improved and by no means solved issues of reliability. 
Further, while the makers of the DSM-III took an approach of inclusivity- including any 
set of symptoms (as disorder) that had been observed by psychiatric professionals, DSM-
IV makers adopted the approach that nothing gets changed, added or deleted unless 
strong scientific basis existed for doing so, thereby solidifying what had made it in to the 
DSM-III as the scientific foundation (Kutchins and Kirk 1997).  
So what are the key elements that made the DSM-III revolutionary for scientific 
and professional social worlds as well as the larger societal culture of health and illness? 
A quick laundry list of key changes include the ways in which the DSM-III refashioned 
the language of psychiatry (from psychosocial and psychoanalytic to a medical 




biological approach towards diagnosis, added several disorder categories, expanded every 
section of the manual with the greatest expansion among childhood and adolescent 
disorders, removed homosexuality as a disorder fromthe manual, made claims for being 
scientific and increasing diagnostic reliability and added a list of necessary criteria 
(symptom checklist) required for diagnosis (Kutchins and Kirk 1997). Each of these 
changes has made a significant, lasting impact not o ly on the mental health profession, 
but on the social framing and response to mental health in general and adolescent mental 
health in particular.   
Thus, American Psychiatry was a profession in crisis that sought to strategically 
reposition themselves as a medical science through the standardization and 
operationalization of symptom-based diagnostic categori s (Orr 2010; Whooley 2010). 
They imported a medicalized framework organized around specific disease entities to 
formulate the basic nature, causes and treatment of disturbed behaviors. The fundamental 
premise of the DSM-III was that different clusters of symptoms indicated distinct 
underlying diseases such as schizophrenia, depression, panic disorder or substance abuse. 
(Horwitz 2002: 2) 
In effect, the new framework of the DSM-III introduced an epistemic order of diagnosis 
that posited mental disorders are discrete, biological phenomena (Orr 2010).  This new 
order transformed diagnostic practice from professional interpretation and experienced 
judgment to a formulaic performance of matching symptoms to descriptive checklists, 
thereby devaluing the therapeutic relationship (Orr 2010). Orr labels this reformulation 
work the informatics of diagnosis and explains that based on the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria institutionalized in the DSM-III; professional background training, treatment 
orientations and clinical experience are replaced with performances that mirror computer 




In addition to refashioning the epistemic language nd structure of diagnostic 
practice, the DSM-III created a manual of codes that were soon adopted by managed care 
insurance companies and lists of symptoms that later were used by pharmaceutical 
companies to advertise medications for potential disor ers.  
The widespread adoption of the DSM by researchers, insurance companies, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and other mental health professions represents a validation 
of psychiatry’s claim to expertise. DSM codes organize the institutional infrastructure of 
the mental health field as they are required for insurance reimbursement, hospital 
admittance, psychiatric research and professional exams. The ascendancy of the DSM has 
facilitated the proliferation of pharmaceuticals in the treatment of mental illness (Rose 
2004), the new big business of these drugs (Healy 1997) and the increased presence of 
managed care. (Whooley 2010: 453).8 
Whooley demonstrates the negative unintended consequences the DSM has had for 
psychiatric professionals’ clinical practice through the adoption of the DSM by the for-
profit industries of managed care insurance and pharmaceutical companies alike.  
 In addition to the profession of psychiatry, the pharmaceutical profession had and 
continues to have a significant stake in the language and structure of diagnosis and 
treatment of mental illness. The emergence and increased popularity of biological 
psychiatry and its reliance on pharmaceutical therapy has benefited both professions, but 
their allegiance has been rightly interpreted as one of a number of adaptations to the 
changing political economy, namely, the requirement by the managed care enterprise that 
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 Whooley (2010) demonstrates that the institutionalization of the DSM has actually led to negative 
unintended consequences for psychiatrists in clinical practice, especially their professional autonomy, and 
as a result, psychiatrists employ strategies to retain discretion in their daily work practices. As Whooley 
(2010) argues, in previous research the DSM has too often been presented as a monolithic artifact rather 
than a tool used in a variety of ways by clinical practitioners. This dissertation examines the ways in which 
non-psychiatric mental health professionals, those least likely professionally socialized and trained 
through the dominant biomedical approach to therapeutic intervention to reveal the ways the DSM as 





treatment for mental illness and its compensation depend on diagnostically specific 
ailments (Pearlin, Avison & Fazio 2007).  
The Pharmaceutical Revolution and the Rise of Corporate Psychiatry 
While the first antipsychotic drug, Chlorpromazine, was discovered in 1952 and the first 
antidepressant drug, Imipramine, in 1957, the psychotropic medication boom began in 
1980s with the development of the “new” antidepressant  known as Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) (Horwitz 2002:187). “The initial tremors of Corporate 
Psychiatry were felt in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, when Valium became the top-
selling drug in America, but this was just a flirtation compared to what was to come 
later. Corporate Psychiatry began in earnest in 1988 with the introduction of Prozac” 
(Barber 2008:61). In his investigation of the history f psychiatry and psychiatric drugs, 
Barber describes how the effects of Valium were historic because earlier drugs like 
Haldol, Thorazine and Lithium were taken exclusively in asylums or hospitals, but 
Valium was prescribed for all sorts of people to enhance their productivity and ability to 
function occupationally and socially (Barber 2008:26-27). You didn’t have to be severely 
mentally ill to take Valium, marking a major cognitive shift in professional and public 
thinking about both mental illness and psychiatric d ugs.  
This shift in the ideal user of pharmaceuticals for mental problems from the 
severely ill to anyone suffering any number of broadly defined symptoms of depression 
or anxiety massively expanded the market for psychiatric drugs. While some of this shift 
had to do with the rise in biological psychiatry and the compulsion by managed care for 
psychiatrists to demonstrate specific disorders, symptoms and treatment for 




colluded in expanding pharmaceutical markets. Whatever the direct and indirect cause, 
there is no denying the revolutionary impact the pharmaceutical industry had on 
healthcare in society in less than a decade. In the transition from the 20th into the 21st 
century, Big Pharma did more than climb to the top of the fortune 500 – they reaped 
profit margins higher than all of the other companies combined (Barber 2008). “. . . 
antidepressants have been the most profitable product in the most profitable industry in 
the most profitable country in the world” (Barber 2008:24).    
Within specialized psychiatric practice alone, between 1985 and 1994 the number of 
visits where an antidepressant was prescribed nearly tripled, from 4.2 million to 11 
million visits (see Olfson et al. 1998). These antidepressants penetrated not only 
psychiatric and medical practice but also popular culture and everyday discourse, most 
notably through Peter Kramer’s best-selling Listening to Prozac (Kramer 1993) (Horwitz 
2002:187). 
According to national estimates, antidepressant use incr ased 73.4 percent 
between 1990 and 1995, with the majority of this increase coming from prescriptions of 
SSRI’s (Sleath and Shih 2003).9  On average, between 1998 and 2002, antidepressant 
prescription among children increased 9.2 percent each year and even more importantly, 
the largest year-to-year increase was from 2001 to 2002 at 16 percent (Delate et al. 2004).   
The pharmaceutical revolution refers to how increases in pharmaceutical 
advertising and prescription rates has significantly impacted cultural understandings of 
where mental illness comes from and how the “problem” can be fixed. Biological, 
genetic and pharmaceutical framings of mental healt and illness are evidenced in “t-
shirts and greeting cards and one-liners about medication for a psychiatric disorder (e.g. 
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 A similar estimate found that between 1990 and 1996, the total number of SSRI prescriptions for 
children and adolescents increased by 69 percent (Shiremen, Olson & Dewan 2002).  Finally, a study that 
evaluated almost a million Medicaid and HMO youths concluded that child and adolescent psychotropic 




“Don’ Worry, Take Prozac”) all suggest that the biological revolution has become 
entrenched” (Schwartz and Corcoran 2010:65). Mental health and ill ess in 
contemporary U.S. society are culturally defined in biological and genetic terms, mental 
illness is socially framed as a brain disease and pharmaceutical medication is slotted as 
the right treatment for the job. 
The sharp rise in pharmaceutical prescriptions and antidepressants treatment 
coincides with political and economic trends of neoliberalism. Neoliberal policies in the 
late 1970s were designed to facilitate corporate expansion, privatization of social services 
and deregulation of markets (Moncrieff 2006). The model of distress underlying the 
promotion of psychiatric drugs is useful to neoliberal policies and the languages and 
practices (discourse) of neoliberal ideology encourages U.S. citizens to see ourselves in 
biomedical, genetic, neurological or even molecular terms (Pitts-Taylor 2010). Thus, the 
transitioning biopolitical economy in the late 70s and across the 80s and 90s not only 
restructured the political and economic institutions such as the government and the U.S. 
workforce (wages and employment), but all social institutions, knowledges and practices, 
including those shaping and shaped by health care. 
Neoliberalism 
Beginning in the late 1970s and strengthening through t the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan, a new pro-business activism and ethic seized the primary institutions within the 
U.S. (Duggan 2003).  
This pro-business activism became the foundation for late 20th century neoliberalism, and 
it was built on earlier conservative activism. Neoliberalism developed over many decades 
as a mode of polemic aimed at dismantling the limited US welfare state, in order to 
enhance corporate profit rates. The rising of profit ates required money be diverted from 




supporting political culture, compliant constituencies and amenable social relations. Pro-
business activism in the 1970s was built on and further developed a wide-ranging 
political and cultural project – the reconstruction of the everyday life of capitalism, in 
ways supportive of upward redistribution of a range of resources, and tolerant of 
widening inequalities of many kinds. (Duggan 2003:xi) 
Neoliberalism refers to a theory of political economic practices and thinking that 
posits that social well-being is best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills (Harvey 2005). Neoliberal policies and practices have deceptively 
constructed economic policy as a matter of neutral, technical expertise that has nothing to 
do with politics or culture, thereby shielding its policies and practices from political 
accountability or cultural critique (Duggan 2003; Moncrieff 2006). However, any good 
analysis will show that the political economy does not operate separately from other 
social institutions in society. Economic goals are embedded in and formulated through 
political and cultural meanings that shape social organization and cultural context 
(Duggan 2003).  
There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic 
practices and thinking since the 1970s. Deregulation, privatization and withdrawal of the 
state from many areas of social provision has becom the norm. Almost all states have 
embraced some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and 
practices accordingly. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it 
has become incorporated into the common-sense way man of us interpret, live in and 
understand the world. The process of neoliberalization has entailed much creative 
destruction of prior institutional frameworks and powers and has challenged divisions of 
labor, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, 
reproductive activities, attachments to the land an habits of the heart. (Harvey 2005:3).  
Within healthcare in general, and mental health care in particular, neoliberalism meant 
privatization of health care, a shift to mental health policies being driven by fiscal rather 
than social goals, and rising profitable industries such as the insurance and 




National Governance of Mental Health Research Funding  
In alignment with the rise in a neoliberal ethic of individualism throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, sources of research funding for mental healt and illness such as the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH)  increasingly 
shut out investigations of the social conditions and causes of mental health and illness 
and instead, increasingly embraced the disciplines and methods of biology, neuroscience 
and genetic mapping as the right way to investigate mental illnesses (Orr 2010; Pilecki et 
al. 2011; Schooler 2007). In a chapter dedicated to the history of the Laboratory of 
Socioenvironmental Studies (LSES) of the Intramural Research Program (IRP) at NIMH, 
Carmi Schooler (2007) provides evidence of how the changing currents of scientific and 
medical knowledges and practices significantly restructured government financing of 
mental health research.  
Several classic sociological studies of mental healt  were researched and written 
during the 1950s and 1960s and a noticeable proporti n of the sociologists were at one 
time associated with the LSES at the NIMH, including John Clausen, Melvin Kohn, 
Morris Rosenberg, Leonard Pearlin and Erving Goffman. However, after Melvin Kohn 
left LSES in 1985, the laboratory was reduced to section status with a significantly 
reduced budget and labor force (Schooler 2007). Further, Schooler (2007) fears his own 
departure (retirement), will bring a presence of social science in NIMH intramural 
program to a close. Not only have sociologists suffered dramatic reductions in funding 
and number of appointments within the NIH and NIMH across the past few decades, but 
anthropologists and psychologists that are not biomedically oriented are also near NIMH 




In the early days of the intramural research program – from the mid 1950s to mid 1970s – 
the Laboratory of Psychology, which was dedicated to studying both normal and 
abnormal adult human psychology, was notably larger than the Laboratory of 
Socioenvironmental Studies and contained a similar proportion of quite notable 
researchers. Its remnants are also pretty much reduced to one researcher and supporting 
staff. The Laboratory of Developmental Psychology, which can be said to have played an 
equally illustrious role in the study of the psychological development of children, is gone, 
without leaving a trace. Today the Intramural Program can be fairly characterized as 
highly disease oriented, biologized, and reductionist- in the sense of seeing human 
behavior – both healthy and non-healthy—as essentially being determined by interrelated 
biological, biochemical and genetic processes. (Schooler 2007:57) 
Following Schooler’s (Schooler 2007) recommendations, one easy way to understand the 
contemporary scientific financial and social value structure is to examine the listing of 
research units listed on the public website. Even a quick glance at the list of IRP research 
program titles demonstrates the disinterest or even disdain the NIMH has towards 
investigations of how the social environment affects mental health and illness. Another 
researcher found evidence for a medical model bias of the NIMH by examining the 
information they provide for the public on various mental disorders and their possible 
treatments.  
For Obsessive Compulsive Disorders (OCD), one common ental illness, the treatment 
recommendations that were published in early 2009 focused on various 
psychopharmacological medicines and only mentioned th rapy as a secondary 
suggestion.  . . Several prominent OCD researchers, including one author of this article, 
submitted a response to NIMH stating that such treatm nt recommendations are 
misleading and not based on a totality of relevant evidence. Essentially, medication was 
emphasized over cognitive-behavioral interventions, which have been shown to be at 
least as efficacious. . . . It is hard to explain why a drug-based model of OCD is being 
favored despite clear evidence that other models of explanation and treatment may do just 
as well, or even better, in predicting treatment outc mes. . . . This oversight by the NIMH 
is not out of character with the organization’s general preference for a biological model 
of mental illness, to the exclusion of other ways of conceptualizing psychiatric disorders. 
(Pilecki et al 2011:198). 
In contrast to the past few decades in which governm ntal organizations and 




Schooler (2007) argues that in the 1960s and 1970s the NIH and NIMH was not only 
open to social science research programs, but even appointed directors with sociological 
and social psychological backgrounds. Schooler (2007:60) points to multiple causes  for 
the decline in funding and valuing social science within the NIMH the past few decades: 
1) the value system that underlies the prestige hierarchy within the sciences such that the 
more micro the phenomena under investigation, the higher level of esteem attributed; 2) 
the perceived successes of methodologies of studying m cro level phenomena such as 
brain imaging; and 3) the increasing influence of corporations and lobbying groups that 
steer funding towards research on finding cures for pecific diseases.  
Deinstitutionalization  
Massive deinstitutionalization occurred during the 1960s and 70s as a result of 
sociological, pharmacological, administrative and legal factors (Thornicroft and Tansella 
2009). In the decades that have passed since deinstitutionalization, health analysts have 
largely come to agree it was one of the worst impleented policies of health care in the 
history of the U.S. Deinstitutionalization was in fact largely motivated by the critiques of 
the ill effects institutions had on patient residents such as from Erving Goffman’s study 
Asylums (1959).  Inappropriate mental hospital admissions were another significant 
concern with researchers such as Wing and Brown (1970) demonstrating the strong 
association between the poverty of patients and their lik lihood of being institutionalized. 
However, in addition to these critiques, innovations i  patient care such as day hospitals, 
half way houses, therapeutic communities and antipsychotic drugs enabled communities 
to care for patients with mental illness (Thornicroft and Tansella 2009). The problem 




community support systems – was not fully established or maintained to the degree 
necessary, especially for persons suffering from severe mental illness (Thornicroft and 
Tansella 2009).   
The Rise of Managed Care and Complex Health Corporations 
The emergence, rise and dominance of managed care structures and strategies designed to 
reform the financing of health care has drastically ltered the U.S. health landscape. 
Managed Care (MC) emerged in the 1980s as a response t  declining government support 
for public sector health care and the soaring costs f p ychosocial and substance abuse 
treatments in the private sector (Frank, Salkever, and Sharfstein 1991; Scheid 2003). 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) 
and other group insurance entities were established and have multiplied as have their 
strategies of external and internal reviews that dictate the type and intensity of treatment 
services (Manderscheid and Henderson 1996; Manderscheid, Henderson, Witkin, and 
Atay 2000).  
In addition to controlling costs by limiting access to services, MC companies 
changed the financial structure from the traditional fee-for-service payments to one in 
which providers are paid a set capitation fee based on a specified range of services 
(treatments deemed most effective) for a predetermined length of time (Mechanic 1999). 
Capitation fees are significantly lower in comparison to traditional fee-for-service (30% 
lower according to one estimate) (Moffic 1997).  
Other predominant strategies of cost-containment include: gatekeeping, 
precertification, case management, and measureable outcomes. Gatekeeping requires 




requires that services be authorized before they can be provided to clients. Concurrent 
review or case management involves insurance companies scrutinizing client cases, 
documentation of treatment services and evaluation of treatment outcomes of providers 
on a regular or on-going basis. Further, managed care corporations emphasize 
measureable outcomes and require patients fulfill a criteria of ‘medical necessity,’ which 
facilitates denials of reimbursement claims. Often these denials are for therapies that have 
yet to be proven efficacious or are for some reason, devalued Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM) disorder diagnoses (Mechanic 1999; Scheid 2000).  
While MC organizations started out primarily in the private health insurance 
market, over time, they have moved to the public, state and federal market sectors, 
including Medicaid and Medicare. The effects of MC on the quality and quantity of 
mental health services is just beginning to be studied for different types of services and 
populations, but the hallmark change is a decline of inpatient care and increase in 
outpatient care.  
Before reviewing some of the key critiques of managed care, it’s important to 
note that the prior mental health system had its own flaws.  
Patients often lacked access to needed services and commonly received inappropriate 
care. Patients were put into long term therapies without a clear treatment plan or focused 
objectives. There were few clear treatment standards n  therapy was commonly 
determined more by clinicians’ preferences than by evidence. . . The overall system was 
characterized by fragmentation, important gaps in services and little coordination. 
(Mechanic 1997:45) 
 
In comparison to the previous health landscape, advocates argued MC would improve 
mental health services by increasing effective use of economic resources and holding 
mental health providers accountable to high standards of care and improved treatment 




Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) E. Clarke Ross, examined the application of 
managed mental health care in the public sector and co cluded: 
 . . . other than constraining costs, most managed behavioral health programs have not 
lived up to their promises. . . In poorly performing public managed care systems, often 
the managed care vendor lacks a social commitment because of primary obligations to 
private shareholders or the bottom line [which contribu es to the] problems faced by 
consumers, families and enrollees. (Ross 2000:9) 
 
Thus, the primary criticism of MC is that it undermines social justice through its 
commodification of health and in the process, demoralizes professional ethics (Scheid 
2004). In two articles and a book titled Tie a Knot and Hang On: Providing Mental 
Health Care in a Turbulent Environment, medical sociologist Teresa L. Scheid 
illuminates the ways in which managed care practices threaten professional logics of 
health care, autonomy and ethics (Scheid 2004, 2003, 2000). Scheid conducted 
qualitative interviews and survey questionnaires with mental health providers who 
worked in both private and public sectors for a deca . She argues that managed care 
significantly altered the paradigm operating in the health landscape from one based on 
professional ethics and commitment to community care to one of technical rationality and 
bureaucratic control (Scheid 2004, 2003, 2000). “Providers at CARE felt they were not 
able to provide the treatment or services they believ d their clients needed, and they have 
raised serious concerns about the quality of care” (Scheid 2003:158).  
Rather than adhering to a social or biopsychosocial model of mental illness, 
managed care imposes a medical model of illness on its providers via privileging 
treatment goals that focus on short-term improvements at the expense of deeper changes 




“consequence of MC is the greater reliance upon psychiatric medication as opposed to 
more intensive forms of therapy or skills training” (Scheid 2000:709).  
In Scheid’s analysis of interviews with providers in the private sector, she found 
MC significantly affected the everyday therapeutic work practices, to the extent that 
some therapists were considering leaving private practice (2000). Providers in the private 
sector were working longer hours to augment their incomes due to the significant decline 
in reimbursement fees and yet had increases in administrative duties such as paperwork 
and phone calls for treatment authorizations (Scheid 2000). However, it wasn’t just the 
intensity of administrative labor that providers reented; it was that these duties took 
focus away from patient care, proper supervision, ctinuing education and the quality of 
the therapeutic relationship (Scheid 2000). MC is a coercive system because if providers 
spoke out against a managed care insurance company, they could be (and were) dropped 
from mental health panels, or put on a provider excluded list (Scheid 2000).  
In summary, managed care subjects the treatment decisions of providers and 
provider-client relationships to increased managerial, financial and bureaucratic scrutiny 
to the point where both the quality and quantity of interaction between provider and 
patient are compromised. In addition to harming therap utic relationships, managed care 
threatens professional autonomy over their own work.  
The Role of the Professions in Transformations of Health Care  
In the past few decades the organization and delivery of health care has 
undergone significant interconnecting social, political, economic and cultural 
transformations (Hafferty and Light 1995). These transformations have led to questioning 




Martin, Currie and Finn 2009; Timmermans and Oh 2010). Opening up the role of the 
professions in the organization and delivery of healt  care services is in part based on the 
fear that professional norms and clinical decision making have been corrupted by the 
logic of the market and increased consumerism. Several scholars have examined the 
features of changing organizational contexts and their impact on the normative 
orientations of health professionals and the social processes of clinical decision making.   
Increased attention to the role of organizational contexts and professional norms 
in shaping the terms and conditions of health care delivery have led to the realization that 
the professions’ relations to capital are complex. It is easy to both over and under 
estimate the role of the professions in the organization and delivery of health care, and in 
order to better understand the paradox of the expansion the medical sovereignty and 
decline of professional autonomy, professionalism needs examined within  the larger 
macro context of the political economy (its relations with the state, economy, other 
professions, all external actors) and within the micro politics of interaction in day to day 
work within and across varying organizational settings (see Light 2009; Timmermans and 
Oh 2010). 
The combination of a tightening of revenue streams, rising costs, competitive 
markets and patterns of variation in both availability and quality of health care situate the 
role of professions in the center of the contemporary health care controversy. While the 
government, (federal, state and local) is the biggest purchaser of health care, it is only one 
among corporate purchasers (insurance and managed cre companies), corporate sellers 
(manufacturers of medical technologies and drugs such as pharmaceutical companies), 




that have been designated as external forces of power and interest within the Medical-
Industrial Complex (Hafferty and Light 1995). In addition to the forces external to 
professions, the internal dynamics of professions such as increasing specialization, 
differentiation and substitution, the degree of inter-professional competition and changing 
demographics within professions have been studied as internal forces within the health 
care arena (see Abbott 1988; Hafferty and Light 1995; Nancarrow and Borthwick 2005).  
CONCLUSION 
In this introductory chapter I provided a review of the historical background of 
the rise in the emergence of adolescent mental disorders as a significant object of 
scientific study and clinical intervention as well as a review of literatures relevant to 
understanding the contemporary mental health arena. Following this in chapter two, I set 
up key theoretical frameworks, analytic concepts, and methodological procedures 




Chapter 2: Theory/Methods Analytical Framework 
 This study analyzes the technoscientific knowledge-practices of psychotherapy 
provided to adolescents with mental disorders in the contemporary U.S. Four questions 
guide this study: (1) how are adolescent mental illnesses defined within and across 
psychotherapeutic communities of adolescent mental he lth practice? (2) How do 
psychotherapeutic practitioners negotiate social processes of diagnosis? (3) In what ways 
does the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), as a biomedical technology, shape the 
everyday diagnostic and treatment work of mental het  practitioners? (4) In what ways 
does the political economy, specifically, managed care, shape contemporary adolescent 
mental health care? 
 In what follows, I lay out my core theoretical and methodological frameworks. 
First, I provide an overview of the modified grounded theory I employ to analyze 40 
semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted with psychotherapeutic clinicians across 
a Midwestern state and an east coast metropolitan area. Social worlds analysis is a 
Theory/Methods package that facilitates simultaneous data collection and analysis 
through two step coding and memo writing processes. Thi  approach utilizes techniques 
of method based on material social interpretive and feminist standpoint orientations to 
qualitative research. Second, I describe the procedures of method I used to analyze my 
qualitative interviews. Third, I provide detailed descriptions of my data. Finally, I review 
the theoretical frameworks, debates and concepts of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), Medical Sociology and the Sociology of Mental Health and Illness. This study 




feminist STS that examine science as a shared activity that is accomplished through 
relationships within and across communities (social worlds). I bridge these theoretical 
frameworks and empirical studies with the sociology f mental health and illness to make 
a unique contribution to the literature. 
THEORY/METHODS PACKAGE: FEMINIST POSTMODERN SOCIAL WORLDS THEORY 
The theory/methods approach of social worlds analysis was designed to expose 
conflicting interests and commitments in the social aspects of accomplishing work. I 
deploy social worlds analysis to examine how mental he lth practitioners grapple with 
definitions of adolescent mental, emotional and behavioral disorder as a scientific and 
clinical boundary object and the messiness of the social and political values embedded in 
biomedical and bureaucratic standardization. 
Feminist Grounded Theory after the Postmodern Turn: Social Worlds Theory 
Glaser and Strauss (1965) developed grounded theory through their research in hospitals 
on how the medical system and clinical care providers managed dying patients. 
Following the tenets of Symbolic Interactionism (SI) and the lessons they had learned 
through research, they explicated the complex processes of qualitative data collection in 
the medical setting by emphasizing how the symbolic and social aspects of patients’ lives 
outside of the hospital played a key role in reaching an in-depth understanding of the 
clinical management of death. Later, they formalized these processes in The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  
The premise of a grounded theory approach to social research is that theoretical 
explanations of social phenomena are grounded in and emerge through empirical 




Glaser and Strauss, they later disagreed, causing grounded theory to develop in multiple 
directions. Barney Glaser, originating what came to be the Glaserian tradition of 
grounded theory, holds to a more positivist and structuralist orientation toward perceiving 
the outside world as waiting to be discovered.  
On the other hand, Anselm Strauss and his student, Juliet Corbin (see 1998), 
developed a grounded theory tradition built on a more social constructivist 
epistemological framework – one that grapples with the way that researchers and research 
participants, or even the observed, make meaning together and how there are multiple 
levels of interpretation. This theoretical differenc  has become known as the interpretive 
turn – and points to the notion that there is no complete objective standpoint or empirical 
truth that is waiting to be observed by a neutral observer (see Charmaz 2006; Denzin and 
Lincoln 2000). In this study, I use a modified version of grounded theory – one that has 
followed Anselm Strauss’s turn to social worlds analysis and feminist and postmodern 
turns in social theory.  
The different approaches to “doing” grounded theory can be simplified in terms of 
their standpoint in relation to a more or less positivi t or social constructivist approach in 
their work (Clarke 2005:2).  The grounded theory employed in this study utilizes 
techniques of method based on material; social interpretive and feminist standpoint 
orientations to qualitative research (see Clarke 2005; Charmaz 2000; Casper & Clarke 
1998; Clarke & Montini 1993; Clarke 1990; Naples 2003).10  My approach to using 
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 See Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 27) for a table, typology and explanation of interpretive paradigms of 




grounded theory follows the poststructuralist turn to discourse theoretically, which 
facilitates explicit attention to discourse as it is produced and enacted. 
Strauss (1978) introduced the notion of “social worlds” to identify a research 
situation of a group committed to or oriented around a key set of activities. In the case of 
this dissertation, social worlds involve mental health practitioners who diagnose and/or 
intervene in adolescent mental, emotional or behavior l disturbances. There is a long 
tradition within SI medical or science studies of examining science as a shared activity 
that is accomplished through relationships within and cross social worlds. In this sense, 
the science and clinical intervention of adolescent mental disorders are a scientific and 
technological activity.  
Within this version of grounded theory (situational or social worlds analysis), the 
goal is to understand the elements of a situation or the social worlds involved in an arena 
of action and their relations within it. Also, subjects and objects are decentered, meaning 
that methodological attention is paid to actors and ctants, including cultural objects, 
technologies, media and non-human entities. The social worlds theory/methods package 
approach prioritizes examination of the relationship  of animate and inanimate things as 
they work together in constituting situations. Thus modified grounded theory is an 
empirical approach to studying social life via qualitative research and analysis.  
In her book Situational Analysis, Adele Clarke (2005) argues that in many ways, 
grounded theory has always been (theoretically) beyond the postmodern turn due to its 
symbolic interactionist roots. For instance, foregrounding deconstructive analytic 
interpretations such as open coding and multiple interpretations and attending to 




(1934) notion of perspective and the social self inf uence grounded theory principles of 
attending to negotiations and relational forms of analysis. 
Following these core SI properties, Clarke (2005) modifies grounded theory to 
take up theoretical turns toward feminist postmodern epistemologies. Her work illustrates 
core feminist postmodern assumptions such as the situatedness of all knowledge 
producers, recognizing heterogeneities and the importance of discourses. This study is 
theoretically and empirically situated in feminist STS literatures and goals. Therefore, 
modified grounded theory of social worlds that has SI and constructivist roots but attends 
to postmodern feminist concerns facilitates the analysis of the definitions, practices and 
relationships at the heart of my study.  
PROCEDURES OF METHOD 
Grounded theory is an analytic process that assumes that data collection and 
analysis are carried out simultaneously and are consci usly (by the researcher) put into 
conversation with one another by conducting a two-step data coding process, comparing 
sections of data to one another and by writing memos. These procedures of method are 
carried out with the goal of working through conceptual issues, emergent themes, patterns 
and gaps between the data and what is understood abut the relationships that are being 
examined (see Charmaz 2000:510-11).  Following these strategies, I employed the 
method procedures of two-step coding and memo writing processes. 
These procedures are the concrete techniques which facilitated the analysis of 
emerging patterns of adolescent mental disorder definition, diagnosis and treatment 
across disciplinary psychotherapeutic social worlds.  Relationships between contexts of 




arounds they employ in negotiations of the DSM, and diagnostic standardization emerged 
by engaging the discourses of my data sources. 
Coding and Memo Writing 
I followed two-step coding procedures.  I started by performing line-by-line coding of 
single documents.  As particular themes or “codes” emerged repeatedly or in relation to 
one another throughout the line-by-line coding of dcuments and interview transcripts, I 
authored memos which put my research questions into d al gue with these emerging 
thematic codes.   
Memos are reflections that tracked my theoretical understandings of the 
disciplinary social worlds and the discourses they produced about adolescent mental 
disorder.  I continuously moved back and forth between coding documents, interview 
transcripts, reading the literature, and writing memos until I began reaching theme 
saturation. Theme saturation occurred when new coding categories ceased emerging and 
the codes already emerged repeatedly accounted for “what was going on” in the 
discursive renderings about definitions of adolescent mental disorder, diagnostic 
processes, the DSM as a technological actant, EBPs, interdisciplinarity and MC.  In this 
iterative process, I produced some memos which focused on particular disciplinary social 
worlds—and compared how the discourses of the published disciplinary documents 
mapped onto or diverged from the interviews with professionals from similar disciplinary 
backgrounds.  I sought out patterns both within and cross these disciplinary worlds, and 
wrote memos that focused on content, context, convergence/consensus and 
divergence/contestations.  Thus, throughout the iterat ve deconstruction and analytic 




theoretical orientations and some about constellations of documents from particular 
professional worlds or about particular emerging issues that crossed over multiple worlds 
(issues with MC).   
Early memos were more explorative and asked questions of the data, and put the 
research questions in dialogue with the discourses studied.  As analytic work continued, 
memos became more refined and explicitly set out to answer research questions and 
move towards coherent data chapters. Through the employ ent of these techniques of 
analysis, discursive themes emerged that rendered the relations across multiple mental 
health professionals, their knowledges and practices surrounding adolescent mental 
disorder diagnosis and treatment, visible. 
Descriptive Information on Data Source 
This dissertation analysis is based on social worlds analysis of 40 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with mental health professionals. The interviews were conducted 
from the winter of 2009 through the fall of 2010 in a Midwestern state and a large east 
coast metropolitan area. Respondents were recruited sing a snowball sampling methods, 
starting with contacts I had from previous work exprience in the field. 
When I began my study I reached out to professional contacts I had acquired from 
working as a paraprofessional in the adolescent menal health field for six years before 
going to graduate school. Some of my previous contacts connected me with other mental 
health professionals and four of them participated in the study themselves. Each of these 
four respondents had worked with me in some capacity t a Residential Treatment Center 
(RTC) for a large non-profit mental health care organization in a mid-sized city 




In addition to professional contacts I already had in the field, I reached out 
through my informal loose tie network of acquaintances to find out who they knew 
working in adolescent mental health care. I had people send me the email addresses of 
mental health professionals. I sent emails to these loose ties explaining the project and 
only continued contact if they expressed interest in taking part in the study. Once I 
conducted an interview with a mental health professional I used snowball sampling 
methods to acquire new interview respondents.  
 The sample consists of mental health professionals who worked in some capacity 
with adolescents diagnosed with mental, emotional or behavioral disturbances. Initially I 
intended to only interview mental health professionals who worked in out-patient clinical 
office settings. However, as the study progressed, discussions of schools and school 
therapy repeatedly came up during my interviews. Some f the out-patient clinicians I 
interviewed worked in schools one day or afternoon a week in addition to their work in 
out-patient clinics. Schools emerged as a an important site of study from processes of 
conducting and transcribing interviews and writing memos, and thus my original 
conception of the desired respondent characteristics were broadened to include 
psychoeducators and counselors, social workers and psychologists who worked in 
schools.  
As is true in the general population, the majority of mental health professionals I 
interviewed were white women: 35 women, 5 men; 35 white, 3 African American, 1 non-
white Hispanic and 1 Native American. See Appendix A for information on sample 
characteristics. The mental health professionals I interviewed had diverse disciplinary 




set out with the orienting framework that practitioners from different disciplines or 
professional backgrounds were likely to approach adolescent mental health and illness 
from uniquely different theoretical models or orientations, I struggled to find concrete 
patterns across disciplines. See Appendix B for information on disciplinary backgrounds 
and theoretical orientations and their overlap. I refer to the mental health professionals 
who comprise the communities of practice or social worlds in my study as 
psychotherapists and MHPs because what they all had in common was that their 
everyday work was structured around some form of psychotherapy (although the form it 
took varied by context of care). In addition to a diverse set of professional backgrounds 
and theoretical orientations, MHPs varied widely in ears of experience as an adolescent 
mental health professional. The range was 2 to 43 years of experience in the field, with 
the 14 years mean average, 13 years median average. Ten practitioners (25%) of my 
sample had less than 10 years experience while 15 practitioners (almost 38%) had 15 or 
more years of experience.  
 Interviews were semi-structured and conducted in various public, school and 
office settings. Interviews lasted anywhere from 40 minutes to two hours. Two 
interviewees that had each been in the field as clinicians for over 15 years were 
interviewed twice. These two interview respondents were among a group of four 
interviewees whom were extremely knowledgeable and articulate about their field and 
their everyday clinical work, and thus heavily shaped the analysis. Prior to starting the 
interviews, research participants were asked to read informed consent documents which 
asked permission to record the interview. Every participant received a copy of the 




copy of the consent form. Each interview was conducted using the same semi-structured 
interview guide (see Appendix D for a copy of the interview guide).  
 Interviews were recorded, and started with a general s ction about the 
professional background of the research participant. A  important aspect of this study 
was to understand the ways in which disciplinary training and professional socialization 
shaped the definitions of adolescent mental health and illness. The beginning of the 
interview guide entailed questions about duration in the mental health profession, 
background professional education and training and how their discipline and approach to 
providing adolescent mental health services had changed since they entered the field. The 
second section of the interview guide asked about their definitions and approaches to 
adolescent mental illness, their professional and disciplinary memberships and 
interdisciplinarity. This section allowed me to successfully tap into mental health 
professionals’ theoretical orientations towards adolescent mental illness and the 
significance with which their professional background shaped these orientations and 
approaches to treatment. Further, this section yielded information about the costs and 
benefits of the interdisciplinarity of the field.  
The third and fourth sections of the interview guide focused on diagnostic and 
treatment practices, including the ways in which the DSM was understood and utilized in 
diagnostic processes. As themes emerged through the interviews, I added a few questions 
to theses sections of the interview guide. For example, after almost half of my interviews 
were completed and V codes had emerged as a significant contentious issue for 
practitioners, I added a question about them on the interview guide. V Codes are 




secondary diagnoses to provide clinicians and other professionals with information about 
the social contexts of mental illness. V codes encompass relational and other social 
environmental disturbances such as parent-child or sibling conflict, neglect, abuse, school 
problems and more. Several practitioners thought V codes should be legitimate 
(reimbursable) diagnoses, and thus I followed the data by asking other professionals if 
and when they used them and the role they played in processes of clinical diagnosis and 
treatment. 
The final section of the interview guide focused on professionals’ evaluations of 
the larger field of adolescent mental disorder servic s. While the third question in this 
section was about Managed Care (MC), there were very few interviews where MC had 
not already emerged as a significant theme in the interview. MC emerged as the thematic 
code of analysis that was connected to everything else including the ways in which the 
field had changed, how treatment plans are written and had changed over time and how 
the DSM has been utilized to standardize diagnostic pra tices.  
DATA ANALYSIS: FEMINIST POSTMODERN GROUNDED THEORY  
In this study, theory and research are a package appro ch that shape data analysis. Theory 
and methods are intimately intertwined in this study through interpretive, postmodern and 
feminist standpoint turns in social theory. Thus, this study takes a constructivist SI 
approach that follows these theoretical turns in focusing on deconstructive analytical 
interpretation, (open coding and enabling multiple nt rpretations), orientation towards 
social actions such as negotiations, discourse, and the ways in which discourses are 
produced and enacted (see Clarke 2005). Discourse is d fined as knowledges and 




on a long tradition of SI constructivist, medical and STS studies that examine science as a 
shared action that is accomplished through relationships within and across social worlds 
of psychotherapeutic mental health professionals. Next, I review key theoretical 
frameworks of constructivist, SI, feminist STS and medical sociology studies that 
facilitate examination of adolescent mental disorder knowledge-practices as scientific and 
technological activities. My unique contribution is to apply this SI, feminist STS 
approach to the sociology of mental health and illness. 
SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY: THEORETICAL REVIEW 
The sociology of health and illness and STS both have distinct intellectual histories yet 
can be considered sister sub-disciplines due to their ov rlapping research questions and 
methods of inquiry. This is where I situate my dissertation. Rather than a thorough review 
of each of these fields and the ways they overlap, I lay out theoretical concepts relevant 
to my study and develop the analytic framework for the empirical chapters that follow. 
 
Social Constructivism  
Social Constructivism refers to the notion that knowledge is created through human 
interaction. Social reality is accomplished rather than given by humans collectively 
defining and acting in social situations (Berger and Luckman 1966). Studies of how 
science, medicine, medical technologies, health and illness are constructed offer a lens 
into the dialectical relationship between them and the social-historical forces with which 
they interact. A social constructionist framework examines the historical and social 
shaping of ‘truths’ and ‘common-sense knowledge’ which comprise contemporary 




knowledge, including health and illness or disease cat gories, are not natural products of 
objective science but instead are created out of particular historical and political 
circumstances (Clarke 2001).   
In Science Studies: An Advanced Introduction, David Hess (1997) argues that a 
large majority of science studies scholars posit a moderate constructivist stance, or the 
balanced view that both the social and the material sh pe knowledge production. 
Scientific theories are both representations of the material world and operate as vehicles 
through which social values and local culture are transmitted (Hess 1997:35-36).  Most 
moderate social constructionists do not question the material reality of disease or illness 
but focus on the way these experiences are known and interpreted through social 
meanings and practices (Lupton 2003; Conrad and Barker 2010).  
An early theoretical move by social scholars of healt  nd illness was to 
distinguish illness from disease precisely because the expert medical categories did not 
capture the subjective experiences of illness (Kleinman et al. 1978; 1988). Following 
pragmatism and the tenets of Symbolic Interactionism (SI) (Mead 1934; Goffman 1959, 
1961), Anselm Strauss and his colleagues (1963, 1965, 1967, 1978) began examining 
how people who were ill made sense of, embodied and managed their illness in 
conjunction with other aspects of their lives. Over time, social constructivism was used to 
understand how subjective illness experiences, presum d “objective” diseases and other 
medical facts were shaped by social values and processes. This is closely aligned with 
STS because the object of study is how biomedical categories of disease and methods of 
intervention are socially created, negotiated and interpreted (Conrad and Barker 2010; 




In contemporary STS, the term “construction” is worn- ut to such an extent that 
new terms have arisen up to restore some value and specificity to the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks used (see Aronowitz 2008; Jutel 2010; Sismondo 2007). 
Sismondo (2007) notes that terminology such as framing, constitution, organization, 
production, and manufacture have all been used to convey the social construction of facts 
and artifacts. Despite the particular term used, the main tenets of contemporary social 
constructionist studies of science and technology include a questioning of taken-for-
granted realities and objectivity; an understanding that the concepts we use to interpret 
the world are historically and culturally specific; and that science, medicine and 
technology are inherently social and active, and rather than being natural, are made 
(Clarke 2001; Sismondo 2007). 
Social constructivist studies have contributed to STS in several ways, but 
important for this study is how science has been conceived of and studied as a form of 
culture as opposed to a special form of truth that exists outside of social practices (see 
Law 2008:626). Social constructivist studies of scientific knowledge take the content of 
science, including the theories, methods and more rec ntly, the practices and tools 
involved in its production, as the focus of examination. Thus, constructivist researchers 
study science, medicine and technology in the same ways as they examine other areas of 
culture because the underlying assumption is that all knowledge, even scientific 
knowledge and technologies, are created through collective social processes, or social 
relationships.  




Considered both a theoretical and methodological approach to knowledge, the self, and 
human interaction, Symbolic Interactionism emerged out of American Pragmatism. 
Building on the ideas of William James (1879), Charles Horton Cooley (1918) and 
George Herbert Mead (1934) theorized how the mind, self and society arise out of and 
are sustained through human interactions. Mead (1934) posited both the mind and the self 
as social processes capable of using symbols, rehearsing lines of action and choosing 
among the possibilities. Thus, individuals perceive and interpret gestures and the self 
arises as individuals symbolically represent themselve  as objects, while at the same time 
society emerges out of organized and coordinated activities.  
After Mead’s death, Herbert Blumer took over his social psychology course and 
coined the phrase “Symbolic Interactionism,” becoming as influential to the frame as 
Mead had been.  His three premises of SI are: 1) humans act toward things on the basis of 
the meanings that the things have for them; 2) meanings of things are social products 
created through human interaction; and 3) meaning occurs through a process of 
interpretation used to guide actions within situations (Blumer 1969).  Blumer (1969) 
advocated for exploration and inspection as preferrd SI methodologies and was 
primarily concerned with linking social behavior to elements of social structure. 
The SI frame has often been conceived in a polarized fashion as the Chicago 
versus the Iowa schools of thought.  However, according to Jonathan Turner (2006), all 
Symbolic Interaction frames converge on the following four premises: 1) humans create 
and use symbols; 2) humans use symbols and gestures to give common meanings to 
things; 3) the generalized other mediates social control and change by individuals taking 




defined through each other.  Individuals can assess and sort out various lines of conduct 
based on the definitions of the situation which are continuously created over time through 
on-going interactions. Symbols and meanings of particular situations ultimately evolve 
into taken-for-granted and routinized practices (Blumer 1969; Fine 1992; Stryker 1980; 
1988).  
Constructivist, Symbolic Interactionist Framework 
For the past four decades constructivist SI scholars h ve analyzed the social processes 
involved in medical practices, including the role of technologies within medical practices 
(see Glaser and Strauss 1965; Charmaz 1991; Timmermans 1999) (Casper and Morrison 
2010). My study follows this intellectual tradition i  examining the medical practices of 
mental health care work, and the role the DSM as technology plays in that work. At the 
intersection of symbolic interactionist medical sociology and STS, scholars have 
developed key concepts such as negotiated order (Strauss 1978), work-arounds (Clarke 
and Casper 1998), boundary objects (Star and Griesem r 1989), infrastructures (Bowker 
and Star 1999), bandwagons (Fujimura 1988, 1996), and the right tool for the job (Clarke 
& Fujimura 1992) in order to help shed light on thesocial aspects of medical practices 
(Casper and Morrison 2010). In this section, I briefly xplain a few of the key concepts 
and foci of this theoretical tradition on which my work builds.  
A social constructivist SI framework examines sciene, medicine and technology 
as work and work activities organized in particular cultural spaces, using particular 
materials and techniques (Fujimura 1988). Monica Casper reviews how SI studies 
commonly focus on the diverse aspects of science and medicine related to work tasks, 




through social processes and actions (1998:30). She identifies two crucial interactionist 
concepts: (1) Mead’s (1934) notion that people live and work within contexts of 
meaningful objects, and therefore objects are social products that are created via 
definitional processes of social interaction; and (2) Strauss and colleagues’ (1964:176) 
concept of negotiated order which describes the way th t social order continually 
emerges or is negotiated and renegotiated through hman actions that become patterned 
or routinized across time (1998:31). In following these highly developed interactionist 
concepts, Casper (1998) developed the notion of work objects and theorized the ways in 
which multiple consequences flow from the diverse meanings attributed to work objects 
in medical practice.  
Clarke and Casper (1996) developed the term “work-arounds” to denote the 
emergent local solutions to problems that are posed by standardization. In his award 
winning article that examines how psychiatrists negotiate diagnostic standardization, 
Owen Whooley (2010) uses the concept of work-arounds to demonstrate the strategies 
employed by psychiatrists to respond to and alleviat  their ambivalence for the 
bureaucratization and biomedicalization of the DSM. I discuss Whooley’s (2010) work in 
chapter four and build on his analysis of work-arounds to show the ways that non-
psychiatrist mental health practitioners negotiate the DSM as a biomedical technology. 
I utilize the concepts of negotiated order and work-arounds in analyzing how 
mental health practitioners accomplish the work of defining, diagnosing and intervening 
in the mental, emotional and behavioral disturbances of youth. The concept of negotiated 
order refers to the capacities of different actors  protect their own interests and to 




Thus, a negotiated order is a set of working arrangements within an arena (Strauss 1978), 
which does not mean that the actors have reached consensus or are free from competition 
or conflict. I use the concept of negotiated order in examining the way that mental health 
practitioners have conflicting interests and commitments in their negotiations of 
diagnostic practices in general and the DSM in particular. Even though most practitioners 
must operate under diagnostic standardization, there is interpretive flexibility within and 
across sites of practice.  
Another key area of work for interactionist STS studies of medical practices is the 
focus on classification systems, standards, protocols and contingencies of practice. Susan 
Leigh Star and Geoffrey Bowker (1999) examine how every single standard, category or 
classification valorizes one particular point of view while silencing others, yet in 
everyday real life practice, whether inside or outside the clinic, we commonly struggle 
with things that do not fit. The problem with things not fitting is that social and moral 
values are embedded within classification systems and thus both classification work and 
standards have material consequences.  
While standards are similar to classification systems, Bowker and Star (1999) 
define them as distinct entities. They define standards as: (1) agreed upon rules for 
production of textual and material objects; (2) span more than one community of practice 
or site of activity, have temporal reach and persist over time; (3) are deployed in making 
things work together over distance and heterogeneous metrics; (4) legal bodies often 
enforce standards, be these mandated by professional organizations, manufacturers’ 
organizations or the state; (5) there is no natural law and the best standard shall win and 




Standards embody goals of practice and production and are never perfectly realized .. . 
Classifications may or may not become standardized.  . . Every successful standard 
imposes a classification scheme, at very least between good and bad ways of organizing 
actions or things. The work-arounds involved in practical use of standards frequently 
entail use of ad hoc nonstandard categories. (Bowker and Star 1999:15-23) 
 
 The classification system of the DSM and the formalized standard of requiring a 
DSM code for a legitimate diagnosis and thus for reimbursement for care are at the heart 
of my examination of mental health care practices. Following this intellectual tradition, I 
examine the DSM classification system as a biomedical technology and the way that 
practitioners employ work-arounds in negotiating the order of diagnostic practices and 
the biomedical infrastructure in which it is embedd. Only examinations of how 
practitioners tame, unleash, or work-around contemporary diagnostic standards in their 
particular setting of practice reveals the messines and complexity of their work. 
In summary, my work builds on the following five major assumptions of 
interactionist science studies: (1) scientific facts, findings and theories are socially 
constructed; (2) knowledge represents and embodies work or particular ways of 
organizing the world and STS is concerned with the processes by which scientists 
develop standard procedures and patterns of commitments; (3) science is a matter of 
work, organizations and institutions; (4) scientific work is like other social activities; and 
(5) there is an insistence on multiple perspectives and a concern for silenced and deleted 
perspectives, thereby making itself compatible with feminist approaches that are 
inherently concerned with marginalized outsiders (see Van House 2004:25-27). 
Feminist Epistemologies  
While there is no distinctive feminist theory or method of inquiry, there are a few 




theory/methods are studies done by and/or about women – they begin with something 
that appears problematic from the perspective of women’s experiences. Second, feminist 
analyses connect the purpose of their research to their research subjects and thus their 
research questions and research subjects are guided by a purpose of furthering knowledge 
by or about women or gendered experiences. Third, feminist analyses explicitly locate 
themselves in relation to their subject matter. Feminist analysis is an approach to studying 
the social world, not a unitary method (Reinharz 1992).  
Underneath a feminist framework there are multiple research methods that are 
guided by different lines of feminist theorizing. However, there are general trends within 
feminist research towards interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary scholarship, aims to 
create social change, attention to difference and diversity in representations and 
researcher reflexivity (Reinharz 1992). Feminist analyses attend to local settings, multiple 
social worlds, and deconstruct the assumption of a single society, culture or even, woman 
or feminism. Further, feminist analyses focus on both multiple and partial knowledges, 
including an explicit attention to relations of power or dominant versus subjugated 
knowledges.  
 Feminist epistemology, also known as standpoint theory, is a problematization of 
how knowledge and truth are bound by relations of power that operate in all knowledge 
contexts. Dorothy Smith (1974) was one of the firsteminist sociologists to identify how 
traditional theories and methods of sociology was built on and within a male social 
universe, thereby discarding women’s experiences and how they might be different, 





Smith’s (1987) project in The Everyday World as Problematic: a Feminist 
Sociology, was to create the space necessary for there to be a different kind of 
epistemology operating in the field of sociology and among feminist scholars. Smith 
(1987) revealed how the principles of universality (rationality) and neutrality 
(impersonal) that operated in the field of sociology and in the wider public sphere were 
gendered – i.e. the rulers of academia and the public sphere’s social relations were men; 
and thus women had become confined to the subjective. Smith’s concept of bifurcated 
consciousness refers to how the professional sociological vision of ordinary reality was a 
mode of consciousness controlled by men; the actual experiences of women were 
repressed and experienced as some “other” form of consciousness. The organized 
practices of society bring into relation particular forms of understanding between the 
knowers and the known, and Smith (1987) challenged this traditional way of knowing in 
order to create a space where the experiences of women, as located inside their body, in 
particular places in the everyday world, could be expr ssed and validated as 
“knowledge.” Smith (1990) extended Gouldner’s (1970) concept of reflexivity by making 
the everyday world of women as the problematic of sociology, allowing for the material-
social relations of women to be explored as an areawhere knowledge exists, thereby 
reconfiguring the traditional object/subject of study as a place in which searching for 
knowledge and understanding began from within women. 
 Patricia Hill Collins is one of the most influential standpoint and intersectionality 
theorists. The term intersectionality refers to the way in which each social identity such 
as gender, race, age, sexuality, social class, and others, intersect to confer advantages and 




groups, institutions, policies or discourses and practices, but the goal is to understand 
how social structures organize relations of inequality nd how diverse groups and 
positions within those structures produce uneven experiences. For examples of theoretical 
and empirical intersectional analyses, see Collins 2000; Dill 2009; McCall 2005. 
Collins’ (1990) standpoint theory is about the project of furthering critical social 
thought on group formation and power relations within e social structure of society. 
Collins’ takes Smith’s reconfiguration a step further by claiming that sociology was still 
excluding black women and their standpoints. Collins set out to show how Black 
Feminist Thought as oppositional and subjugated knowledge, could inform a critical 
social theory (Collins 1990).  
What both Smith and Collins are concerned with is how to create a space within 
social theory where the subject/object divide disappears and the reflections and 
experiences of those researched do not. Collins’s standpoint epistemology is based on the 
notion that social groups are situated within unjust power relations; and although each 
member of a social group may not experience the same thing or have a similar standpoint 
on any given issue, it is the position within the ov rall structural relations of domination 
and subordination that gives any social group a “stndpoint.” Collins demonstrated that 
intersectional thinking is a useful heuristic devic for describing the patterns of social 
organization (for making structural power dynamics visible). Standpoint theory connects 
the previously invisible subjectivities of Black women at the meso level of power 
relations through their shared experiences of subjectivity. As such, Collins theoretically 
mediated between the micro and macro contexts of subordination, domination and all of 




society. Her concept of “outsider-within” explicated the ways in which black women 
were situated yet treated as outsiders subjugated wi hin their own communities (1998).  
Donna Haraway’s influential feminist epistemology is widely known as “situated 
knowledges” – a concept she utilizes to convey that all knowledge is partial and socially 
situated (2004). To Haraway, objectivity and feminist standpoint theory is about situating 
our knowledge from within ourselves. Situated knowledges offer partial perspectives that 
are more accurate and that demand the investigator to become accountable for her claims.  
Key questions of feminist epistemology include: Who can know and by what 
means? Who can be the knower? What can be known? Feminist epistemologies have 
created strategies for justifying knowledge claims that include triangulating multiple data 
sources, methods and tools; collaborative research projects, researcher reflexivity, 
integration and examination of the connections betwe n the personal and social; and an 
engagement, responsiveness and accountability to the people studied. Thus feminist 
epistemological studies tend to be transparent in their presentation of data and analysis, 
focus on disenfranchised groups, are accountable to their subject matter and the 
implications of the knowledge claims their work produces. At the forefront of feminist 
epistemological concerns are the worlds that are produced by scholarship, due to the 
explicit recognition that all knowledge has material consequences.  
The theory/praxis of Haraway, Smith and Collins re-configures the material 
relations of knowledge production such that the credibility of all constructions of reality 
are regarded as needful of explanation (Hernstein-Smith 2006). This reconfiguring is not 
about reordering knowledge producers in an attempt to create a new hierarchy of ideas, 




and in what knowledge contexts). Feminist epistemology assumes that theory and 
practice are bound together and thus produce situated knowledges. This reconfiguring of 
knowledge as a socially-situated process allows for ociologists to investigate how beliefs 
about the world are socially shaped, constrained and stabilized (situated) (Hernstein-
Smith 2006: 101).  
Key Concepts of Feminist Social Studies of Science, Medicine and Technology 
Given that social studies of science, medicine and technology are interdisciplinary 
and draw from multiple traditions of theory/methods, there is no unitary origin story or 
easy way to characterize the entire field. In this section I review key aspects of STS that 
shape my data analysis.  
From the earliest development of the field, STS scholars have been committed to 
studying the social content of science. Charis Thompson (2005) describes how a large 
majority of STS scholarship has examined the interdependence of knowledge production 
with the classification and evaluation of persons ad things in various naturecultures.11 
Early studies of STS interrogated the social aspect of he content of science, but in more 
recent decades, STS theory/methods has turned toward ex mining science in the making, 
or how scientists arrive at “facts” (Thompson 2005). As already discussed in detail, one 
such theory/methods approach is social worlds theory, which traces the flows of people, 
practices and knowledge claims as they occur around a shared object or arena of concern 
(Thompson 2005). Examinations of science in the making are labeled the ontology of 
science. This strain of STS scholarship focuses on how technoscience matters for our 
                                                           
11
 For a more in-depth review of STS scholarship that examines naturecultures, see Haraway 2004, 1997, 




everyday living in the world. A different theory/method approach that is also popular is 
Actor Network Theory (ANT).  
ANT is well known for being concerned with science in the making and attending 
to the ways in which science and nature are interdependent (Thompson 2005).12 Actors, 
or more commonly referred to as actants (actors may be human or nonhuman), coordinate 
or work together in heterogeneous networks to resist and accomplish scientific 
knowledge production. Within this kind of STS scholarship and the ANT tradition, there 
has been a turn towards laboratory studies or following the practices of scientists and 
practitioners to understand how particular versions f the world are made. A key concept 
taken up across STS studies is the notion of black-boxing – the process by which 
knowledge comes to be accepted or taken-for-granted ev n though many do not 
understand how it came to be that way, and even more importantly, often, it could have 
been otherwise. In other words, within STS, scholars examine how it is that one 
technology, protocol or model came to be accepted and how others have become hidden 
from view. Bruno Latour (1999) argues that ANT is not a theory at all, rather it is a 
heuristic that is part of a larger materialist turn within social theory that recognizes the 
critical role that material objects play in the production of facts and social order (Harbers 
2005:26-28).This aspect of STS is intimately connected to standards and routines of 
practice, including the processes through which social networks play a role in 
constituting the particularities of how knowledge is made. A feminist STS version of 
scholarship focused on science in the making is Donna Haraway’s (1990) development of 
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the concept of the cyborg. The cyborg is a great exmple of the way feminist 
technoscience scholars explores the ontology of science – by examining the intersections 
of gender, race, and naturecultures. Even further, an early articulation of the ontology of 
science is found in Haraway’s theory of situated knowledges where she explicates that 
partial perspectives are actually better versions because they are truths which are situated 
in particular naturecultures, and thus have accountability.  
Haraway proposes an alternative form of modest witnessing – one that is partial, 
can be located in specific cultural context and is accountable. Feminist versions of STS, 
in their poststructural and cultural turns (and ontological politics of technoscience), argue 
that both material realities and discursive representations of those realities are enacted or 
performed simultaneously (Law 2008; Mol 2002).  
The basic proposition that comes from STS and its cognate disciplines is this. Since the 
real is relationally enacted in practices, if those practices were to change the real would 
also be done differently. Foucault tells us this. He talks of the conditions of possibility set 
by an episteme, and then of heterotopic spaces that lie at or beyond the margins . . . more 
or less different realities are being done, moment by moment, in those different practices. 
(Law 2008:635-36) 
 
While Haraway (1997, 1999) and Mol (1999, 2002) have different vocabulary and to 
some extent, politics, both are feminist STS scholars whose attention to multiplicities of 
and differences within social practices are important. Haraway (1997) and Mol (2002) 
both position themselves as modest witnesses that interfere so that perhaps the more 
humane versions of reality or practices with less subjugation have a better chance of 
being reproduced.  
A more recent concern within STS scholarship is the int rrogation of how various 
scientific truths co-constitute particular versions of nature, politics and identity 




how knowledge is always political, and this strain of scholarship deconstructs how 
coproduction plays out in various sites of scientific practice and standardization. This 
strain of STS takes seriously the claim that every scientific production, story, routine set 
of standards and practices privilege some version of reality and silence or minimize 
others. The notion of coproduction of science, technology and society conveys that 
social, political and moral relations are embedded in scientific knowledge and 
technological systems – they are constituted in one and the same historical process 
(Harbers 2005:257, see Fishman 2004; Taylor 1995).  
In addition to analytic attention to coproduction, STS has taken a turn towards 
examining the social construction of technologies. Thus, scholars increasingly use their 
interactionist constructivist theory/methods to examine the content and making of 
technologies (see MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999; Star 2002; Williams and Edge 1996; 
Van House 2004). Information and biomedical technologies have restructured 
contemporary medical practices (Casper and Morrison 2010). Information technologies 
have become central to health care practices, financ g, politics of reform and outcomes 
(Casper and Morrison 2010:S121). At the intersection of sociology of health and illness 
and STS studies, biomedical technologies have been examined for how they reshape 
medical practices, reconfigure human bodies and personhood and our understandings of 
them, and have contributed significantly to newer halth social movements (See Balsamo 
1996; Casper and Morrison 2010; Dumit 2004; Joyce 2008; Loe 2004; Saetnan et al 
2000). Casper and Morrison (2010) illustrate that empirical findings about medicine and 




concepts, and methods that have been used to understand medicine, medical technologies, 
health and illness, as what we know (Casper and Morrison 2010).  
Social studies of technology, including SCOT approaches, argue that technology 
is mutually co-constituted with the social. The SCOT approach, developed by Pinch and 
Bijker (1987), focuses on the producers and users of technological artifacts in order to 
show how the meanings of artifacts vary across groups. The concept interpretive 
flexibility (Pinch and Bijiker 1987) was coined to explain how technologies can be used 
and understood differently – i.e. that different users attribute different functions, abilities 
and properties to them (Brey 2005).  
Within STS, both SCOT and ANT approaches have been criticized for attending 
more to the development of technologies and less to the appropriation and usage of 
technologies or the users, including the differential power dynamics involved in who uses 
the technology and under what circumstances (Wajcman 2000; Van House 2004). 
Feminist STS scholars have examined the ways in which t e users of technologies are 
active agents who convey their interpretations of a technology within specific situational 
contexts and have extended the script approach to understand how masculinity and 
femininity are inscribed in technological devices (Balsamo 1996; Clarke & Fujimura 
1992; Cowan 1987; Wajcman 1991).  
Oudshoorn, Brouns and Van Oost (2005) stress the importance of situating 
medical technologies, arguing that both different contexts of use and different types of 
users are part of larger heterogeneous network of act rs that co-constitute clinical 
practices, including the meanings assigned to technologies within those practices. Within 




together form a collective actor (Oudshoorn, Brouns & Van Oost 2005). Their concept of 
distributed agency is used to interrogate the way technologies distribute agency among 
people and things, often in uneven ways across user groups (Oudshoorn, Brouns & Van 
Oust 2005).  The feminist criticism that ANT and SCOT approaches tend to focus too 
much on powerful experts and too little on women’s voices are taken seriously in this 
study. “Feminist scholars argue it is important to include th  “silent” and “silenced” 
voices of less-powerful actors than experts and producers in technology studies” (See 
Star 1999; Clarke & Montini 1993; Clarke 1998; Saetn n et al. 2000) (Oudshoorn, 
Brouns & Van Oust 2005:87).   
My dissertation takes these criticisms seriously. Within the mental health field, 
the profession of psychiatry is the dominant professional group with authority to codify 
diagnostic criteria and to transform a distressed person, into a biomedical identity, 
through the application of its diagnostic categories.  The legally and socially 
institutionalized DSM, created by the American Psychiatric Association, is a 
technological actant (non-human actor) that shapes processes of diagnosis. I acknowledge 
this by investigating other mental health practitioners – psychologists, social workers, 
counselors and paraprofessionals whose daily work activities are significantly shaped by 
biological psychiatry and the DSM, but whose use of the DSM emerge from their own 
material-semiotic meanings and locations. Thus, in chapter four, I examine the ways in 
which the DSM is socially scripted and interpretively flexible, and how meanings of the 
DSM emerge from practice (for other STS studies that take this approach, see Mamo 
2007; Oudshoorn 1994; Petryna 2002).  




Medical Sociology of the Professions 
The notion of the professional project was one of the first theoretical concepts to 
explore the relations between how professions used their specialist knowledge to 
monopolize a set of services and thus an exclusive share of the market (see Freidson 
1970, 1986; Larson 1977). The two main features of the concept are (1) autonomy – the 
degree to which a profession controls the content and application of their technical 
knowledge and (2) dominance- the degree to which a profession is able to exclude other 
professions from their market share and/or control the work of other health care 
occupations (Evans 2003). Keith Macdonald (1995) argues the professional project 
concept was important in that rather than focusing o  professions as static structures, it 
led the way for the examination of the strategies professionals used such as exclusion and 
social closure, to achieve and maintain their special elevated social status and power 
(over other professionals). Further, Macdonald notes that studies of collective 
professional strategies or the move toward examining the actions and interactions of 
professionals was heavily influenced by the Chicago School of American Sociology and 
the theoretical orientation of Symbolic Interactionism (see Glaser and Strauss 1965).  He 
(1995) argues that it was the Symbolic Interactionist attention to the actions and 
interactions of the professions as they negotiated th ir everyday work and acted to 
maintain their positions of status that led Larson (1977) to actively investigate how 
technical, cultural and ideological authority were achieved by professions. In addition, 
Macdonald (1995) argues Larson’s (1977) explication of a professional project employed 
Weber’s view of stratification in that her study emphasized the ways in which social 




followed the lessons learned from interactionist and professional-state (or producer-
economy) relations (Cooper et al. 1988; Macdonald 1995). David Evans (2003) argues 
the professional project was a useful explanatory framework for the professions before 
the mid 1990s; but it is unable to account for complex olitical processes as they play out 
in contemporary health care governance regimes.  
A similar concept that developed in explorations of professionalism and is still 
used today is jurisdiction (Abbott 1988). MacDonald (1995) critiques Abbott’s view of 
professionalism as a system, claiming that he places too much significance on the 
structure and function of professions as a systematic en ity, thereby leaving meanings, 
negotiations or interactions of professionals in everyday work unsettled; yet he praises 
the way in which Abbott’s theme of jurisdiction attends to occupational divisions and 
conflicts among professions. In recent sociological studies of the professions, jurisdiction 
is often paired with the medicalization thesis, or the notion that increasingly more areas 
of social life have become defined by medical professions as medical problems (Conrad 
2005, 1980; Clarke et al. 2010, 2003; Zola 1972). Jurisdiction is used to refer not only to 
the encroachment of one profession’s area of knowledge, expertise and intervention into 
another but also to the process of taking control over and/or erasing conceptual models 
and practices previously used to understand or inteven  in a particular problem or 
process (see Garry 2001). Thus a significant mark of the concept of jurisdiction is the 
focus on the relations between professions and/or occupational organizations and their 
competition for control over the definitions, practice and assessment of an area of work, 




Jurisdictional disputes occur over professional boundaries of specific work 
activities, including techniques and technologies that best accomplish said work. Abbott 
(1988) discusses how the cultural work that maintains or accomplishes distinct 
professional activities and areas of expertise is professional boundary maintenance in 
attempt to gain or maintain professional dominance. Further, jurisdictional boundaries are 
perpetually in dispute. Abbott (1988) attended to three important sites of jurisdictional 
struggle: the workplace, legislation and public opinion and emphasized the importance of 
understanding jurisdictional disputes within contexts of internal and external forces. Thus 
following (Freidson 1970, 1986; Larson 1977; Johnson 1972 and Abbott 1988), medical 
sociology of the professions began to recognize and examine the ways in which 
professional dominance and professional boundaries e contested spheres of knowledge 
and practice, and boundary maintenance requires cultural work. 
Technoscientific Knowledge-Practices:  Biomedicalization and the Professions 
The concepts of medicalization and biomedicalization “have significantly reconfigured 
what “technology” means, under what conditions, and for whom” (Casper and Morrison 
2010:S121). Medicalization refers to the ever-expanding jurisdiction of the medical 
establishment, including the reframing of social, moral or legal problems in medical 
terms (Zola 1972). Much like what the term is used to escribe, the definition and 
implications of medicalization have also expanded since the social constructionist SI 
studies of American medical sociologists in the 1960s and 1970s. Early sociological 
studies of medicalization focused largely on the creation of new medical categories and 




Peter Conrad, one of the foremost American scholars f medicalization theory, 
argues that prior to the 1980s, three foci comprised th  majority of medicalization 
studies: (1) the power and authority of the medical profession; (2) how medicalization 
occurred through the activities of social movements a d interest groups; and (3) the 
concrete inter- and intra-professional activities (professionalization) (Conrad 2005). 
Thus, before the 1980s, the primary agents of medicalization were the powerful medical 
professions, social movements and interest groups, whereas other agents such as the 
media, consumers, the pharmaceutical and insurance companies, remained secondary 
(Conrad 2005; Conrad and Leiter 2004).  
Changes within the organization of medicine and betwe n the establishment and 
the political economy in the early to mid 1980s, transformed the character of 
medicalization. Within the institution of medicine, there was an erosion of medical 
authority (Star 1982), and the aforementioned secondary actors (pharmaceutical and 
insurance companies) entered front and center, exercising what Light (1993) theorized as 
countervailing powers against the sway of medical professionals and professional 
organizations. “As a sociological concept, countervailing powers is not confined to 
buyers and sellers; it includes a handful of major p litical, social, and other economic 
groups that contend with each other for legitimacy, prestige and power, as well as for 
markets and money (Light 2009:241). The sociology of the professions work today starts 
from the assumption that a profession is one of several countervailing powers in society 
invested and interested in health care. In addition to the awareness of multiple interested 
stakeholders, contemporary analyses attend to how tese relations change in response to 




Conrad (2005) argues that by the 1990s, changes in the organization of health 
care, medical knowledges and marketing had shifted m icalization in a systemic way. 
He examines how major changes in medical knowledge and organization created a shift 
towards biotechnology, consumers and managed care as k y drivers of medicalization: 
“ In a culture of increasingly market-driven medicine, consumers, biotechnological 
corporations and medical services interact in complex ways that affect social norms in 
changing definitions of behaviors and interventions. The relationships between normative 
changes and medicalization run in both directions” (Conrad 2005:11). Following these 
shifts in the agents of medicalization and the growing countervailing powers in the 
political economy, Conrad (2005) urges medical sociol gists to go beyond social 
constructivist analyses of medicalization by including political economic perspectives.  
One such group of medical sociologists has been examining what they see largely 
as technoscientific changes in biomedicine since the mid 1980s (Clarke et al 2010, 2003). 
If medicalization was the first major transformation f the organization and properties of 
health care in the U.S. (Bauer 1998; Clarke and Olesen 1999; Conrad 1992, 2007), 
biomedicalization is the second major transformation (Clarke et al 2010, 2003).  
Biomedicalization is our term for the increasingly complex, multisited, multidirectional 
processes of medicalization that today are being both extended and reconstituted through 
the emergent social forms and practices of a highly and increasingly technoscientific 
biomedicine. We signal with the “bio-” in biomedicaliz tion the transformations of both 
the human and nonhuman made possible by technoscientifi  innovations such as 
molecular biology, biotechnologies, genomization, transplant medicine, and new medical 
technologies. That is, medicalization is intensifying, but in new and complex, usually 
technoscientifically enmeshed ways. (Clarke et al 2010:47) 
 
The designation of this transformation alludes not only to technoscientific 
innovations of molecular biology and biotechnologies, but to Foucauldian theories of 




emergence of political knowledges, techniques and technologies that enable analysis of 
processes and forms of life, and thus also, health and illness. For Foucault (1977), 
biopower and biopolitics signaled a major historical break in the ideas and practices of 
politics, leading to the reformulation of political sovereignty through the emergence of 
new forms of political knowledge. Prior to the 17th century, a sovereign repressive control 
over death reigned, whereas contemporary forms of power now make regulative 
calculations to maximize life and the surplus value it produces or will produce for the 
economy.13 Thus, biopolitics refers to the ideas and practices of government and state 
institutions that attempt to administer and regulate ife processes.  
Thomas Lemke (2011) follows Foucault’s oeuvre and proposes a relational and 
historical notion of biopolitics as an analytic lens for understanding how new disciplinary 
knowledges and techniques are applied to life. Lemke distinguishes between three 
different uses of biopolitics in Foucault’s work: (1) biopolitics as a rupture in political 
thinking and practice that reformulated sovereign power; (2) the role of biopolitical 
mechanisms in the rise of modern racism and; (3) an emergent art of government focused 
on regulating both the individual and social body (Lemke 2011:34).  Foucauldian theories 
of biopower and biopolitics have been taken up as an lytics that reveal relationships 
among government and state institutions, power, knowledges and individual subjectivity 
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and collective well-being. Foucault uses the term biopower to refer to two types of power 
over life (and by extension, health and illness): (1  a power that disciplines individual 
bodies, and (2) a regulatory control over the population (Foucault 1977; Lemke 2011). 
Foucault demonstrates how history is rooted in forms of power and emergent forms of 
disciplinary power operate through social discourses and practices in acting on 
individuals and populations (Foucault 1977). “Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics is 
an account of the ways in which, through techniques of normalization, standardization, 
visualization, and enumeration, populations get included, and thereby accounted for, 
within “state rationality” in its broadest sense” (Rajan 2006:99). Thus, Foucault’s 
theoretical constructs of the disciplines, disciplinary society, the life sciences, biopower, 
the individual and social body (population), and normalization, produce a theoretical 
frame from which social theorists examine how new tchnoscientific knowledges 
intervene in processes of life such as health and illness.   
In hopes that biomedicalization theory will be used as an analytic framework for 
future studies, Clarke et al. (2010, 2003) delineate five key interactive processes of this 
major transformation in American medicine. (1) The first interactive process describes 
the biopolitical economy of health and illness. This process encompasses how the health 
care organization is increasingly profit oriented, corporatized, and how new biomedical 
knowledges, technologies, services and capital are co-constituted. “Biocapital is the study 
of the systems of exchange and circulation involved in the contemporary workings of the 
life sciences, but is also the study of those life sci nces as they become increasingly 
foundational epistemologies for our time” (Rajan 2006:12). In his seminal book titled 




that epistemic and technological assemblages such as genomics (and therefore 
biomedicine and neuropsychiatry) are impossible to understand without attending to the 
political and economic frameworks within which they merge (Rajan 2006:280).  
Following Foucault’s concept of the biopolitical frame, the manner in which 
Rajan (2006) explicates it in his analysis and biomedicalization theory, my study 
considers how youth populations are accounted for and governed through techniques of 
normalization and standardization (Foucault 1977; Rajan 2006:99).  I employ the 
biopolitical economy of health and illness as an analytic lens in the fifth chapter where I 
examine how the larger assemblage of managed care, the DSM and state governance 
structures the organization of mental health care work. 
 (2) Clarke et al’s (2010) second interactive process is the intensified focus on 
health in addition to illness and disease. An important consequence associated with an 
increased focus on health is the elaboration of risk calculations of and surveillance over 
individuals, target groups and populations. Steven Epstein (2007) examined the ways in 
which the biopolitical paradigm is built into contemporary medical and nation-state 
research, policies and practices. He defines a biopolitical paradigm as a framework of 
ideas, standards, formal procedures and unarticulated understandings that structure how 
concerns about health, medicine, the body and personhood are made a focus of medical 
and state research and practice (Epstein 2007). Especially relevant to the increasing 
elaboration of risk calculations and surveillance ov r individuals, target groups and 
populations, is Epstein’s concept of niche standardiz tion. Niche standardization is a type 
of categorization that is concerned with social groups as opposed to the individual on the 




categorization of groups based on social differences such as gender, race and age 
contribute to the conflation of social with biological differences. In my study, adolescents 
constitute a niche standardization that shapes the oci tal and clinical definitions and 
responses to their mental, emotional and behavioral disturbances. While no one specific 
chapter is devoted entirely to adolescents as a soci l group, the analysis in chapter three 
speaks to how practitioners’ negotiations, work-arounds and cribbing processes are all 
heavily shaped by the unique aspects of caring for ad lescent as opposed to childhood or 
adult disturbances. Further, I build on what my entir  data analysis has to say about 
adolescents as a niche target group in my theoretical conclusion. 
(3) The third interactive process of biomedicalization is the technoscientization of 
biomedical practices, which describes how increasingly, medical interventions are reliant 
on new sciences and technologies and how therapeutic r medies themselves are 
increasingly technosicentific applications (Clarke et al 2010; 2003). The 
technoscientization of biomedical practices is central to my empirical analysis because in 
chapter four I analyze the DSM as a key scientific technology that shapes mental health 
care diagnosis and treatment.  
(4) The fourth biomedicalization process describes th  continual transformation of 
knowledges, including constantly changing information management, distribution and 
consumption needs. In chapter four I demonstrate that a significant aspect of negotiating 
social processes of diagnosis depends on collective knowledge building or crib sheets that 
guide mental health professionals in passing insurance company utilization of DSM 
diagnoses in their reimbursement and treatment plan policies. Further, in connection to 




reveals important connections across organizational settings and the types of information 
technologies or computer software programs used for iagnosis and documentation. 
While not a central focus of this analysis, emergent computer software programs such as 
Shrinkrapt and Therascribe used by practitioners in their everyday clinical work is 
revealed as a primary focus for future research on interactions between the 
technoscientization of biomedical practices and on-g i g transformation of knowledges 
within mental health care work settings.  
(5) Finally, the fifth interactive biomedicalization process is the transformation of 
bodies and selves. New individual and collective identities are formed, such as those on 
the basis of normalizing biopolitical risk groups. In my analysis of the social processes of 
diagnosis, I found mental health practitioners were painfully aware of the material 
consequences of labeling adolescents with mental disor ers. Several diagnostic work-
arounds were employed by mental health practitioners in order to acquire authorization 
from insurers to provide psychotherapeutic services without having to severely label an 
adolescent with depression or anxiety. Adjustment disor ers were the go-to disorders and 
the fact that V codes (relationship and social environmental problems) are not recognized 
as legitimate diagnoses were found to be a contentious issue for contemporary 
psychotherapists. It is clear that the transformation of adolescent selves through DSM 
diagnostic labels, and the degree to which adolescent  adopt technoscientific identities 
based on DSM disorder labels is an important area for future work, although an area for 
which an IRB approval may prove to be near unattainable (are you still awake)? 
These five biomedicalization processes occur at muliple levels of the social and 




ambivalences, negotiations and countertrends (Clarke et al 2010). I employ 
biomedicalization theory in my analysis and examine the ways in which these processes 
are actively negotiated, resisted and/or transformed in different ways through mental 
health practitioners’ theoretical orientations and pproaches to treatment (chapter three); 
negotiate diagnostic processes, biomedical and bureauc atic standardization (chapter 
four), and are governed by assemblages of insurance d state power (chapter five). 
 Contemporary biopolitics and biomedicalization necessitate scholarship which 
examines concrete practices and sites of action within situated political and economic 
contexts (Clarke et al 2010; Haraway 2004; Raman and Tutton 2010). Raman and Tutton 
(2010) challenge Rabinow and Rose’s body of work on bi politics and the assumption 
that in interactions of medical technoscience and society, biopower operates only through 
the life sciences and at the molecular level (Rabinow 2002, 1996; Rabinow and Rose 
2004; Rose 2001). Further, they critique the notion hat contemporary biosocieties and 
their discursive practices of life, health and illness, are post-disciplinary (Raman and 
Tutton 2010). While citizens of U.S. society increasingly participate in individual self-
techniques to optimize, enhance and self-govern their own health, they also continue to 
be shaped by institutional authorities and disciplinary knowledges. State population and 
subpopulation categories, statistics and interventions, niche standardizations as well as 
self-identified sociopolitical categories; continue to be crucial to contemporary biopower 
and biomedical knowledge production. Finally, Raman and Tutton (2010) importantly 
critique how too many analyses of biopolitics have ignored the issue of resource 
allocation and potential uneven access to the opportunistic self-enhancement and 




Contemporary studies of the biopolitical economy and the medical professions 
have begun to demonstrate the ways that biomedical, genetic and neurological 
technologies serve to further stratify health care within the United States and globally 
between wealthy and poor nations (Clarke et al 2010; Scheper-Hughes 2004; Shim 2010, 
2005, 2002). Following Casper and Morrison (2010), Clark et al (2010), Raman and 
Tutton (2010) and other key Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars (Braun et al 
2010; Fujimura, Duster and Rajagopalan 2008; Harbers 2005; Rosoff 2010), I investigate 
concrete sites of action situated within the contemporary adolescent mental health care 
arena in order to reveal the contours of contemporary biopower and biomedicalization in-
practice.  
Following the theory/methods that have been reviewed thus far, this study bridges 
the gulf between STS of medical practices and the sociology of mental health and illness. 
Since the beginning of my graduate education, I have been interested in studying the 
social aspects of mental health and illness, but have found social constructivist SI 
approaches to be marginalized in this field, at bes. I argue STS theory/methods such as 
grounded theory, and the empirical work on the medical professions and medical 
practices has much to contribute to understanding the debates within the sociology of 
mental health and illness, especially regarding its definition and measurement. In the final 
section of this chapter, I review these debates. 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS 
Sociologists who examine mental health and illness focus on social circumstances, how 
the organization of society and the medical establishment shapes the proportion of the 




to mental illness (Horwitz 2010). In studying social processes of everyday life, 
sociological studies of mental health and illness might examine (1) how social processes 
influence the definition of mental illness or the classificatory boundaries of what 
constitutes mental illness or mental health; (2) the role social processes play in the 
aetiology or causation of mental illness; and/or (3) the social processes of mental health 
practice such as diagnosis and therapeutic intervention (Busfield 2001, 2000).  
While there are several sociological perspectives of mental health and illness and 
the field is inherently interdisciplinary, sociological studies are generally focused on 
examining mental health and illness from the standpoint that social arrangements and 
processes are integral to understanding both the causes of mental illness and its 
consequences (Aneshensel and Phelan 1999).  
This assertion rests first and foremost on a foundation of empirical research 
demonstrating repeatedly and convincingly that mental disorders are not randomly 
distributed throughout society, but tend to cluster more densely within some social strata 
than others . . . a person’s chance of developing and maintaining a healthy mental state 
throughout the life course is influenced by his or he social status, for example, by 
gender, race or ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (SES). These characteristics also 
influence the ways in which disorder is likely to be experienced and expressed. 
(Aneshensel and Phelan 1999:4) 
 
Further, the social circumstances of a person’s life, including his/her social status 
characteristics, influence interactions with mental health professionals including the 
likelihood of particular diagnoses or treatment in particular settings (Aneshensel and 
Phelan 1999). The theoretical and empirical lessons of the sociology of mental health and 
illness have much to contribute to this study, but in addition to the basic assumptions and 
empirical lessons just described, I particularly build on the critical debates over the 
definition and measurement of mental illness.  




Sociologists’ attention to definitional issues surro nding mental health and illness is 
important in that popular, practitioner and/or scientific understandings of what “it” is 
socially shapes how we talk about,  experience, intrvene and respond to “it”. Several 
sociological scholars working in the sociology of mental health and illness subfield have 
weighed in on the debate over whether or not mental illness is better conceptualized as 
distress or disorder. For instance, there have beentwo special journal issues in which 
researchers were invited to grapple specifically with the question of how best to define 
and measure mental illness: The Journal of Health and Social Behavior (2002:43) and 
health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine 
(2007:11). Each demonstrated the integral role the definition of mental health and illness 
plays in this arena of sociological scholarship.  One good place to start is the social stress 
paradigm.  
The stress process paradigm has dominated the sociology f mental health for the 
past 30 years (Aneshensel 2005; Horwitz 2007b; Pearlin 1989). The paradigm 
investigates how social arrangements and resources contribute to mental illness.14 Stress 
process researchers have investigated a variety of different social sources or conditions of 
mental illness, but over time, three key contexts or fundamental causes have been 
demonstrated: (1) inequalities in income, power and/or prestige, (2) loss of or absence of 
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close attachments (i.e., divorce, death of a loved one, social isolation), and (3) the 
inability to attain important life goals (Horwitz 2007b).15  
While sociologists generally focus on the consequences social structures or social 
arrangements have on mental health and illness, Sharon Schwartz critiques the tendency 
for scholars to reduce sociological phenomena into psychological constructs such as 
mastery and self-esteem (Schwartz 2002:224). The critique that sociologists of mental 
health and illness too often measure mental illness at the level of the individual largely 
holds today, although there are a growing number of xceptions (see Scheid 2004, 2003, 
2000). Schwartz (2002) argues sociologists should seek to understand the variety of 
consequences of social organization rather than the etiology of specific disorders. “We 
should examine whatever outcomes fit with our theories of how the social world impacts 
our minds and bodies” (Schwartz 2002:233).  
John Mirowsky and Catherine Ross (2002) also argue we should study a broader 
range of symptoms, especially the material connections between how our epistemological 
constructs (distress or disorder) align with particular kinds of understandings and 
experiences of mental health and illness. They claim that mental illness scholars should 
be more mindful of how our measurements shape and reflect how people actually 
experience mental illness (Mirowsky and Ross 2002). Measuring mental illness as 
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 Horwitz claims that similar to social stress research, evolutionary psychology research demonstrates 
that humans become distressed in contexts of subordination, attachment loss and inability to achieve 
valued goals, and thus both of these fields of research lead to the conclusion that distress is a natural 
response to stressful situations (2007b). Thus, Horwitz (2007b) argues that both the sociology of stress 
and evolutionary psychology research demonstrate that distress is a natural response to social 





discrete diagnostic categories rather than as a broade  range of symptoms makes it more 
difficult to understand the problem because it discards important information (or fails to 
consider social context) (Mirowsky and Ross 2002):16  
Psychological problems are not discrete. Diagnostic categories do not reflect the reality 
of psychological problems. Indexes are scientifically superior to diagnostic categories, 
but continuums are not as useful in convincing the public, other physicians, insurance 
companies, or government agencies that psychiatric problems are real, serious problems 
that deserve insurance coverage and funding (Wilson 1993). (Mirowsky and Ross 
2002:160)  
 
Expanding upon Schwartz’s (2002) call for sociologists to examine a broader 
range of social rather than psychological variables, Aneshensel (2005) demonstrates 
empirically that mental health effects of social organization are nonspecific. She 
differentiates a social etiology from a social consequences model of research; for her, 
social etiology identifies social antecedents of one particular disorder whereas the social 
consequences model is concerned with overall mental health consequences of social 
arrangements (Aneshensel 2005). In showing the multiple ways that we can examine the 
social consequences of social institutions and arrangements (including families, schools, 
relationships and social status characteristics), Aneshensel reiterates that social conditions 
frequently affect more than one domain of functioning. When sociologists examine 
specific disorders rather than a broad array of social consequences, the impact of social 
conditions is underestimated (Aneshensel 2005). She argues that sociological methods of 
                                                           
16
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range – minor to major, low to high number or low to high intensity, of symptoms). See Aneshensel 2002, 
2005; Kessler 2002, Mirowsky and Ross; Wheaton 2001 for more discussion of the discrete versus 




research should reveal the broad impact of social organization on health outcomes, not 
conceal it.  
Horwitz (2007a) argues that social arrangements produce two different types of 
psychological outcomes – mental disorders and mental distress, and that its important to 
distinguish between the two. For both Horwitz (2007a) and Wakefield (1992), the 
difference is that a mental disorder exists when a psychological mechanism is broken 
down, regardless of whether its cause was social, psychological or biological. Horwitz 
argues that distress occurs as the result of stressful circumstances; and sociologists can 
tell it is distress and not disorder because when t s ressor disappears, the distress 
subsides. The definitional distinction is that distre s is a normal human emotion and a 
reaction to social circumstance whereas disorder is not (Horwitz 2007a).  
Horwitz (2007a) argues that sociologists do more harm than good when they 
assume that stressors necessarily produce mental disorders, rather than distinguishing 
between the outcomes of distress and disorder that often, kinds of social circumstances 
might give rise to. He claims this does not mean tht distress is less severe or a more 
transient version of disorder, since stressful circumstances can lead to very serious but 
non-disordered and long-lasting distressing symptoms that are not disorders (see Turner 
et al 1995). Thus, it is not the severity of psychological symptoms that distinguishes 
distress from disorder, but rather the presence or absence of social stressors, i.e. when the 
stressors are removed and the psychological symptoms c ntinue, then its disorder, if they 
get better, its distress: 
Finally, when both levels of stressfulness and sympto s stay high over time, the issue of 
whether conditions are distressed or disordered remains unresolved. Longstanding 




a disorder; alternatively, persistent symptoms could reflect a natural response to the 
continuing stressfulness of social circumstances. (Horwitz 2007a:283) 
 
Horwitz’s (2007a) analysis challenges sociologists to reconceptualize mental 
illness by developing clear definitions and measurements for both distress and disorder, 
including the kinds of factors most likely to lead to each. He believes that by labeling 
outcome variables as distress rather than disorder, sociologists can help resist the 
inappropriate medicalization of human emotions and life conditions (see Conrad 2005; 
Horwitz 2007a).17   
In response, Schwartz (2007) claims that Horwitz’s (2007a) definition of mental 
disorder is based on Jerome Wakefield’s ‘harmful dysfunction’ criterion. She notes that 
disorder as individual dysfunction is the key criterion that distinguishes Horwitz’s 
(2007a) definition of disorder from distress. In the t eory of the harmful dysfunction 
model, dysfunction refers to an organ or mechanism that is not performing its intended 
function, as can be inferred from evolutionary psychology (Wakefield 1992). Following 
this notion of functionality of bodily organs and mental processes as they have evolved 
across time, Wakefield (1992) defines a mental disor er as a condition that arises when 
an internal mechanism fails to perform its intended or ‘natural’ function, and causes some 
harm to the person.  
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 In the field of psychiatry as well as in the pharmaceutical industry, there is currently a recognition that 
any intense emotion as mental disorder. Medicalization justifies social policies that define and allocate 
resources to conditions that are viewed as pathologies of individuals rather than stressful social 
arrangements (Conrad 2005; Horwitz 2007a). Social policies that improve child and elder care, family 
leave, unemployment benefits, health care coverage, etc should provide better solutions for preventing 





Schwartz (2007) takes issue with the ambiguity of the dysfunction criterion when 
it comes to determining the intended or natural functio s of cognitive, linguistic, affective 
or motivational mechanisms. Further, she argues that scientific advances have rebuked 
simple one gene, one neurotransmitter models by showing that most evidence 
demonstrates that mental disorders arise from complex interactions at multiple levels of 
organization (Schwartz 2007). Her critique is that t e harmful dysfunction criterion 
presupposes that minds operate like the biology of bodies – that they have natural mental 
functions first and when they dysfunction, then it may be social or internal (biological): 
“While this notion of dysfunction may eventually prove useful in separating disorder from 
non-disorder, as a conceptual framework for the categorization of any particular 
condition it is a hypothesis to be tested” (Schwartz 2007:294).  
Schwartz (2007) critiques the definition of mental disorder, and thus the 
distinction Horwitz (2007a) makes between disorder and distress, on the basis of the 
dysfunction criterion because of (1) a lack of scientific consensus on what mental 
functions are and therefore, when they are dysfunctio al and (2) the value criterion –  i.e. 
that symptoms are expectable or not is based on social judgment and thus strips the 
concept of dysfunction from its objective character. 
Schwartz (2007) also questions the feasibility of operationalizing internal 
dysfunction (i.e. expectability of psychological symptoms) in sociological studies. While 
Horwitz (2007a) suggests we rate responses in proporti n to their context to determine 
normality or pathology (normality indicated when the severity and duration of symptoms 
are proportionate to the stressor), Schwartz (2007) notes that the establishment of levels 




statistical averages, that require local definitions f symptom severity. Also, the duration 
of symptoms or response to a stressor will be determined based on social norms of 
expectable response to a given social circumstance (Schwartz 2007). Further, she argues: 
But the most fundamental problem is the assumption that an outcome that 
substantially outlasts the stressor or is disproportional in severity is a sign of an 
internal dysfunction that says something is broken. Why do we assume the body 
works in a way that things are broken or not? There may be weaknesses, 
inefficiencies and liabilities that interact with contexts large and small to 
determine responses. (Schwartz 2007:296)  
 
Yet, Schwartz (2007) leaves open the possibility that e expectability of 
symptom response may be a conceptual and operational improvement over current 
discrete disorder measurements in which symptoms are completely decontextualized 
from the social environment. Horwitz (2007a) argues that sociologists of mental health 
and illness in general, and social stress research in particular, have failed to distinguish 
between distress and disorder, and further, that distress, not disorder, is the proper 
outcome for social stress research focusing on social arrangements such as life events, 
chronic strains and conflicting roles (see Pearlin 1989; Aneshensel 2005). Schwartz 
(2007) on the other hand, argues that the social stress paradigm is more general and is 
focused on examining all of the consequences of social structures; if Horwitz (2007a) is 
right, then empirical inquiry will, demonstrate stressful events to be highly associated 
with distress and less associated with disorder, but this remains an empirical question.  
Wheaton (2007) argues that the distinction Horwitz (2007a) makes between 
distress and disorder defines distress as transient, expectable, natural and less 
consequential for outcomes compared to disorder. While only some of this is true— 




and lead to internal dysfunctions or disorder – (2007a)— Wheaton’s (2007) problem with 
this binary definition is that it positions the sociology of mental illness or distress 
research as less important and excludes major stressors as key social causes, thereby 
privileging biological explanations of mental disorde s. Wheaton (2007) focuses on how 
the two definitions and measures overlap, and whether or not distress and disorder are 
indicators of a single underlying construct, leading to his own definition. 
Wheaton (2007) defines distress as an affect-based impairment in social 
functioning. This is a more specific definition of distress in that it is tied to two forms of 
disorder (depression and anxiety). In comparison, Dohrenwend et al. (1980) define 
distress independently from disorder as a non-specific form of demoralization and 
Mirowsky and Ross (1989) define it in terms of subjectively uncomfortable states. In 
contrast to Horwitz’s definition of distress, Wheaton’s (2007) is not transient, moderate 
or normal (Wheaton 2007). He critiques Horwitz’s (2007a) assumption that distress is an 
expectable or proportionate response to stress, claiming that research on stress doesn’t 
show a clear pattern of normative or expectable respon e (Wheaton 2007). While 
Horwitz (2007a) draws on the work of Wakefield (1992) and his harmful dysfunction 
model in his definitional criteria, Wheaton draws on the history of stress research and 
Kessler’s (1979) differential vulnerability model.  
The history of stress research and the differential vulnerability model both focus 
on the wide variability in individual responses to the same social stressors (Kessler 1979; 
Thoits 1995; Wheaton 1999, 2007). Wheaton (2007) argues that to be an expectable 
response, it should be not just the average but the prevalent response. Further, he argues 




response to stress, the empirical evidence shows a number of life events that produce 
chronic strains (e.g., divorce) (Eccles 2005; Sweeney and Horwitz 2001; Wheaton 1990; 
2007).  Third, he rebukes the common assumption that disorder (but not distress) 
produces impaired functioning, arguing that distress is more stable than is widely 
assumed and has patterns of life consequences that mirror the evidence of redirection in 
life trajectories reported in studies of disorder (Wheaton 2007). Finally, he argues that the 
DSM-IV definition of disorder similarly sets up distress and not disorder as related to 
social causation. Wheaton claims that this is problematic because these are theoretic 
models, no internal dysfunction has been located within ndividuals with mental disorder 
and the manifestation of dysfunction is heterogeneous. Rather than continuing to use 
distress as a screening device and considering disorder as closer to the gold standard 
(which doesn’t exist yet for mental illness diagnosis), he suggests scholars take a less 
bounded approach that might lead to a better understanding of the correspondence 
between distress and disorder (Wheaton 2007). In summary, Wheaton (2007) argues that 
when talking about stress, variability is the rule, and distress demonstrates many of the 




DSM and ICD Classification Systems’ Definitions and Criteria of Mental Illness 
Sociology is not the only field grappling with how to reach consensus about how 
best to define and measure mental illness. Contemporary classification systems such as 
the DSM and ICD strongly shape mental health and ill ess practice and research, but 
even such seemingly coherent systems resist conceptual clarity about the definition and 
diagnostic criterion of mental illness.  
Unlike many sociologists who critique the DSM definition of mental illness, 
Allan Horwitz argues that the DSM’s definition of mental disorder appropriately 
distinguishes between disordered and nondisordered con itions that are the result of 
social stressors (Horwitz 2007b; Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). However, in their book 
The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow Into Depressive 
Disorder (2007), Horwitz and Wakefield carefully demonstrate that several sets of 
criterion for DSM disorders contradict its own definition (Horwitz 2007b; Horwitz and 
Wakefield 2007). The problem, they argue, began with the DSM-III when the APA set 
out to erase theoretical, especially psychodynamic, assumptions from the manual 
(Horwitz 2007b; Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). With te publication of the DSM-III, the 
field of psychiatry tried to purge all theoretical assumptions of etiology from the manual 
and adopt symptom based definitions. In doing so they also took out terms such as 
“excessive.” This led to all symptoms, whether “normal and proportionate” responses to 
social stressors or “inappropriate and pathological” signs of dysfunction, to become 
treated as indicators of mental illness (Horwitz 2007b; Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). 
Thus, Horwitz and Wakefield (2007) critique the DSM for inconsistent disorder diagnosis 




In response, they provide their own definitions: diorder as pathological internal 
dysfunction, distress as normal sadness. 
Rather than critique the DSM’s definition and criterion of mental disorder, 
Michael Phillips (2009) examines the operationalization of distress both within and 
across the dominant classification systems. He argues that despite being vague and 
unclearly defined, the concept of distress is widely used in both the DSM and to some 
extent, the ICD systems of classification (Phillips 2009). Phillips (2009) questions 
whether distress is a symptom of mental disorders, a marker of functional impairment, or 
both, and examines what he notes as substantial differences and inconsistencies both 
across and within the two diagnostic systems’ use of distress: 
. . . both diagnostic systems use distress as a stand-alone symptom, as a qualifier of other 
symptoms and as a general measure of severity, but neither the DSM-IV nor the ICD-10 
provides a definition of the term, so there can be a wide range of interpretations of the 
corresponding diagnostic criteria. The frequent use of various qualifiers for distress in the 
diagnostic criteria (clinically significant, marked, excessive, etc) suggests that distress is 
construed as a dimensional construct that is being truncated to be employed as a 
categorical diagnostic criterion, but the diagnostic ystems do not assess the degree of 
distress and do not provide further clarification about the cut off between distress that is 
and is not diagnostically important. (Phillips 2009:92) 
 
Given the lack of consensus in the literature on the definition of distress, Phillips (2009) 
argues that the makers of both diagnostic classification systems have two options. First, if 
they can’t find a suitable operational definition for distress, then it should be dropped 
entirely from the diagnostic criteria and from the assessment of functional impairment. 
Otherwise, if it is possible to develop an operational definition of distress, it should be 




all disorders, and be considered as a symptom for some specific disorders (Phillips 
2009:92).18  
Multiple Models and Measurements of Mental Illness 
 
In response to this ongoing source of conflict in the sociology of mental health and 
illness, Andrew Payton (2009) empirically assesses three competing frameworks 
regarding the relationships between the concepts mental disorder, mental distress and 
mental health. First, he tests what he terms the modal perspective, the historical tendency 
of mental health researchers to view mental illness or disorder as the larger concept and 
assume mental health exists in the absence of mental ill ess (Payton 2009). In contrast to 
this modal perspective, the positive psychology pers ctive argues that mental health is 
not the same thing as absence of mental disorder, but instead, is its own concept. In fact, 
Marie Jahoda’s (1958) classic piece demonstrates the necessity of specificity and 
distinction with regards to the differential content between negative and positive affect. 
Yet, the norm in studies of health and illness tends to be to focus on mental illness at the 
expense of mental health as a unique concept in itself.  
Second, Payton (2009) tests what he calls the Mirowsky and Ross (1989, 2002) 
perspective which treats distress as the larger umbrella concept and defines it as negative 
emotional affect, commonly manifested as depression or anxiety. Third, he tests the 
positive psychology perspective that mental health is a separate and unique construct that 
is not simply the presence or absence of mental disorder (Payton 2009). The results of his 
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analyses demonstrate that mental disorder, distress and health are all distinct concepts 
and should be studied both separately and in interaction. His results provide support for 
the positive psychology perspective because mental health and disorder do not appear to 
exist on a continuum, yet this perspective and his tests neglect the relationship between 
mental distress and mental health. Payton (2009) argues that his results suggest we think 
of mental health, distress and disorder through a discontinuous lens – that while these 
concepts may be correlated, they do not underlie a continuum. “In fact, the moderate-to-
strong correlations among the concepts suggest that the substantive relationships among 
the concepts are likely more important than the mere fact that they are conceptually 
distinct phenomena” (Payton 2009:223).  
Social Meanings of Health and Illness  
 
In theorizing the potential relationships between the unique constructs of mental 
health, distress and disorder, Payton states: “It is likely that how the individual, her or his 
significant others, professionals, and corporations view these phenomena plays a part in 
how these phenomena relate to one another in the actual experience of them” (Payton 
2009:225). Thus, social meanings of health and illness— epistemological knowledges 
of— shape their materiality (social practices of intervention, individual and collective 
experiences, etc.). In this last section, I focus on the consequences of the contemporary 
dominant definition of mental illness as mental disorder.  
As a result of the third revision of the DSM in 1980, biological psychiatry 
undergirds the dominant contemporary definition andu erstanding of mental illness. 
The biological revolution in thinking has displaced social, environmental and 




the consequences the contemporary dominant perspective has for larger societal 
understandings and responses to mental illness.   
Since the third edition, the DSM fails to distinguish symptoms that are responses 
to stressful circumstances from those that are individual pathology and represent true 
mental disorders (Horwitz 2007b; Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). Horwitz and Wakefield 
(2007) argue that while the conflation of normal versus pathological symptoms can easily 
be corrected in clinical practice settings where practitioners use their own judgment, three 
other major consequences have resulted: (1) inflation of rates of mental illness in 
community populations, (2) public policy towards mental illness focused on unmet need 
for treatment and (3) shifting societal norms surronding mental illness, mainly, 
expanding the social space of pathology (Horwitz 2007b; Horwitz and Wakefield 2007).  
Horwitz and Wakefield, among others, argue that the field of psychiatry created 
the atheoretical DSM-III to enhance their scientific status as a profession, but once the 
APA’s DSM-III popularized symptom based definitions, several groups such as the 
pharmaceutical and insurance industries, found they benefited from them (Horwitz 
2007b; Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). That a number of constituencies benefit from the 
atheoretical symptom based definitions popularized by the DSM-III is the reason why 
they haven’t changed (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). Both the profession of medicine in 
general and the profession of psychiatry in particular, are rewarded with the primary 
claim to jurisdiction over an expanding range of conditions that are redefined as medical 
problems (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007).  
Symptom-based conceptions of medical disorder thus expand the range of conditions that 
can be the legitimate objects of psychiatric management. Piggybacked on justifiable 
exercises of psychiatric power aimed at mental disor er, normal human emotions, once 




psychotropic medications or psychotherapy. These technologies have spread from the 
mental hospital or psychiatric clinic to the doctor’s office, the school classroom, and the 
Internet self-help site. (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007:213)  
 
However, psychiatrists are not the only mental healt  professionals who benefit from 
symptom-based definitions of mental disorder. Sympto  based definitions of mental 
disorders help clinicians receive insurance reimbursement for rendering therapeutic 
services, largely because insurance companies will pay for conditions for which treatment 
is medically necessary but not for “problems of living” (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). 
Further, researchers, public policy, government and f mily organizations all benefit from 
symptom-based definitions in that their research is easier, less expensive, better funded, 
estimates of the social and economic costs of mental ill ess are bigger, and mental illness 
becomes less stigmatized as larger percentages of the population are recognized as 
afflicted (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007). Research funding has facilitated biological, 
neurological and genetic understandings of mental illness, impacting all scientific 
disciplines that take mental health and/or mental illness as their object of study. It is no 
surprise that pharmaceutical companies reap enormous pr fits from their reliance on 
symptom based definitions of disorders in their advertisements (Horwitz and Wakefield 
2007).  
 While Horwitz and Wakefield (2007) adeptly cover the range of consequences of 
the medicalization of unpleasant emotions, Schwartz (2007) questions why their critique 
only pertains to distress and not disorder. She points out that there are several physical 
disorders for which a wide variety of treatment regimens exist that include behavioral, 
social and pharmaceutical solutions (Schwartz 2007). For example, diabetes may be 




monitors and insulin (Schwartz 2007). The assumption in Horwitz and Wakefield’s 
(2007) argument is that medicine is appropriate to treat dysfunctions but not for treating 
distress, yet Schwartz argues that there are consequences or side effects of any 
intervention and questions whether it is necessarily more fruitful to treat disorder rather 
than serious chronic distress with medication. Further, Horwitz (2007b) claims that by 
distinguishing distress from disorder, sociologists can help redress the hyperfocus on the 
individual as the site for intervention because distress, since it is clearly caused by social 
stressors, should be solved by social policy. Yet again, Schwartz (2007) questions why 
this would be true for distress but not disorder and cites evidence from the field of social 
epidemiology that has repeatedly demonstrated how social policies are often the most or 
only effective way of preventing or ameliorating disease and or dysfunctions.  
Dysfunctions while located within the body are not of he body alone. In the effort to 
demarcate dysfunction from normal response, the boundaries are translated into gaps that 
are far too wide. The body and its functions and dysfunctions cannot be separated from 
the social and physical environments in which it resid s. Ultimately, these considerations 
make me hesitant about this approach to our outcome variables. My fear is that attempts 
to make sharp distinctions between disorders and distress, between the normal and the 
abnormal, may lead to more harm than benefit. It may do harm to our understanding of 
disease formation if the conceptualization of dysfunction does not reflect our physiology. 
It may do harm to the hard-fought movement to consider the role of the social in both the 
cause and the cure of frank medical conditions. It may deflect the recognition that our 
bodies are socialized bodies that have no existence independent of the social context in 
which we carry out our biologic functions. The disorder/distress boundary may be 
inherently fuzzy and value laden. I am not yet convinced that an objective dysfunction 
criterion can provide a distinct or useful marker. (Schwartz 2007:298)  
 
Horwitz (2007b) urges sociologists to focus on distre s rather than disorder 
because he believes distress but not disorder is caused by social arrangements. The 
problem with this distinction is that it leaves out the role of social conditions and 
stressors in causing, mediating or alleviating mental disorders. However, it is now 




social environment and are changed by it. Contemporary genetic diathesis models and 
findings about brain plasticity bear witness to a much more intricate interaction between 
our biological and social mechanisms. As argued by Schwartz (2002, 2007), sociologists 
who study mental health and illness should be envisioning theoretical models of our 
minds and bodies as interconnected. Sociologists of mental health and illness should 
explore the relationships between the social and biological, distress and disorder and 
health, and not just mental or physical health, but the too often ignored relationship 
between them. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter three examines how adolescent mental disorders are defined and 
approached within and across psychotherapeutic communities of practice, or social 
worlds. I examine how psychotherapy is understood as an art and a science through a set 
of knowledge-practice tensions that are salient in co temporary mental health care 
practice. Chapter four examines the social processes of diagnosis, including practitioner 
negotiations of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) and the ways in which the 
DSM as a biomedical technology shapes the diagnoses and therapeutic interventions 
adolescents receive. Chapter five examines the largr macro political economy of the 
adolescent mental health field and the meso level institutional forces shaping the 
conditions under which screening, diagnosis and treatm nt of adolescent disturbances 
occur. For instance, in out-patient expert mental he lt  professional settings, managed 
care is a major social force that shapes the everyday care work of practitioners. Finally, in 
chapter six, I theorize what the empirical data and alysis from this study suggest about 




Chapter 3: The Art of Psychotherapy:   
Therapeutic Eclecticism, Interdisciplinarity & Clinical Expertise 
 
The clinical professions that take adolescent mental disorders as a key object of 
study and or intervention are diverse in their background disciplinary training, 
professional socialization, theoretical orientations a d approaches to therapeutic 
intervention. This chapter examines how adolescent mental illnesses are defined and 
approached within and across multiple psychotherapeutic social worlds. I examine these 
relationships through the following three knowledge-practice tensions that are salient in 
contemporary mental health care practice: (1) Biomedicalization vs. eclectic theoretical 
orientations to mental health and illness; (2) Increasing specialization and 
interdisciplinarity; and (3) a simultaneous push for standardization (Evidence Based 
Practices) and individualized treatment plans and care. 
First, I examine how practitioners negotiate the knowledge-practice tensions 
between the dominant biomedical model and their owntheoretical orientations and 
approaches to treatment. Building on Luhrmann’s (2000) concept of models of illness 
and Scheid’s (2004) concept of treatment ideologies, I deploy the concept of theoretical 
orientation to understand how contemporary psychotherapeutic clinicians define and 
intervene in adolescent mental illness. Theoretical orientation refers to how their 
epistemology of mental health and illness, their disciplinary and professional 
socialization, and their current institutional work settings all influence their 
understandings and approaches to psychotherapy. My anal sis reveals three ways that 
MHPs resist the biomedical model of illness and, instead, embrace eclectic and more 




theoretical orientations as eclectic and/or in opposition to the biomedical paradigm. 
Second, their theoretical orientations and approaches to treatment focus on the strengths 
of adolescents and their families with a turn towards constructivism. Third, their 
theoretical orientations value the social aspects of mental health and illness, including the 
central role of relationships and understanding the complex personhood of adolescents in 
approaching psychotherapy interventions. 
Second, I explore the knowledge-practice tension betwe n the increasing 
specialization within the mental health professions a d growing interdisciplinarity of 
psychotherapeutic social worlds. I examine the costs and benefits of the diversification of 
the field of mental health care from the standpoint f psychotherapeutic social worlds. 
Does it matter that mental health professionals enter therapeutic practice from a diverse 
set of disciplines, specialties (i.e. social worlds)? My analysis reveals that the 
interdisciplinarity of the mental health professions has become black-boxed, or a taken 
for granted aspect of mental health care. MHPs perceive the interdisciplinarity of the field 
as necessary to fulfill different types of health care coverage needs. Interdisciplinarity at 
its best is described as facilitating professional collaboration and more comprehensive 
care and at its worst, encouraging jurisdictional disputes and the devaluing of some of the 
professions’ perspectives and contributions.  
Third, I examine how practitioners negotiate the tensions between the 
simultaneous push for standardization and personalized medicine. To what extent do 
mental health practitioners embrace Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) and Evidence 
Based Practices (EBPs) in their every day clinical work and to what extent do they focus 




patients (students)? Largely in response to concerns about variability, EBPs have 
developed and are defined as an integration of the best research evidence, clinical 
expertise and patient values (IOM 2001). My analysis reveals that psychotherapeutic 
social worlds value EBPs as a good place to start in their treatment plans, but claim it is 
important to maintain clinical freedom (professional autonomy) and flexibility with 
regards to theoretical orientations and treatment techniques. MHPs critique the way in 
which EBPs privilege scientific evidence over patient subjectivity, social context and the 
therapeutic relationship. Further, MHPs take issue with the way managed care policies 
have implemented EBPs in ways that have shifted the field of mental health care from 
psychodynamic towards more Cognitive Behavioral focused theoretical orientations and 
therapies. At the heart of this criticism is a tensio  over how best to define and measure 
mental health and illness. MHPs struggle with the EBP standardization and how it 
privileges discrete, quantitative understanding and measurement of emotional well-being. 
CONTEMPORARY KNOWLEDGE-PRACTICE TENSIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE 
While biological psychiatry has reigned as the dominant paradigm of mental 
health and illness in the U.S since the 1980s, biomedicalization isn’t a hegemonic 
process. Biological psychiatry is entrenched in scientific, legal, and popular discourses 
and clinical practices of mental health and illness, yet there are also on-going active 
negotiations, resistances and countertrends to biomedicine.19 Contemporary knowledge-
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practices of health and illness in U.S. society have been characterized as suffering from 
competing paradigms (Gergen 1997) and problematic interactions between two kinds of 
medical knowledge—experiential and experimental (May et al 2005). Kenneth Gergen 
(1997) points out that at the crux of the controversy over definitions and orientations 
toward treatment of mental illness lies incommensurable conceptualizations of 
personhood. He, like Saul Feldman (2003) calls for the democratization of the mental 
health project— for the healthcare institution to mve beyond silos of distinct professions 
and practitioners, and the totalitarian logic of biomedicine (Gergen 1997). Gergen argues 
that multiple worlds of clinical practice are doing just that – that there is a “rapidly 
growing movement of therapists, social workers, counselors and other professionals who 
reject the essentializing and objectifying predilect ons of both the psychological and 
biological professions. They are deeply cognizant of the socially constructed character of 
these realities” (Gergen 1997:26). Within several disciplinary and professional worlds, 
the biomedical approach to mental health has been critiqued for its epistemological 
assumptions of universal truths, objectivity, rationality and moral principles (Gergen, 
Lightfoot & Sydow 2004). These challenges can be located in multiple disciplines and 
professional social worlds.  
In a study on the technological changes and solutions in medicine, May et. al 
(2005) demonstrate that there is a fundamental tension between two different kinds of 
medical knowledge that are actively negotiated in the heterogeneity of clinical encounters 
(for specific study exemplars, see Clarke et al. 2003; Franklin 2001; Nettleton 2004; 
Waldby 2000). These two kinds of knowledge emerge fom different ways of organizing 




medicine (or individualized treatment plans) and the push for statistical evidence about 
large populations, i.e. Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) or Evidence Based Practices 
(EBPs). These kinds of knowledges can be characterized as (1) experiential qualitative 
knowledge rooted in clinical experience and worked out in the everyday encounter versus 
the (2) experimental quantitative knowledge derived from population studies, 
Randomized Control Trials (RCTs), and meta-analyses (May et al. 2005). Thus multiple 
kinds of medical knowledges coexist and inform conceptualizations of health and illness, 
patient personhood and orientations toward therapeutic practice.  While contemporary 
assemblages of scientific research funding, insurance d pharmaceutical companies, 
media and popular sentiment favor a biomedical view of health and illness; the 
interdisciplinary arena of the health professions democratizes and diversifies theoretical 
orientation and approaches to therapeutic intervention. Thus, there exists a simultaneous 
push for EBM/EBPs and individualized treatment plans; for objective scientific 
guidelines and professional expertise and discretion; for professional specialization and 
interdisciplinarity. All of these technoscientific knowledge tensions are at work in 
contemporary clinical practices. 
In what follows, I examine the relationships between these different social worlds 
of psychotherapeutic practice and their definitions a d approaches to adolescent mental 
illness through three knowledge-practice tensions salient in contemporary mental health 
care practice. First, I examine how practitioners negotiate the knowledge-practice 
tensions between the dominant biomedical model and their own theoretical orientations 
to treatment. Second, I explore the costs and benefits of the diversification (simultaneous 




health professionals enter therapeutic practice from a diverse set of disciplines and 
specialties? Third, I examine how practitioners negotiate the tensions between the 
simultaneous push for standardization and personalized medicine. To what extent do 
mental health practitioners embrace Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) and Evidence 
Based Practices (EBPs) in their every day clinical work and to what extent do they focus 
more on tailoring their treatment plans (or Individualized Educational Plans IEPs) to their 
patients (students)?  
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL WORLDS OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRACTICE 
Social worlds are defined by their collective meanings, shared activities and 
ideological commitments. A recent study describes th  difficulty of distinguishing each 
mental health profession as a unique and distinctive entity:   
The heterogeneity of disciplines’ training programs, practitioners, clinical emphases, 
scope of practice, professional organizations, regulatory mechanisms, and other factors 
within and between disciplines confound comparisons among them. . . Their respective 
scopes of practice are overlapping and complementary, appearing to be increasingly fluid 
in response to changes in the healthcare system. (Robiner 2006:606) 
 
Thus, we cannot assume that all mental health professionals with a social work 
background will define or approach adolescent mental illness completely differently than 
professionals with counseling or psychology education l backgrounds. The mental health 
professionals that comprised the multiple social worlds in my study, while coming from 
multiple disciplinary backgrounds, having various forms of formal and informal training 
and working across diverse contexts of care, are all united as they all advocate for youth 
mental health and practice psychotherapy.  
While United States federal law only recognizes social workers, psychologists, 




(AAMFT 2012), current analyses demonstrate that community counselors, marriage and 
family therapists, educational specialists trained in teaching children and adolescents with 
Emotional and Behavioral Disturbances EBDs (psychoeducators), primary care and 
pediatric physicians contribute significantly to the deliverance of mental health services 
(Ivey 1998; Walter 2006; (BLS) 2010-2011; BLS 2010-2011).20  
The mental health professions encompass a diverse array of disciplinary and 
professional training socialization processes. As the Mental Health Workforce operates in 
an increasingly complex and competitive health market, it has become more important to 
understand the total universe of MHPs and how their knowledges and practices, 
experience and expertise shape their increasingly iterdisciplinary professional activities 
(Robiner 2006). Analyses of the mental health servic s demonstrate a multiplicity of 
existing theoretical or epistemological models and overall fragmentation of services 
(Robiner 2006).  
The assemblage of the mental health professions continues to expand and 
diversify, as do the contexts of care in which they d liver their services. A growing 
number of youth receive mental health services in school and primary care (pediatrician 
and family doctor) settings. Social workers, counselor  and psychologists increasingly 
work in and are specially trained for, school settings.21  
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 A recent study that examined the six mental health professions of psychiatric nurses, licensed 
professional counselors, marriage and family therapists, psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers 
calculated that there were 353,398 clinically active providers (Ellis, Konrad et al. 2009). A different study 
using broader parameters estimated that 537,857 persons comprise the core Mental Health Professionals 
(MHPs) (Duffy 2004). 
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 A specialist degree or its equivalent is required in most states for professionals to work as school 




FRAMEWORKS: MODELS, IDEOLOGIES AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS 
Medical Anthropologist T. M. Luhrmann (2000) argues that each mental health 
practitioner has a personal model of illness, or their own epistemology of or answer to the 
question of why a patient is sick, disturbed or struggling. She argues that each 
professional’s answer to that question shapes their app oach to treatment, their goals of 
treatment, their interactions with the patient, andthe culture of the work place.  
Like the interpretive patterns that lead psychiatrists who are thinking therapeutically or 
biomedically to evaluate patients in different ways nd to anticipate different kinds of 
emotional responsibilities and responses to them, the psychotherapeutic interaction model 
of illness has a different impact on the life of a hospital unit than the biomedical disease 
model of illness. Working with these different models changes the way staff joke, the 
way doctors relate to nurses, and even the sense of th  unit’s ultimate goal. Ultimately 
these differences help to produce different moral sensibilities about mental illness. 
(Luhrmann 2000:119) 
 
T. M. Luhrmann’s (2000) ethnography of psychiatric residents in training illustrates how 
professional models of illness develop from disciplinary and professional socialization. 
She examined how psychodynamic and biomedical perspectives and training led to 
different therapeutic and pharmacological approaches and tools of intervention 
(Luhrmann 2000).22  Yet, medical sociologist Teresa Scheid (2004) found that mental 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Specialist (EdS) degree in school psychology requires a minimum of two years of full time graduate study 
and a one year internship during the third year. The training for EdS requires coursework in both 
education and psychology since their professional practice addresses both educational and mental health 
components of students’ development.  
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 Biomedical and pharmaceutical approaches tend to be more heavily relied upon in in-patient settings, 
whereas various forms of psychotherapy are more prevalent in out-patient settings. The majority of 
adolescents who receive some form of intervention for mental, emotional and behavioral disturbances 
are seen in out-patient clinical care and/or school settings. This chapter focuses on interviews with mental 




health practitioners leave their disciplinary and clini al training behind to some extent in 
their switch from the institution of schooling to that of the workplace.  
Scheid’s (2004; 1998) work has largely investigated how institutional 
environments and professionally generated norms shape interactions and approaches to 
treatment and care at the collective level. She argues that occupational identification is 
more important to understanding the work experiences of providers than their unique 
disciplinary backgrounds (Scheid 1998). That is, she argues that the types of 
organizational work places that mental health providers practice in matter just as much as 
their disciplinary and professional socialization in shaping their everyday work practices. 
Rather than investigating individual professional’s models of illness, Scheid analyzed 
treatment ideologies; defined by her as the complex set of beliefs providers hold about 
mental illness and treatment (Scheid 2004, 1994). She argues that treatment ideologies 
convey the individual theories providers hold about etiology, the way they view the 
provider-client relationship and what they consider the “best” treatment or approach 
(Scheid 2004). Rather than examining professional’s individual models of illness and 
how they were shaped by their disciplinary training a d socialization, Scheid examined 
treatment ideologies and argued that they arise from a combination of their past training 
and on-going work experiences.  
Following the work of Luhrmann (2000) and Scheid (2004), I analyze 
practitioner’s theoretical orientations – a combination of their individual models of and 
beliefs about etiology, as well as their treatment ideologies – or the complex set of 
orientations toward treatment that have been formed by both their past professional 




orientations of mental health practitioners, I demonstrate that while biological psychiatry 
is the contemporary dominant paradigm, alternative mental health professionals, i.e. those 
who are not biological psychiatrists, resist biomedicalization of mental health and illness. 
The diverse interdisciplinary field of alternative mental health professionals did not 
ascribe to biomedicine or biological psychiatry as their acting theoretical orientation or 
the collective ideology of their workplace. Instead, practitioners articulated numerous 
ways that their own theoretical orientations and approaches were alternative to and/or 
actively resisted the biomedical paradigm.  
DATA FINDINGS: THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOTHERAPY 
While biological psychiatry continues to be the dominant model of health and 
illness in U.S. society and the managed care organization of the mental health field, none 
of my practitioners identified it as their theoretical orientation.23 Several models of illness 
and therapeutic approaches were presented as important al ernatives to the biomedical 
paradigm, but often practitioners were resistant to name just one that was the most 
important and more often described the multiple models they used and how their 
therapeutic approach is eclectic. Theoretical orientations that were described most often 
include family systems, strength based, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), 
biopsychosocial, psychoeducational, psychoanalytica, solution focused, constructivism 
and relationship based. Rather than describe the ways in which their orientation, approach 
                                                           
23
 One mental health practitioner I interviewed did identify the medical model as the collective treatment 
approach of her organization, but clarified that this was only because they had restructured their 
treatment plans and practice to fall more in-line with the biomedical DSM and the bureaucratic 
requirements of managed care (each of these issues will be discussed in detail in the next chapter). While 
her organization had brought their diagnoses and treatment plans into correspondence with the 





or goals of treatment built on or contributed to the biomedical model, practitioners 
frequently located their therapeutic approach far away from it. Practitioners discussed 
aspects of psychotherapy, diagnosis and treatment that have not been valued and/or 
legitimated by the psychiatric profession’s DSM, insurance companies and the majority 
of mental health care research funding. My analysis revealed practitioners resisted the 
biomedical model of illness in the following three ways: (1) by describing their 
theoretical orientation and approach as eclectic, as different from, or actively in 
opposition to, the biomedical model, (2) by (re)focusing on strengths of adolescents and 
their families and possible positive linguistic constructions of them and their futures 
rather than pathologizing them with labels, negative language, or focusing on their 
weaknesses or bad behaviors, and (3) by valuing the importance of the social aspects of 
mental health including relationships, the family and reaching an understanding of the 
adolescent as a whole complex person.  
Resistance toward the Dominant Biomedical Model 
While the majority of the mental health practitioners I interviewed were hesitant to 
identify with just one theoretical model or approach, several identified biopsychosocial, 
family systems and psychoeducational orientations as having a significant influence on 
how they saw patients and developed therapeutic goals. These orientations are eclectic in 
and of themselves in that they pull from diverse theories and modes of thinking about 
health, illness and personhood. For example, the following practitioner, who holds an 
MSW and works full time in a school setting, acknowledges all components of the 
biopsychosocial model: “With a lot of the work I do here, I’m bound to be more crisis 




person, the biopsychosocial aspects. You know, biologically, what’s going on, socially, 
what’s going on, mentally, what’s going on, and then kind of just pulling pieces. It’s more 
eclectic.” A counseling psychologist who works in a large out-pa ient group practice 
gave a similar definition. She rejects the biomedical paradigm by characterizing her 
approach as holistic: 
I’m pretty eclectic. I’m holistic in my approach, and definitely always respectful of 
culture. I believe it’s very important to see what-- when a client comes in and presents 
with concerns-- its ‘What are these concerns telling you? What needs are not being met in 
this client’s life to where this solution, adaptation of behaviors has now become a 
problem, a problem in their daily functioning? . . . These children may have special gifts 
but they are so different then what we see as normal that we pathologize their behaviors 
because we can’t control those. They are not what we see as normal so we reject them. 
That is something that I think a lot about in my work with adolescents and children. 
 
While some practitioners defined their theoretical orientation and approach as 
opposite from or in resistance to the medical model, this Licensed Mental Health 
Practitioner (LMHP), with a Psychology background, attributes some of her theoretical 
orientation to her current institutional care setting:  
I never think of it as a model. That seems so formal. When I think of model I always want 
to put the term medical in front of it. I would be almost the opposite end of that. I don’t, 
in outpatient therapy, there’s very little major mental illness. I don’t have to do a lot of 
medical model stuff. A lot of people come in with wat would be considered adjustment 
disorders. Most of what I would work with are kind of depressive or anxiety symptoms, 
things that would also be on the V codes--the systemic stuff: family, relationships, those 
kinds of things. That term, model, mine would be much less medical than maybe 
somebody who was in an acute care facility like at the regional center they would 
probably have to function much more along those lins, I know even at RTC [Residential 
Treatment Center]  we did. Now I feel like its much less medical model based. I don’t 
spend so much time thinking about the diagnostic codes, and what symptoms I’m going 
to be able to pick out to justify them being there. I mean really kind of meeting that 
model’s needs; outpatient therapy is gloriously removed from that. As far as my 
interventions or approaches I suppose it would be, I g nerally lean towards the cognitive 
behavioral, I suppose I’m eclectic although when I really think about it most of what I 
come from is really more cognitive behavioral and the systemic approach, family systems 





The LMHP quoted above described how her current out-patient setting enabled her to 
practice psychotherapy from an orientation that is much further away from a medically 
focused model. This finding shores up Scheid’s (2004) argument that treatment 
ideologies of mental health professionals are heavily shaped by the characteristics of their 
institutional work setting.  
In comparison, the following licensed Marriage and Family Therapist (MFT) 
owns her own out-patient practice, accepts mixed forms of insurance, and resists the 
medical model not because her work setting facilitates this type of orientation, but 
because she has found that taking a broad view of the patient and his/her presenting 
issues is more effective than working from a narrow medical model perspective. 
My roots are in the family systems model. I’m not attached to that but I usually start with 
that and it gives me a frame of reference for understanding a presenting problem. It’s 
really important to me to develop a hypothesis around the presenting problem so that I 
can have a relevant treatment plan. That doesn’t mean that I bring the family in for every 
session but I tend to look at the presenting problem from a family systems point of view.  
I actually resist medical models and operate more from a strength based model, especially 
working with adolescents; I get a lot further faster with them when I go from a strength 
based model.  
 
In other words, her theoretical orientation is shaped much more heavily on the 
epistemological models of her disciplinary training. Following the findings of both 
Luhrmann (2000) and Scheid (2004), both of these quotes reveal that disciplinary 
training, professional socialization and institutional work setting all impact theoretical 
orientation and approach to treatment. I followed up by asking how her definition and 
approach to adolescent mental disorders was different from other mental health 
professionals she has worked with to get a sense for how her disciplinary background and 
current practice setting might intersect:  




regarding that, I just want to pause on this because I think it’s really important to 
understand presenting problems, and to keep it openenough to give it a broad 
hypothesis. I think sometimes other clinicians might tunnel vision it a little more 
and have a narrower perspective. Maybe they’ll be just as successful in treating 
the adolescent. I think there can be good outcomes from that as well, but, I think 
my training brings perhaps a broader perspective. Not only developing a 
hypothesis but of course, treatment goals and interventions.  
 
Thus for this seasoned professional, her approach to psychotherapy is heavily shaped by 
her theoretical orientation, one shaped heavily by her background training in family 
systems theory and practices. She locates her theoretical orientation as distinct from the 
medical model because family systems theory facilittes a broader view of what is 
happening in a youth’s life.  
Several mental health care practitioners identified with multiple models yet also 
named models and approaches that influenced their ev ryday clinical work with 
adolescents. Their theoretical orientations provided alternative ways of defining and 
intervening in adolescent mental health and illness, although they are currently not part of 
the dominant biomedical view, the DSM and health insurance companies’ forms and 
requirements. The importance of both language and the family system is noted by this 
Marriage and Family Therapist:  
I studied a lot of structural strategic. I also integrated that with constructivism. . . I think 
the biggest thing is the heavy influence the family system has on adolescent behavior, but 
there is an emphasis, still, in the field on the individual approach. You approach an 
adolescent who may not have a good grasp on their own development, on what they 
want, on the pay offs they get for misbehaving, but then you put the onus of change on 
that child or person who is still not 18 years old, they are a child, with a body that’s going 
waaarghuh,. . That’s the thing, being able to garner the attention of extremely defensive, 
mortified parents. I think any therapist that does not know how to do that will not get 
very far with treating adolescents.  
 
Thus, the MFT above is eclectic in his theoretical orientation because he integrates 
epistemological frameworks of structural strategic, family systems and constructivism in 




importance of language, narrative and building hope f r new possible futures was echoed 
by a different MFT who worked in the same city but in a different out-patient practice: 
I do a combination of solution focused and narrative herapies. Both are very language 
centered, future focused. I definitely ask question about the past, but its more, what did 
we learn from that? Okay, that was a problem, what skill can we use kind of a thing, I 
don’t have people lay on my couch or anything like that. It’s definitely about the 
language they use and looking at the times when it wasn’t a problem. Just the other day 
someone was saying, well sometimes I think about doing these really evil things, and 
sometimes I do them. So I go, so sometimes you don’t. What is different about the times 
it isn’t a problem? A lot of hope and strength building. Some of my girls like to play the 
game mash. I’ve had to teach them. Are you familiar with it?  You list 5 guys, 5 jobs, and 
then you figure out who you’re going to marry, where you’re going to live and we’ll end 
with that sometimes. A lot of the girls here, their world is so small. Where do you want to 
work? Wal-Mart, burger king, McDonalds, you know. So, I’m a fortune teller and its like 
you’ll move to New York city, you’ll be a teacher, let’s look at a map of the world, so 
expand these kids worlds. You don’t have to stay in [this town] and have the same life 
you’ve always had. 
 
These descriptions of theoretical orientations are constructivist. They reflect an 
epistemological standpoint about the language adolescents use to talk about and 
understand their situations, the terms in which they t ink of themselves and their futures, 
their problems and their diagnoses. The following quote comes from the lead special 
educator and liaison between a well known graduate program in a large East coast 
metropolitan area that trains psychoeducators and administrators that serve special 
education students. When asked if the special education or ED students she serves are 
similar to youth treated in out-patient clinics formental and emotional illness, she 
emphasized that the important thing to understand is who the student person is, not what 
their mental disorder or ED label is: 
If we’re looking at people as individuals, we’re going to build a program [treatment or 
education plan] for them based on their needs. From personal experience, a lot of my 
time even though I’m a special education teacher, is really spent in general education, 
helping individual students through a school day, whether it’s academically, emotionally 
or behaviorally. . . The sociological piece, the humanistic piece, the biomedical piece, the 
emotional piece, behavioral piece, it’s definitely a piece. They’re all equally important 




environmental piece. . . All of those components are very important from a 
psychoeducational perspective. It really is individual. From an educational point of view, 
it’s really important to understand who the student is and what the impact of that label, 
that illness, what that means to them during the scool day. 
 
While this professional works with emotionally and/or behaviorally disturbed children in 
the school setting rather than in an out-patient cli ic, she approaches psychoeducation 
from a constructivist lens that emphasizes the importance of language, who the students 
are, and takes a broader view of the adolescent in his/her context(s). As a comparison, a 
clinical psychologist who works in a nearby private practice but sees adolescents who 
tend to be from more economically advantaged families, also discusses how larger trends 
in society, the dominant biomedical paradigm of healt  nd illness, and the social context 
of her patients’ and her own practice setting, shape her approach to intervention: 
Because of managed care, and the general trend in society, people want a quick fix, they 
want answers and everything is cognitive behavioral. Unfortunately people eat up the 
media and their understanding of what mental health work is, is quite superficial. We live 
in an era where, while we know as much as we do about mental health, everything is very 
medication oriented and very quick fix. People don’t come in to sit on the couch and be 
analyzed or really transform the way they think or feel or relate to people. You kind of 
end up staying on the surface a little bit more. I think we refer out for medication more 
than we would if people were devoted to working . . . I think a lot in terms of the culture 
we live in,  the sort of macro picture, the family and then I think about the internal 
workings of the kid. And they are probably equal, I don’t think of one as bigger than the 
other. This area is a real pressure cooker academically, everybody has to be advanced 
placement. I’m all about the values that trickle down onto the youth, their families and 
family dynamics. Also, their internal workings, their resilience, how fragile they seem 
and their strengths and weaknesses. I think I’m a little bit community psychologist or 
social psych, a little bit psychodynamic and family systems is big for me, looking at the 
whole system. 
 
This clinical psychologist describes her theoretical orientation as eclectic and subtly 
rebukes the dominance of the biomedical model and how it has shaped larger public 
definitions of mental illness and perceptions of how t  fix the problem. However, she 
also, like some of the other therapists, acknowledges that the social environment that 




as the treatment approach. Thus the social environment was discussed as important in 
several different ways, including how it shapes the definitions and responses to mental 
illness, as well as the experiences of both providers and patients and their therapeutic 
interactions. Her theoretical orientation is responsive to the culture of mental health care 
in the U.S. 
 In the following description, a mental health practitioner offers a different view of 
how the social environment is important for her own theoretical orientation toward 
psychotherapy: 
I take more of a relationship approach. I think relationships or lack thereof can be a huge 
cause of or have a great impact on client issues. The absence of a father, that lacking 
relationship or maybe a mother that is in the picture but is so busy she doesn’t have time 
to give. The different dynamics of relationships ha a lot to do with client issues, so I 
focus a lot on relationships. That’s kind of the heart of where things come from. 
Unfortunately the program I am in right now, we don’t have a lot of family participation. 
It takes place in the schools so, they are pretty passive and don’t feel like they have to be 
a part of it. We certainly encourage it, so in that c se it’s more of a, you can’t change 
them but what can you change about yourself to copemor  effectively with that 
relationship? 
 
While the social environment was discussed as important here, she focuses on how the 
social aspects of the self, relational being or interpersonal relationships strongly influence 
person’s emotional well-being, and therefore, her toretical orientation. 
 Another way that mental health practitioners discus ed the social environment is 
how their background disciplinary training and current institutional features of their 
workplace shape their own as well as their colleagus approach to intervention. A 
licensed nurse practitioner discusses how her professional training in the nursing field, 
and the majority of institutional environments in which she has worked have all been 
shaped by the biomedical model, yet her own theoretical orientation is much more 




When I worked at [local hospital] they always said I spent too much time with my 
patients because I look at everything holistically so when I go in and have a patient who 
is different than the day before I’m actually doing more pursuing, I told them I’m sorry 
I’m a psych nurse, I see change in behavior, I have to find out why, and I think it helps 
with how they are doing physically or why they are not doing well physically, so I think 
that’s one thing. I really push that holistic approach to mental health. We need to look at 
patients, not just a disease, but the whole picture. 
 
In response to the stark contrast between her background professional training, her work 
contexts (both of which are dominated by the medical model) and her own holistic 
theoretical orientation, I asked her to elaborate more on these differences:  
It’s very medical model, very focused on the disease. It’s the hip in 214, so we’re going 
to deal with the hip. We have the spinal cord in ths room; we’re going to deal with all the 
aspects of a spinal cord injury. We don’t deal with the whole individual. Say the person 
with the amputee-- okay do they have some body image problems going on? Is that why 
they are so resistant to therapy because in therapy they actually have to look at the 
missing limb? As nurses we are going to get that leg healed and walking and they can 
deal with all of the other issues when they get home. It shouldn’t be that way, but that is 
the dominant approach. On the flip side I find there a e mental health nurses that never 
want to go beyond the mental health part of it, but you really have to look at the patient 
holistically, you have to understand the whole patient. 
 
In the above analysis, I demonstrated that MHPs resi t the biomedical model of 
illness and instead, embrace eclectic and more holistic theoretical orientations and 
approaches to treatment. First, MHPs situate their oretical orientations as eclectic 
and/or in opposition to the biomedical paradigm. Second, their theoretical orientations 
and approaches to treatment focus on the strengths of adolescents and their families with 
a turn towards constructivism. Third, their theoretical orientations value the social aspects 
of mental health and illness, including the central role of relationships and understanding 
the complex personhood of adolescents in approaching psychotherapy interventions. 
Best and Worst Models and Treatment Ideologies: Eclectic Theoretical Orientations 
 




approaches to mental health and illness was by naming and describing models of illness 
with which they disagree. There was a noticeable degree of discomfort when I asked 
about this.  
I think they all have their strengths as well as their limitations. I struggle with CBT 
because it doesn’t focus on the relationship and the power of the relationship between the 
therapist and the client but this is where I become ecl ctic because in my work with some 
of the youth and even specifically in bipolar disorder, I utilize a lot of CBT techniques 
that are about changing behavior, but I always have that emphasis on the relationship. I 
think that makes the CBT techniques more effective because of our relationship. I 
couldn’t say that there are any [theoretical orientations] that I just disagree with, that I 
wouldn’t utilize. I think that as a therapist, you have to be open to what best meets the 
needs of the client and if I was only to provide CBT, that might not be effective for 
certain populations. 
 
Practitioners clearly value the authority and wisdom f other practitioners and eclecticism 
in their fields, and even go at lengths to discuss why openness to multiple models and 
approaches is better than being too fixed to a narrow perspective or only one approach to 
intervention. The following quotation offers yet another example of how practitioners’ 
repeatedly valued therapeutic eclecticism rather than adherence to any one model or 
treatment approach: 
I definitely am more along the lines of pulling from different approaches and what’s 
going to be best for each kid. What we call it here is a psychoeducational approach. We 
look at cognitive theory, behavioral theory, ecological, humanistic, and pull from them 
equally. You give them all consideration though, especially when dealing with kids with 
such big issues. If you don’t make those considerations you could be completely 
overlooking something and if you miss that then you’ve lost your chance at least in that 
moment. Nothing has stood out for me oh I’m not even going to consider that theory 
because you just don’t know it might work for someon . 
 
Similarly, the following therapist emphasizes the value of multiple models and 
approaches over one dominant (especially biomedical) model: 
I think the biggest danger is when any model is a silo. If any model doesn’t respect 
interdisciplinary models, then I have a concern because the main thing is developing 
some kind of working perception, hopefully evidence based, so you can gather a 
hypothesis about the presenting problem. As long as one has a framework, which is 




attack so to speak. I strongly believe in collaborating with a client to produce a treatment 
plan, hopefully in the client’s words, so that the cli nt sees what’s in it for them. You 
know some medical models are, I don’t want to over generalize, but let’s say there is a 
psychiatrist out there that doesn’t have psychotherapy training or background so they see 
depression purely as something that one needs to be medicated and they don’t see the 
power of relationship affecting that or other stressor  in the client’s life. If they have no 
appreciation for the interdisciplinary need to address an issue then that would be an 
example of a model that I wouldn’t respect. 
 
Another example illustrates the extent to which the psychotherapists I interviewed valued 
eclectic theoretical orientations and approaches to treatment intervention:  
I find that while in the schools I primarily worked from a CBT perspective because it was 
more solution focused and more in the moment, like you could get kids back into 
classroom. Kid has crisis, remove kid from classroom, process and get them back as soon 
as possible-- CBT is best model or way to go about d ing that and doesn’t tap a deep 
psyche. But when I was doing individual therapy, especially with those older adolescents, 
I think it has its place, but that’s not my go to. I would have a problem with someone who 
relies solely on one perspective and particularly is a strict behaviorist. Its not 100% 
effective, it doesn’t reach every child, no approach can. I think about what translates, a 
behavioral approach, works in that moment with thatreward, but it’s important to have 
things that translate outside of certain settings. Single minded approaches, I’m not so 
fond of. 
 
 Thus, therapists emphasized the way the social environment of a patient’s life, 
including their social and economic differences as well as the context of treatment 
setting, all shaped the approach to intervention. In addition to consistently expressing 
respect for therapeutic eclecticism, when asked about m dels they disagreed with or 
found difficult to embrace, practitioners frequently problematized the biomedical and 
behavioral models and approaches. Clearly, these themes are all interrelated as one of the 
key problems practitioners have with biomedical andbehavioral treatment ideologies are 
how they leave out important social aspects of healt  and illness. Biomedical and 
behavioral approaches to therapeutic intervention were problematized for their focus on 
symptoms, diagnosis, disorder and surface level responses rather than being concerned 




I will tell you which one the toughest and that is P ychiatry. It is rampant; they do a lot of 
talking and not very much listening. Just the way a psychiatrist may look at and talk 
about a child, they can sometimes misdiagnose but its really good to have them when 
major mental illness diagnoses come along and they are right because medication is 
really important for some adolescents, you know all that abnormal psych stuff. We need 
the psychiatrists around for that but sometimes they will try and grab the therapy space 
and be the therapist and if they don’t even check to see what we were working on, that 
can unravel things. They really sell the idea that pills are magic bullets for all of these 
problems that they don’t even help in my opinion. Psychiatry that model of illness you 
have a chemical imbalance that started here and so here pop a pill.   
 
I followed up by asking, so biological psychiatry would be the model of illness or 
approach you disagree with most? “Yeah, biomedical as opposed to biopsychosocial.”  
 Practitioners often pointed out that they weren’t against the use of medication or 
psychiatry, and recognized each had a proper place in ontemporary mental health care. 
Yet, they also frequently critiqued the biomedical and behavioral paradigms for how they 
privilege disorders, diagnoses and medication treatm n  over understanding patient 
personhood. For example, the following school social worker discusses her disagreement 
with models or approaches that focus on diagnoses rather than understanding the child or 
adolescent as a person. 
Primarily thinking about kids in terms of their diagnoses, I have a hard time with that. 
Diagnoses help you understand the child but the child is so much more than their 
diagnostic label. I think everybody has some challenges in some area but we start to put a 
name, the labeling thing with kids, I think we need to be very careful with that. Throwing 
around labels, diagnoses are given out pretty readily. The medication piece also, I see a 
lot of our kids benefit from medication when it’s done very thoughtfully. Some of our 
kids are put on a lot of medication and it’s not done very thoughtfully, and they have a lot 
of side effects. . . I would hope we could understand why he’s behaving, there’s so much 
more to why he’s depressed. 
 
 Several practitioners discussed how the behavioral approach has become popular 
in therapeutic interventions but they disagreed with it as being the primary or only 
therapeutic goal (fixing behaviors): “It’s hard for me to say theoretically but I think some 




particular will come in and it’s the behaviors that re upsetting everybody. If you’re just 
trying to stop the behaviors without looking at what the underlying cause is, I have a 
problem with that.” Similarly, a psychoeducational trainer and therapist discussed how 
she values relationships with her student-patients over taking a behavioral approach to 
their immediate behaviors.  
I’m not opposed to using the behavioral approach; I just don't think it changes behavior. I 
call it the yokya approach, and it’s everywhere andit doesn’t work. It’s these big men, 
who yoke these kids out of their seat or situation. And does it work? Yeah for the 
moment, but what’s the underlying problem? I couldn’t o that in my classroom. They 
can challenge me. I build relationships with kids. 
 
Finally, I offer one more example of how psychotherapeutic practitioners problematized 
theoretical orientations that focus on behaviors or urface symptoms rather than deeper 
social relational issues in the youth’s life: 
The behavioral, the strictly behavioral, I’ve struggled with that. With the school setting, 
they focus mainly on the behavior and how to fix the c ild. It’s not about that. There’s a 
whole bigger complex way below the surface but what t ey [teachers or parents] want is 
the behaviors to stop. That’s putting a Band-Aid on this gaping wound. We don’t address 
what’s going on with the family, what’s in the best interest of the child I don’t think is 
always necessarily taken into consideration. 
 
 Thus, while the mental health practitioners I intervi wed valued multidisciplinary 
models and an eclectic approach to adolescent mental ill ess intervention, they also 
critiqued biomedical and behavioral models/approaches for being too focused on the 
diagnosis, behaviors and surface level symptoms rathe  than on the deeper social 
relational issues in adolescents’ everyday lives. Practitioners privileged theoretical 
orientations that considered multiple perspectives and approaches, and a more holistic 
framework that considered the biopsychosocial and relational as opposed to only the 
biomedical and behavioral aspects of adolescent menal health and illness. 




clinical object of study and intervention has become ore interdisciplinary in both 
practice and theory and rather than subscribing to a “model of the moment” as many 
mental health practitioners called it, practitioners match what they believe is the most 
appropriate approach for each individual youth and his/her social environmental 
circumstances.  
DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE 
In this section I discuss the knowledge-practice tension between the increasing 
specialization and interdisciplinarity of psychotherapeutic mental health professionals. I 
asked practitioners what they perceive to be the costs and benefits of the 
interdisciplinarity of the field, including what difference, if at all, it makes that mental 
health professionals enter therapeutic practice from a diverse set of disciplines, specialties 
and treatment ideologies. My analysis reveals that the interdisciplinarity of the mental 
health professions has become black-boxed, or a taken for granted aspect of mental health 
care. MHPs perceive the interdisciplinarity of the field as necessary to fulfill different 
types of health care coverage needs. Interdisciplinarity at its best is described as 
facilitating professional collaboration and more comprehensive care, and at its worst, 
encouraging jurisdictional disputes and the devaluing of some of the professions’ 
perspectives and contributions.  
Interdisciplinarity as a Taken-For-Granted Fact of Mental Health Care 
 In their initial reactions, practitioners discussed interdisciplinarity as though it is 
just a fact of life. It quickly became clear, after several interviews, that interdisciplinarity 





Clearly there have been different fields that have become involved in mental health work, 
social work, psychology, medicine. I think they all have something to contribute. I don’t 
think it’s good or bad it’s a fact of life. Do many social workers do something very 
different than many psychologists do? Yes, they’re working at a different kind of agency, 
they’re dealing with often times delinquency, other kinds of issues, if they didn’t do that 
there wouldn’t be anyone to do it. There wouldn’t be enough psychologists to go around 
and there aren’t enough psychiatrists at present. . . so it’s not like they are all making a 
unique contribution but they are creating levels of coverage that wouldn’t exist otherwise. 
Similarly, another practitioner thought about the interdisciplinarity of the field in terms of 
providing a wider continuum of coverage: 
Let me talk about continuity of care. You have this vertical continuity of care, like the 
most intense care all the way down to least restrictive care, is one way to look at it and 
then you have, at least a second dimension of care,this broad spectrum of correctional 
and legal, social work, nursing, spiritual, psychological. Without it, I don’t think we 
would be doing a decent service to the clients. 
 
Therefore, both of these practitioners accepted the interdisciplinarity of the field as a 
matter of fact, and articulated that it serves the important function of providing different 
types and levels of mental health care. Related to issues of interdisciplinarity and levels 
of mental health care coverage, multiple practitioners discussed there being a shortage of 
psychiatrists in their area of practice. For some it was discussed as an overall shortage of 
psychiatrists, for others, as a shortage of what they considered to be good psychiatrists, 
and for others, it was a shortage of psychiatrists that will diagnose and treat children and 
adolescents. In my review of the interdisciplinary literature on the mental health 
professions, the psychiatrist shortage was a hot topic. For the mental health practitioners 
who worked in the rural Midwest; this was an actual problem for providing all levels of 
coverage for their patients. This finding revealed that research debates about psychiatrist 
shortages accurately reflect rural and Midwestern contexts of mental health care. Some 
MHPs commented how at times their patients would have to drive up to two hours away 




Overall there are more advantages than disadvantages. Th re are different needs to be 
met and it would be tough for one profession or one discipline to do all of that especially 
with psychiatry and medication. I’ve been fortunate enough to have the experience that 
working with professionals from other disciplines has usually gone really well and there’s 
openness to that around here. I think even with improvements or technology just ways to 
communicate quickly like sending records back and forth has been pretty efficient. It’s 
rare for me but occasionally someone who’s not open to communicating or doesn’t 
respond if I send a release, that can be frustrating. 
 
Again, interdisciplinarity is the norm, it fulfills a function. Yet collaboration is pointed 
out as an integral aspect of how interdisciplinarity gets played out through work 
activities. Different types of professionals are thought to fulfill different needs that no one 
profession could fulfill alone but this also requires inter and intra disciplinary 
professional communication. Regarding the wide continuum of coverage and different 
needs of the population, one psychologist discussed how one of the primary benefits of 
interdisciplinarity is the options it provides to patients. “What’s good is obviously people 
have access to what works for them. There are a lotof therapists out there that have 
different ideas and different models. I think it’s incredibly beneficial.” The MHPs I 
interviewed recognized that the interdisciplinarity of the field allowed for an expansive 
continuum of coverage and array of theoretical orientations and approaches, offering 
patient-consumers choices about their care. In addition to recognizing the importance of 
interdisciplinarity for comprehensive coverage needs, several MHPs discussed the ways 
in which the interdisciplinarity of the field facilitates professional communication and 
collaboration. 
Interdisciplinarity: Professional Collaboration and Jurisdictional Disputes 
I think the benefits are you have the chance to view things from so many different ways. 
We come from so many different places in terms of our schooling, and not that one is 
right or wrong but we approach them from a different perspective so it opens up for more 
dialogue. In terms of the costs or the downfall, we don’t always see things the same way 




Thus both a benefit and cost of the interdisciplinarity of the mental health field is that 
practitioners are offered new or different ways of approaching the same problem and 
opportunities to grapple with more opposing or different views. Several practitioners 
articulated that this kind of collaboration is the id al benefit of interdisciplinarity. The 
following practitioner is an out-patient therapist working from within a Physician Clinic 
in a large metropolitan area in a Midwestern state. 
What’s interesting about where I work is that the pysicians who make the referral are 
very hands off. They don’t really want to get involved in mental health care issues . . . 
They’re not interested in sitting down and talking medications. These are physicians who 
want to do long term medication management. If we’re talking about somebody who is 
going to be on something as basic as an antidepressant for a year, they don’t want to 
manage that. They’ll write the first three months, and then they want them to be referred 
off. I don’t feel like I have much of a multidisciplinary team, which was a very weird 
thing for me going from RTC to outpatient. That was one thing I feel like RTC got right. 
That was one thing they did well, that whole multidisciplinary approach-- having 
everyone meet to discuss cases, coming to the table to talk about what we’re all seeing.  
 
Thus, she compared how interdisciplinarity is enacted in different ways in different types 
of care settings. In comparison to the in-patient Residential Treatment Center (RTC) that 
she had previously worked at, the level of collaborti n across the different types and of 
professionals was very different at her current Physician’s office. Similarly, a therapist 
who works inside a school that is connected to a residential treatment center, discusses 
how working in a setting where there are different types of professionals that all see the 
adolescent allows for a broader picture of what is happening in the adolescent’s life. 
I think the benefits are that you really do get that systems approach within a smaller 
microcosm of society. If you’re a therapist outside in their office, if I was by myself 
outside [this organization/school/treatment network], I wouldn’t get this whole picture, 
you know what’s going on in school, what’s going on with psychiatrists, what’s going on 
with the home environment. I’m here interacting with the teachers; I’m interacting with 
the behavior support staff. That’s certainly a huge benefit. In terms of the costs, I would 




Discussing how interdisciplinarity plays out in the day-to-day work activities at her non-
profit mental health organization, one therapist observed how different types of care 
providers learn and perhaps even value, different information about the adolescent and 
their illness. 
We have two psychiatrists on site that our clients see. We communicate with them. I think 
both of them are terrific and I’m very glad they’re h re but they only see them [clients] 
for like 15 minutes every two months. I always know a lot more about families than 
anybody at the school I’ve talked to ever does or anybody at CPS ever does, you know I 
do have a lot of contact with different schools andI find that I just have a deeper 
knowledge of the client but I have that opportunity to get it you know the teacher has 30 
kids in her classroom. I’m one-on-one with them once a week kind of thing. I don’t know 
if that’s part of my training as a family therapist or just part of the set up here but I always 
know a lot more and I’m really bringing in that piece into it, well yeah but there was a 
baby brother born. That’s one of the problems with [local insurance company that 
manages care including Medicaid] is they want the diagnosis, the goals and I would say 
well at the same time we’ve changed schools, or dads just come back in the picture or 
mom has just been put in the hospital for some illnss kinds of things, so I’m looking a 
lot more at those environmental things and I think other people are like . . diagnosis, 
treatment plan, goals, medication, that’s all we ned to know. 
 
For this practitioner, the interdisciplinarity of the mental health field encourages health 
care professionals to learn and prioritize different types of information about the 
adolescent’s life. Practitioners I interviewed pointed out that while interdisciplinary 
teamwork has the ability to provide more comprehensiv  care for youth than any one type 
of provider, sometimes the disciplinary differences and lack of time for real collaboration 
ends up being a downside of interdisciplinarity. 
Sometimes the collaboration isn’t good. I’m not crii izing the effort, I’m criticizing the 
result. People want to do what’s best; it has the pot ntial to work the very best for a child, 
to have everybody in the same room at the same tabllking. The problem is when 
everyone has their own agenda. There’s so much red tape, so much working across, it’s 
gotten so mired in paperwork. The interdisciplinary idea is brilliant, there would not be a 
better situation than a caseworker, a therapist, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, you know, all 
in one room, saying, what do you see? That’s beautiful. Does it work? It works great 
when the focus is on the child. It has the potential to solve a lot of problems. It’s when 
everybody has their own agendas that things don’t work very well. 
 




improving care by enabling professional collaboration and dialogue; sometimes it falls 
short of those goals.  
I work a lot with different social work people, and psychiatrists and psychologists and 
medical doctors. I think everybody wants, generally, everybody has the eye on the big 
picture, and they want to reduce the concerns with the patient. . .  I think the hardest thing 
is for all of us to get a hold of each other, on a simple level, everyone has people booked, 
booked, booked.  
 
Again, the benefits of the interdisciplinary field of mental health care is that it allows for 
a more comprehensive understanding of the clients but difficulties may arise from 
different perspectives, goals, increased paperwork and time spent on communicating and 
collaborating with other mental health professionals. Finding the time for collaboration 
and networking with other health professionals was an important but challenging aspect 
of daily psychotherapeutic practices. 
I think it’s great in the sense that the more support a kiddo can have, the more progress or 
the more successful they will be. That means all professionals have to be talking non-stop 
so they’re not pulling the kid in different directions, or one person is promising that they 
can do something or get this service for a kid but in reality they haven’t talked to that 
provider and it’s not going to happen. It can be a r ally good thing to have as much 
support as possible, collaboration of services; we can do a lot better. There is a lot of 
room for improvement. I don’t think we correspond enough.  
 
Interdisciplinarity is a matter of fact in the contemporary adolescent mental health field. 
Yet the way it is negotiated in daily work practices varies based on the type of care 
setting and the extent to which professionals value the input from and collaboration with 
other professionals involved in their patients’ lives. At its best, interdisciplinarity enables 
collaboration across different types of professionals and approaches that result in more 
comprehensive care. At its worst, interdisciplinarity encourages jurisdictional disputes, 
with some professionals devaluing each other’s perspectives and contributions.  




adolescent mental health care, it has evolved considerably over the past few decades. For 
instance, this well respected mental health practitioner who owns and manages a large 
out-patient clinic in a rural Midwestern state, discu ses how mental health practice has 
changed across her more than 20 years of practice. 
My treatment plans have become more interdisciplinary . . . We’re really trying to get 
involved with the primary care physician much more regularly.  Not that that always at all 
means medication, based on the fact that usually my hypothesis is around family systems 
kinds of things, I don’t immediately refer for medication. But I think the physician needs 
to be aware of emotional issues that are going on. I’m much more assertive about 
communicating with the PCP then I have been in the past, than when I started twenty 
some years ago. I think I’m also more careful to asses  what’s going on with them, for 
instance at school, probably more interdisciplinary with that when need be. Cultural 
issues, especially in this community, have changed a lot in the last twenty some years, so 
the culture of the family is considered more in trea ment planning than it was in the past.  
 
I asked if she thought the increased involvement of primary care physicians had to do 
with trends of increased medication.  
I think it’s really for other reasons, because actully it’s kind of weird that I’ll have an 
adolescent on medication, but I think as I’ve grown, I’ve become more aware of the role 
they play. Also I think our training in continuing education, the physician has influence, 
and especially if there’s sexual issues going on, and for the total health of the adolescent I 
just feel like it’s really important to bridge that communication so when they are in to see 
their physician so the physician is aware of what else is on the plate.  
 
The field of adolescent mental health care has beenint rdisciplinary since it’s ascendance 
in the 1980s and 1990s as an object of scientific sudy and clinical intervention. The 
knowledge-practice tensions of a growing interdisciplinary yet specialized field of 
professionals and researchers has been discussed as creating a more fragmented mental 
health care system. Yet the benefit of this knowledge-practice tension is that mental 
health professionals currently value multiple models, clectic approaches and 
collaboration with their dissimilar professional coleagues. All of this suggests that 
adolescent mental health care is moving away from the dominant biomedical paradigm 




THE STANDARDIZATION MOVEMENT: EBPs IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 
Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) and Evidence Based Practices (EBPs) are part of a 
larger movement to standardize more aspects of medicin  and health care practice. The 
standardization movement has grown, in part, in respon e to shifts within the health care 
system from primary physicians as sole providers to diverse teams of health specialists, 
each playing their own role in patient care. As discussed in chapter one, the second half 
of the 20th century can be characterized by a rise in medical specialization and diverse 
board specialty and sub-specialty certifications. I parallel to the diversification of health 
care specialties has been an exponential rise in health care costs and expenditures. The 
standardization movement has been one of the primary forms of response to both of these 
trends across the past few decades (Norcross, Beutler and Levant 2006; Timmermans and 
Berg 2003). While the standardization movement in the early and middle of the 20th 
century focused mostly on particular tools, skills and infrastructure necessary to perform 
work, with the reemergence of standardization in the 1980s and 1990s via EBM and 
EBPs, attempts to redirect or prescribe the way health c re practitioners carried out their 
work became center stage (Timmermans and Berg 2003).  
 One reason why EBM and EBPs have become so strongly adopted is because the 
American public and policy makers believe that the U.S. health care system suffers from 
fragmented and uninformed practitioners (Reed 2006; see Tannenbaum 2003:294).  In the 
face of rising health care expenditures that didn’t yield better care, policy makers and the 
public were galvanized by strong rhetoric suggesting that uninformed and fragmented 
practice was the problem. As a result, in the 1990s, EBPs gained currency as a public idea 




 There is widespread agreement that standards such a  EBPs provide order by 
streamlining medical practices of diagnosis and treatm nt while alleviating concerns 
about variability among health care providers (different disciplinary backgrounds, 
training and theoretical orientations).  However, there remains significant disagreement 
over the definition and measurement of scientific evid nce used in the creation of EBPs 
(Norcross, Beutler and Levant 2006; Reed, Kihlstrom and Messer 2006; Timmermans 
and Berg 2003).  
 In their analysis of what standards do in practice, Timmermans and Berg (2003) 
argue that standards are inherently political because their construction and application 
changes the way health care practitioners carry out their everyday clinical work. They 
divide standards into four types: design, terminological (such as the DSM which I 
analyze in the next chapter), performance, and procedural (such as EBPs discussed here). 
Procedural standards such as EBPs refer to specific clin al guidelines, policies or 
protocols that are intended to shape how practitioners proceed in diagnosing and treating 
patients (Timmermans and Berg 2003).  
Although terminological, design, performance, and procedural standards necessarily 
intertwine; procedural standards are the main focus f our analysis because these 
standards boost the stakes of standardization to the highest level and form the heart of 
evidence-based medicine. Such standards attempt to achieve the seemingly impossible: 
prescribe the behavior of professionals. These standards bring people from different 
disciplines and backgrounds together with a variety of diagnostic and therapeutic 
techniques and instruments. They are simultaneously the most difficult to achieve and the 
most contested. As we will see in more detail later, practice standards raise issues about 
human autonomy, flexibility, creativity, collaboration, rationality, and objectivity. In 
short, they reflect important cultural assumptions about how people live and work 
together. (Timmermans and Berg 2003:26) 
 
 The most widely accepted and cited definitions of EBPs is from an Institute of 




for the 21st Century (2001:147): “Evidence-based practice is the integration of best 
research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values.” The three components 
highlighted in this definition: research evidence, linical expertise, and patient values; are 
each included in the IOM’s definition, but none of them are privileged as being more 
important over the others, which is why this definition is considered to be the best and 
most neutral. When it comes to the debates surrounding EBPs though, it is the differences 
in how health professionals, insurance companies and policy makers define and 
distinguish among these three components that encompass the basis of disagreement. 
While some supporters of EBPs, such as the American Psychological Association (APA), 
claim that EBP guidelines aren’t meant to be mandatory or definitive (are careful to leave 
room and respect for professional autonomy and patient difference), other supporters of 
EBPs privilege scientific research or the evidence component of EBPs over clinical 
expertise and patient values (Norcross, Beutler and Levant 2006; Reed, McLaughlin and 
Newman 2002).  
 One of the major criticisms of EBPs is that their formation relies on a hierarchy of 
evidence that privileges Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs), and thus, therapeutic 
orientations and interventions that are easier to test using RCT methods (Reed 2006; 
Sackett et al 2000; Tannenbaum 2005). While most mental health professionals agree that 
research evidence is an important consideration in determining a treatment approach, 
some critique the way that EBPs and insurance companies privilege evidence over 
clinical expertise and patient values. They argue that privileging evidence undermines the 
therapeutic relationship and devalues a wide range of professional knowledge (Reed 




finds that strict adherence to EBPs suggests that wile treatment approach and plans can 
be determined based on calculated probabilities of success, factors such as the patient, the 
clinician, culture, context and the therapeutic relationship are just as important.  
 Similarly, Messer (2006) argues that “neither an evidence-based DSM diagnosis 
nor a manual-based EST (Empirically Supported Treatment) is sufficient to treat 
psychotherapy patients. Diagnoses cannot capture the unique qualities and concerns that 
patients bring to the clinician nor the specifics of the context in which their problems 
emerged in the past and are taking place in the present” (Messer 2006:32). The evidence 
shows that non-diagnostic client characteristics are just as useful in predicting 
psychotherapy treatment plans and outcomes as are DSM-based diagnoses because 
diagnostic categories allow for too much heterogeneity to be valuable as predictors (See 
Messer 2006:39; Clarkin and Levy 2004:214). “In other words, it is frequently more 
important to know what kind of patient has the disorder than what kind of disorder the 
patient has” (Messer 2006:39).  
 Geoffrey M. Reed (2006) takes a similar position. The privileging of EBPs 
ignores two of the most robust findings in the psychological literature: (1) that specific 
treatment techniques account for little variance in psychotherapy outcomes and (2) the 
strongest and most consistent predictor of psychotherapy outcomes are the characteristics 
of the therapist and nature of the treatment relationship (Reed 2006:41-42). In response to 
these position papers, Kihlstrom (2006) rebukes that he doesn’t think placing scientific 
research at the top of the hierarchy of evidence will lead to the deprofessionalization of 
the mental health field. Rather, he argues that professions are defined based on 




profession, it needs more, not less research evidence (Kihlstrom 2006:43-44).  
 As a final response to the debate and dialogue, Messer (2006) acknowledges that 
he and Reed are closer to what might be called the “romantic vision” which values 
individuality, subjectivity and unique qualities of human beings; whereas Kihlstrom’s 
approach to psychotherapy views individual patients as interchangeable and their 
personal values and subjectivity as impediments in assessing psychotherapy outcomes. In 
discussing Kihlstrom’s medical metaphor approach, Messer states: 
The approach valorizes mechanism, objectivity, and technical aspects of therapy over 
artistry, client subjectivity, and quality of the therapeutic relationship. . . To reiterate my 
main point, there is no escape from the subjectivity of the patient whose preferences, 
values and expectations the clinician must always keep firmly in mind. Nor is there any 
escape from the valuative dimension of therapy, which reminds us that decisions about 
the way we characterize peoples’ problems, conduct therapy, and assess outcomes are not 
determined by scientific criteria alone. (Messer 2006:45-46; see also Messer & Woolfolk 
1998) 
 
In response to these larger knowledge-tension debates in the field, I examine how 
practitioners negotiate standardization-in-practice. 
Negotiating Standardization-in-Practice: Psychotherapy as an Art and a Science 
Here I examine how practitioners negotiate the tensions between the simultaneous push 
for standardization and personalized medicine. Following the work of Timmermans and 
Berg (2003) and the debates laid out in the collection edited by Norcross, Beutler and 
Levant (2006), I investigate the politics of standardization-in-practice. This section sheds 
light on how mental health practitioners define andnegotiate the standardization 
movement through EBPs in their everyday clinical work. 
 The mental health professionals I interviewed echod many of the thoughts and 
concerns raised in the above discussion about EBPs. When speaking about the 




MHPs emoted a tone of caution and reserved acceptance. In the same way that several 
were adamant that there isn’t one best model of illness or approach to treatment, they 
were also quick to point out that therapists need fr edom to be creative and try unscripted 
or non-evidence based techniques as well as EBPs. Their everyday clinical work can be 
understood as an art form as well as a science. 
I think [EBPs are] a wonderful thing, for most people. It’s a really good starting point. It 
has given me lots of ideas of what to do, where to go, where to start. Its just after you 
start, it’s more of an art form than a science. [Me: Therapy or?] Yes. I believe so. We 
always start out with a well thought out treatment plan, lots of evidence based treatments 
and interventions and goals and all of that but we’re still dealing with a human being that 
can change week to week. A really good example: a young lady, 17 years old, drugs, got 
kicked out of the senior high school here and was going to a private Lutheran college 
here, used drugs in the bathroom. I’d seen her couple of times. She’s very oppositional, 
she likes to sneak out. I had a plan for what I wasgoing to do that day. I got half way 
through the session and she told me her grandmother died. It was like, oh, throw my 
treatment plan away, my assignment, everything out the window. Let’s talk about that. I 
might have an agenda but it only works after the client tells me where they’re at. That’s 
the way I’ve operated ever since. 
 
This quote is a good representation of the manner ad tone in which EBPs were described 
by mental health practitioners. Most mental health practitioners I interviewed 
immediately recognized the value of EBPs, but discus ed them as a good place to start, 
not the privileged determinant of their everyday clini al work. 
While I’m all about evidence based interventions and goals and treatment plans, it’s 
really important that you allow room for interventions that you can’t exactly measure. I 
think family therapy is one of those, because the relationships, when you work at healing 
relationships and work on identity issues, through relationships, I can see growth and 
reduction of symptoms, but I’m not sure I could measure that. Although on my treatment 
plan, you know it does ask about reduction in sympto s, and we can speak to those. But I 
use a lot of narrative therapy. I am rather eclectic even though family therapy is my 
home. I think doing therapy is really an art. If it becomes too quote “scientific” and 
measurable it takes away the room for the art. 
 
The speaker above is a seasoned licensed mental health professional who runs a group 
practice in a rural area of a large Midwestern state. She acknowledges the importance of 




treatment that aren’t currently considered EBPs. In another interview with this 
professional, she commented on using software programs that help guide the therapists in 
her practice towards EBP interventions, language and documentation. When we discussed 
what had changed about the mental health field as a whole, she brought up the related 
shift between EBPs and theoretical orientations and suggested this shift was the result of 
third party payer influence.  
I think there is more emphasis on evidence based int rventions which I think is a 
good thing. I think there is more accountability which is also a good thing. On 
the negative side I think we’re moving more towards a method driven versus art 
driven form of doing therapy because of those things. I think keeping the art in 
therapy is going to be a challenge because I think it is a very creative process 
and I worry we’re losing room for that creative process to work, because there is 
more charting, keeping demands from everyone, and trying to do more with less 
time. I’m not sure there is as much appreciation for the family systems model as 
there was back in the 80s. Our field is shifting; you know more toward a medical 
model rather than family systems. A large part of that is driven by third party 
payers, you have to show of course, make a case for medical necessity. 
 
Thus, this practitioner values EBPs; she uses them herself in her everyday 
clinical work, and has adopted a software program for her entire practice that 
organizes all of her therapists’ work in EBP languae nd recommendations for 
interventions. Yet, while fully supportive of EBPs, she expressed her concerns 
with how they might cause the field to lose room for therapy as an art form, not 
to mention particular theoretical orientations and interventions that are not 
considered evidence-based. Similarly, another professional who also directs her 
own out-patient clinical practice, shared the view that mental health professionals 
needed the freedom to continue to use non-EBP treatments. 
Well, it depends on your definition of evidence-based practice. . . . The things that I use, 
are they effective?  I would say absolutely. Do they ave some evidence behind them?  
Yes.  Are they considered, under government standards…? No. They’re not. Do I think 
things like play therapy and art therapy, solution f cused type things, things that don't 




modification, which can be quantified, are those also effective? Absolutely. Different 
things, different settings, with the right people, are always effective. But you have to be 
able to have the freedom to be able to use different thi gs. 
 
Again, MHPs I interviewed emphasized that while they value the scientific 
aspects of psychotherapy, there continue to several tr atments that have yet to be 
validated as EBPs. 
What I’ve figured out is you have to be well read an  keep up with evidence 
based practice reading and conferences and list serves, up to date, but at the 
same time I’ve also learned you have to have some flexibility. If there’s a 
treatment protocol you can’t always adhere to it strictly like you would in 
research or training. It just doesn’t work that way. There has to be some 
flexibility for being responsive to the individual sitting in front of you.  
 
In the above quote, the mental health practitioner states the importance of EBPs 
in guiding her everyday work, but stresses the importance of being flexible in 
enacting therapeutic treatment practices. Here, again, the individual patient is as 
important in determining how a practitioner proceeds as is the EBP.  
Each child is so different just like each therapist. It’s not like you’re giving a 
shot or you know, the medicine, you’re bringing in your own personality, the 
social environment, everything that is a factor in shaping emotional well-being. 
 
Thus, MHPs emphasize that not only is the individual patient’s 
subjectivities and social environment important, but so too, is the therapist’s own 
personality, theoretical orientation and treatment t chniques. EBPs are valuable, 
but cannot determine treatment plans without valuable input from all of these 
other considerations. A mental health therapist whoorks in an in-patient 
treatment center where there is usually very limited, if any physical touching 
between staff, therapists and patients, describes how sometimes therapeutic 
progress depends on creative interventions rather than just EBPs.  
I think they’re good. They definitely have their place. It’s nice to go to people 




if it hasn’t been proven as evidence based, that it’s completely discountable, it’s 
not to say it won’t work because there’s been other t ings that maybe research 
hasn’t shown yet but I found it to work really well. 
 
As a follow up, I asked if she could give me an example of something that works 
well but that hasn’t been included as an EBP: 
There was one young man who had mom attachment issues, no family, never 
got hugged or touched in the appropriate way. We started doing yoga with him, 
and the yoga allowed him to self-regulate, and alsolowed for some 
appropriate touching. After watching how we would do the poses or I would do 
the poses he would mimic them and we would say ‘oh no your arm, is it ok if I 
touch your arm? Your arm needs to go here.’ I was kind of doing that on 
purpose because he had never had touch, to help regulat  oh this is what normal 
touch is. After we would do yoga, he would have great afternoons. 
 
This description illustrates the multifaceted issues that therapists have with EBPs. 
While EBPs are almost uniformly valued, practitioners’ veryday clinical work 
was just as much guided by individual patients, their id ntity and social 
circumstances. Further, several mental health disorers or problems do not have 
corresponding EBPs because there haven’t been studie  either because that area 
of mental illness or that therapeutic intervention is too difficult to study and 
measure using RCTs.  
Defining Mental Illness and Therapeutic Interventions through EBPs 
In this section, my findings demonstrate how practitioners struggle with the 
definition and measurement of EBPs, including how the scientific assumptions 
and methods of EBPs define mental disorders and patienthood. The development 
and implementation of treatment plans was characterized as much grayer in 
everyday clinical practices than the way that diagnosis and treatment are framed 
within EBP protocols such as those adopted by managed care companies. One of 




struggled with was the way that individual and social group diversity is 
unaddressed. When interviewing mental health professionals I asked them 
questions about what difference it makes that their patients are adolescents, male 
or female, Hispanic immigrants, or in the process of exploring their sexuality. In 
other words, I wanted to know to what extent scientific knowledge at the level of 
the population, and life experiences at the level of social status characteristics— 
what Steven Epstein (2007) has labeled niche group standardization in 
biomedical paradigms, matters for defining and intervening in adolescent mental 
health care. One of the areas of the interview where individual patient differences 
(both social group and individual subjectivity based) merged was in the 
discussions I had with professionals about EBPs. 
No [not a best approach]. If best is evidence based practice or empirically based 
thing, I think that’s a limitation of social science research at this point, to have 
more choices out there, so while I think it’s important to understand the research 
and what is evidence based, I don’t put 100% stock into something that hasn’t 
been, and studying for my comps I think it’s important to, if something is more 
experimental or new, I think it’s important to inform the client that it’s 
something new. I think it’s important ethically to use the most current and most 
appropriate for your client, considering multicultural factors and being in DC 
you can’t ignore the multicultural diversity, for every age, gender, disability 
status, race, etc, thinking about evidence based practices, what were the groups 
that were studied? Especially when it comes to adolescents.  What was group 
that they are generalizing from compared to groups or individuals I’m working 
with? Personality assessments are pretty much un-normed samples, but being 
knowledgeable when interpreting those is important. 
 
Similar to the mental health practitioner quoted above, who discussed the 
limitations of social science and EBPs literature, others discussed their concerns 
with trying to quantify these differences in ways that are not only nonsensical, 
but offensive. 
I think they’re good but they’re not applicable to everyone and that’s something 




evidence based practices. I don’t know if that would be referred to as the cookie 
cutter therapy but that’s not how this field I think can be successful. I don’t think 
that every concept can be quantified. Something that I’ve worked with that I’ve 
been pretty vigilant about is having an identity scale for American Indians and 
I’ve gone to cultural competency trainings where its recommended that the 
clinician use a scale to identify how Indian a certain person is and I am just 
appalled that I would need to put my level of Indianness on a 1 to 10 scale. 
That’s not something that can be measured and I don’t truly see the benefit of 
me having to do that. There are certain concepts tha  I do not believe should be 
measured. I think we as humans sometimes have this God complex to where we 
want to control everything and put everything in numbers so we can put it in a 
formula, then we can predict behavior and we can control behavior. I’m not in 
favor of quantifying everything. 
 
Many practitioners questioned the extent to which not only psychotherapy, but 
emotional well-being, is measureable, especially via the gold standard of RCTs. 
Well, I mean that’s the hard thing about this field is that it isn’t a problem that you can sit 
down and figure out and come up with an exact number to things. Sometimes you have to 
be really creative with some of them, to get them to be measurable, and that is hard. You 
know the whole, “are they better or are they not better?” On my plans I have, under my 
objectives, I can list different levels of if it’s a completed goal or if it’s a regression on the 
goal or if it’s some progress and even that helps measure in some degree.  You know, if 
you’re regressing then it’s not getting good, obviously, but I think it is hard to measure 
sometimes. You have to be really creative. 
 
The therapist above discusses the difficulty of measuring whether a patient’s 
mental health is improving. Of course the reason why scientific researchers find 
it so difficult to standardize the definition and measurement of mental health and 
illness in the literature is because of the sheer variety in its presentation, severity 
and circumstances.  
For some mental health practitioners, the focus on finding a way to measure or 
quantify mental health and illness and therapeutic progress are things in themselves that 
they struggle with. “I see the need for it [EBPs] yet I have a hard time putting numbers 
and measurements on human life. I think we’re more c mplicated than that. I think 




about EBPs, the following LMHP questions the extent o which we can even measure 
emotional well-being in day-to-day emotional healing. 
Evidence based medicine and evidence based practices? There’s a time and a place for 
that, I just don’t necessarily think that that is all there is. I’m not sure that everything has 
to be evidence based because I think there’s a lot that you’re never going to be able to 
find evidence to substantiate, but I don’t think that means that it’s not important, 
significant or that it shouldn’t be looked at. Everybody wants to make it into black or 
white, either or, and for me so often everything is just so gray. As far as I’m concerned, as 
somebody who is going to encourage clients to consider medication or certainly other 
times with my son who is going to take medication, I want that to be evidence based. If 
we’re talking about medicine or medical interventios, chemotherapy, cardiac surgery, 
then that to me seems very scientific and that seem like it lends itself to evidence based 
practices. If we’re talking about somebody’s emotional wellbeing, I am not sure how to 
measure that, how to quantify outcomes. Certainly if you’re talking about something like 
a cutter, you want a cutter to become a non-cutter but even if they become a non-cutter, is 
their emotional wellbeing really improved or have th y just decided they’re going to 
torture themselves in some other way rather than cutting?  Do you know what I mean? 
You can say your intervention is yielding the desird esults because they’re not cutting 
but emotional well-being is so hard to quantify. Mental health therapy is all about 
improving one’s emotional wellbeing. 
 
Several mental health professionals voiced concerns about how the field 
increasingly defines mental health and illness in a discrete, objective or 
“black/white” versus continuous, subjective “gray” manner. Debates over how 
best to define and measure mental health and illness are on-going in 
contemporary clinical and research settings.  
I think evidence based gives that baseline and gives that standard, uniform 
measurable outcome. But then is it the best, is it the best for every person? What 
could be the best for every person? I think there are a lot of evidence based 
practices that are very effective but I don’t think t’s black or white. I think it’s 
gray a little bit.  
 
Another way that mental health practitioners expressed reserved acceptance of 
EBPs is by questioning the extent to which it works for all individuals. In the 
IOM (2001) definition of EBPs, scientific evidence, clinical expertise and patient 




intervention. In a manner similar to Reed (2006) and Messer (2006), therapists 
did not think evidence should be privileged over clini al expertise or individual 
patient values and circumstances.  In opposition to Kihlstrom (2006), the mental 
health practitioners I interviewed did not think it made sense to define and 
measure mental health and illness in a way that ignores the subjectivity of 
patients nor the social circumstances of their lives.  
I love statistics. I took extra statistics courses but you can lie so easily with 
statistics. It can be so misleading.  Okay, so CBT [Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapy] works great for ADHD kids. We did a study, you know, it was 80% 
effective, that’s fantastic. Well that means every 20 kids out of 100 that come in 
here, that’s not going to be helpful for. It’s definitely good to be aware that these 
things tend to be more helpful than others, but I don’t look at the diagnosis in 
isolation. For those ADHD kids that went to a school with really small class 
sizes, or the ADHD kids that got sent home from school three days a week and 
spent the rest of the time at home watching TV or playing video games because 
they got kicked out of school, you know there are so many more environmental 
things.  I think its good to be aware, but I don’t think its good to be like okay, so 
session one— we are going to do this and this. By session 12, you’ll be perfect.   
 
This therapist represents a position I heard frequently – that while it’s helpful to 
have EBPs as a starting point or as a guideline, there are other social 
environmental factors surrounding the patient that are equally important in 
therapists’ day-to-day work of creating treatment plans and carrying out 
therapeutic interventions. Mental health professionals also recognized how EBPs 
were connected to the politics of their field – mainly, their funding or payment 
sources. 
I think they have made a big push towards evidence bas d. Politics has a lot to do with it. 
You’ve got to be able to stay alive-- in your field it might be publish or parish, we need 
things like parity, and there’s nothing wrong with evidence based therapy except it tends 
to exclude certain approaches that would be effectiv  but that are difficult to measure and 
study. If you don’t have RCTs for this particular approach then someone is ready to throw 
it in the trash can and I’m not.  
 




variety of out-patient therapy settings, and was very knowledgeable about the debates in 
the scientific literature, sided with the others in h s assessment that EBPs are good but 
several other therapeutic approaches that have yet to be proven to be effective, should not 
be excluded from clinical practice work. In a different interview with another extremely 
knowledgeable mental health therapist who worked in a community mental health center 
in an east coast metropolitan area, EBM and EBPs came up as an important shift in the 
larger mental health field.  
I guess the one emphasis I see is there is a lot oftalk about this Evidence Based Practices 
and I would say that when I was in school, it was more of a strong psychodynamic piece 
was pretty strong. There were faculty that had cognitive behavioral or family approaches 
but there was a fairly strong psychodynamic influence. I think that’s changed a little bit. 
our ongoing training there’s all this talk about well there’s these evidence based practices 
and manualized treatments which are definitely more along the cognitive behavioral 
model. 
 
I followed up by asking her what she thinks about this shift from a psychodynamic to 
EBP and CBT focused training in mental health training and the larger field. 
There are some positives and negatives about it. The thing I don’t like is there is 
movement away from that relationship you have with the client. There’s research that 
shows that’s one of the things that accounts for change, if you look at various modalities, 
they all have equal effect and it’s the relationship t at’s the key.  
 
In her assessment, the field of mental health has largely shifted away from a 
psychodynamic approach where relationships and family systems are a key focus of 
therapeutic training and intervention. She was concerned about this shift because she 
obviously values the importance of the therapeutic relationship despite model of illness 
and type of approach, but is uncertain of the extent to which EBPs devalue the 
relationship. Yet, she recognized that there are positive aspects of this larger shift (as did 
others) – such as accountability and concrete therapeutic goals. In addition to hearing 




relationships, mental health professionals also discus ed how it favors short term progress 
over deeper change on an emotional level. 
I think its great to a certain point but you know its l ke, its just cumbersome 
details that can get in the way in treatment. I think its great to have good data, 
and we need that, regarding our outcomes but it’s very cumbersome. In order to 
get second order change you have to be able to do all kinds of things to get 
there. When I sit down with a client I don’t necessarily know what approach I’ll 
take that day, but depending on what he or she brings up, well I might go to 
okay we’re going to do a little bit of inner child work today or I’m going to send 
this home for an assignment and that may be a huge shift that I might not have 
planned on but it worked or was necessary for this particular client. I don’t think 
about getting the evidence about the outcome, I go with what works for what 
we’re dealing with in the moment. In the end I can see the outcome, we 
complete treatment and lives change, but that is not the same as what you’re 
looking for [via EBPs].  
 
As a follow up, I asked: “But you believe your therapy is good despite that?” She 
answered, “I know it is.” I asked, “So do you have to translate or prove through 
treatment plans and measureable goals?” She chimed in, “No, I don’t have to, but 
that’s what they want. You’re not going to get more sessions if you can’t show 
evidence based and improvement on the outcomes. On the other hand if you show 
too much you’re not going to get any sessions, they s ould just be dismissed, 
discharged. It’s just a game.”   
This practitioner, as have many seasoned professional , has stopped 
accepting Medicaid clients not because the pay was lower, but because she 
couldn’t handle the way managed care changed and governed her daily clinical 
practices. Here she discusses how she does not have o make sure that she only 
uses EBPs or documents her therapeutic interventions in EBP and managed care 
approved language (measureable goals and outcomes) because she doesn’t have 




managed care and mental health practitioners and requirements of EBP protocols 
as a game. This dynamic was an important theme in my interviews. The next 
section offers a glimpse into how mental health practitioners describe actually 
using EBPs in their daily work. 
How EBPs change daily work practices of Mental Health Practitioners 
When asked for more details about how EBPs play out in their daily work 
practices, most mental health professionals discussed the way their treatment 
plans have changed to accommodate managed care or insurance company 
policies.  The following explanation of the work necessary to implement EBPs 
also focuses on treatment plans, but it presents what might be considered an 
idealistic description. 
It’s very important that there’s some kind of measureable outcome and it can be 
fairly broad in terms of how that’s defined. I think it’s important as professionals 
that we’re constantly evaluating the clients. Are we moving in the right 
direction? Are we working on the things you think are important? I don’t tend to 
do measurable outcomes in practice but I think that could be helpful. I think the 
industry lends itself to that and that’s exactly how they measure things. That’s 
why I like to use that [software] program that I use to help guide my treatment 
plans, because it’s all evidence based practice for thei  goals. If you’re ever 
going to get audited by insurance companies, you’d better have evidence based 
stuff to back up what you’re doing and not just some smoke and mirrors.  
Obviously there are things that you deviate from soetimes because something 
happens. That’s part of that flexibility.  
 
I feature this description of implementing EBPs for two reasons. First, the mental health 
professional quoted above does the majority of psychological testing (assessments and 
evaluations of new clients) for a large non-profit rganization in a Midwestern state. 
While her appraisal of the benefits of EBPs is well articulated, after I heard from several 
other mental health professionals, it seemed that her notion of implementing EBPs was 




actively practicing as a psychotherapist, her vision of EBPs is closer to that of a 
researcher’s. Further, her therapeutic orientation was behaviorally focused, which more 
easily lends itself to EBPs, compared to many other t rapeutic orientations and 
treatment approaches. The employment of EBPs requires translating therapeutic work 
into something measureable (both goals and outcomes), including practitioners’ 
documentation and treatment plans.   
 Practitioners also discussed how EBPs have been a significant feature in the way 
the mental health field has changed across the past decade. For example, the following 
professional describes how the shift to relying on EBPs in their daily treatment plans has 
happened over the course of her professional career. 
When I first entered as an intern, treatment plans didn’t have to be objective or 
measureable. You could write a couple of words and call it your goal.  The next person 
reading it wouldn’t have a clue what you were intending, so they were very vague.  Now 
writing treatment plans, every goal has to be measur ble. We also review our treatment 
plans monthly and get feedback from the kid as wellas from our team to make sure 
everyone is going in the same path, so there is a lot more supervision, a lot more 
accountability for the treatment goals and treatmen plans. I think the idea of measureable 
goals is great, because if a kid is transferred onto somebody else for whatever reason, that 
therapist has an idea, a very specific idea of what you were working on.  Reviewing them 
monthly, ideally that’s great because you always know where everyone stands on the 
goals. Time wise, it’s challenging because you have to fill out a whole document for 
every kid you see every single month and that can get to be overwhelming at times. 
 
Here, a mental health professional describes how in the nine years that she’s been 
practicing, treatment plans have changed from subjective descriptions of what the 
therapist is working on to become more concrete and measureable.  She remarks that the 
idea of measureable goals is good and helpful for interdisciplinary communication and 
team-work, but has also increased the amount of time professionals spend on paperwork 
in their daily work practices. Increases in paperwork and time spent on paperwork were 




clinical practices have shifted. However, EBPs have not only increased the amount of 
paperwork required for contemporary EBP treatment plans and insurance companies, but 
the content of the paperwork. 
 I hate writing treatment plans. I absolutely despise writing them because sometimes it is 
difficult to make something measureable because it’ a more qualitative concept.  I 
understand the need to make it measureable, so everybody does know what you’re 
working towards and that it’s black and white I guess, so I do understand the need for 
that.  I guess the way I approach it is make a measur ble goal but there are so many 
things, I mean you’ve got three goals and you can encompass so many things under 
those, it’s kind of like reading between the lines, where all that qualitative stuff can kind 
of slip in. No I hope they never just make it evidenc  based.  I know Medicaid right now, 
I don’t have any Medicaid clients, cross my fingers, but right now you’re having to call, 
everybody else is having to call and advocate for their clients to say they need more 
sessions, they need 12 more sessions, 12 individual, 12 family, and Medicaid is deciding 
yes or no, well [name of local insurance company] is deciding yes or no based on black 
and white.  It’s really difficult because people on the other side of the phone aren’t 
necessarily therapists, they aren’t necessarily educated in that area so for you to get 
across the message of all of those qualitative concepts, no, they don’t want to hear it, they 
want black and white. 
 
Insurance companies require mental health professionals to not only use EBPs, but to 
document their treatment progress and write the treatm nt plans in particular language of 
EBPs.  The mental health practitioner above discusses how she has to be creative to find 
ways to work on more qualitative or subjective aspects of a patient’s mental health and 
for those initiatives to be encompassed on her treatm nt plans under the proper language 
(objective) and goals (measurable). This kind of translation work appeared to be more 
difficult for professionals whose theoretical orientations were from more family systems 
and psychodynamic backgrounds than for behavioral, cognitive or solution focused 
practitioners. However, these orientations and approaches are not mutually exclusive. In 
fact, the practitioner quoted above is a licensed marriage and family therapist who 
describes her approach as constructivist and solution focused. Yet, many practitioners, 




content required by EBP protocols of managed care companies.   
There is a new realm of information technology in the mental health field that is 
largely addressing these concerns by structuring the very essence of treatment plans in 
EBP and insurance company preferred terms. “Oh I think that’s been a huge enhancement 
in the field, especially since I’ve started. We have that software called Therascribe, and it 
helps us with evidence based interventions. There was some resistance when we 
purchased it a year ago, but now; people were like what did we do before we had it?”  
 It has become popular if not almost critical, for psychotherapy practices to adopt 
some type of computer software program to help translate their diagnoses and treatment 
goals into EBP language. Programs such as ShrinkRapt, M cPractice, Psychreport, 
Therascribe and others help contemporary mental health practices and professionals 
convert their everyday clinical work into the langua e and content of EBP treatment 
plans that are managed care approved. Although these software programs greatly reduce 
threats of audits or other common headaches of dealing with insurance companies for 
mental health professionals, they don't completely g t rid of the translation work required 
by professionals. 
It might start with a struggle to make something quantitative, to make it black and white, 
so that’s the initial struggle. Then to convey that message to the powers that be that 
decide how many sessions you get if you get any. Right now more than anything though I 
think I would definitely emphasize managed care is hindering a lot of services, there is a 
lot of frustration, a lot more documentation that goes into a lot of behind the scenes work, 
we’re already filled with client caseload so we don’t have time for all of the 
administrative side of it but it’s in addition to, so that’s one of the biggest frustrations. 
 
Similar to the description in the previous section about the difficulties of EBPs reframing 
therapeutic progress in terms of objective, measurable outcomes, the mental health 




practitioners can even write a treatment plan (software guided or not), they must first 
figure out how to translate the work they want to do to improve their client’s emotional 
well-being into quantitative terms. Sometimes the translation work goes beyond just the 
quantification of the client’s issues and treatment goals. 
We have a certified play therapist and another one that’s an art therapist and they 
[insurance companies] don’t like those to show up on interventions anymore so we’ll still 
do them because it’s been found to be helpful but whatever study they were looking at 
says it wasn’t so we don’t use that.  We can’t use the word maintain anymore in our 
plans, so we have to find other ways to say it, and its going to say the exact same thing so 
we just kind of always have to figure out, you know, communicate with each other, well I 
just got denied because I said I did play therapy. So, now don’t say that and you can do it 
because it’s going to be helpful but don’t say thatanymore. So I think, we kind of have to 
code what we’re doing in a way, you know, if we just write helping kids, every single 
time, that’s what we do, we just help kids, end of sentence but no, they want to see “as 
measured by” and you know I start my progress notes before they even come in, reported 
functioning regarding,  and then I fill in the goal ‘ _____ has been impaired’ or ‘as 
measured by’ . . . or ‘as evidenced by’ . . . and you know we kind of have to have those 
specific words in there that they are looking for.  We’ve always said those kinds of 
information but now they want specific words so.  We just all roll our eyes and go to 
meetings. 
 
Here, a mental health professional discusses how sometimes it’s not only the translation 
of what a professional perceives to be a qualitative, continuous or gray concept into 
something quantitative, discrete or black/white, but that their treatment plans and actual 
work begin to take on front stage (treatment plans the insurance companies see) and back 
stage (the actual techniques used and the way practitioners are viewing the problem) 
characteristics. Given that diagnoses and treatment pla s, and increasingly, EBPs are all 
connected and controlled by insurance companies, increasingly every aspect of 
therapeutic treatment, including diagnosis, must be translated or recoded in a formulaic 
manner to secure approval from the insurance companies. 
Yeah, I mean, that’s what the push is, you see it in all faucets, it has become 
insurance driven. I don’t agree with that at all.  I think there is value in, if a 
therapist is trying different techniques or doing different techniques, they need to 




well, if I give you an adjustment disorder, you won’t, you know, they’ll only 
cover services for so long, but if you have something more like anxiety, or 
depression, then that’s a more severe one and I can use the CBT to treat. 
 
Due to this translation work now required by insurance companies, many mental health 
practitioners such as the one quoted below, leave community or public health settings and 
start their own practices or stop accepting public forms of payment from their patients. 
Largely I don’t [use EBPs] because I don’t have big brother over me in the form of 
managed care, and frankly if managed care hadn’t of been all about profit as a disguise 
for mental health intervention, I would have been happy to do evidenced based practice. 
I’m a PhD psychologist, I would love to measure change in terms of what we’re doing in 
here. It really should be happening, but not by the insurance companies. I would give up 
the wealthy elite private practice world if I could go back to the real nitty gritty world of 
treating adolescents in a program with intelligent mental health professionals who can 
look at outcome and actually make an impact with larger numbers of teens. I don’t know 
many people in my world who have professional PhDs who wouldn’t want the same 
thing. What we were trained for we can’t do anymore. 
 
Like many other mental health professionals I spoke with, it isn’t EBPs in and of 
themselves that professionals dislike, but the way th t insurance companies use them to 
constrain or approve of services. EBP protocols have shifted not only the language of 
psychotherapeutic practice, but in some cases, the actual content. EBPs have been used 
by managed care in a way that privileges some theoretical orientations and treatments 
over others to the extent that many mental health professionals really cannot perform 
therapy the way they were trained (i.e. with a focus on deeper second order level of 
change in the person).  Instead, managed care companies prefer what is labeled in the 
field as band-aid treatments that focus on surface lev l symptoms rather than 
understanding deeper relational or system level problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The mental health professions encompass a diverse st of disciplinary 




paradigm is biomedical or biological psychiatry, the mental health professionals who 
practice psychotherapy largely ascribe to more holistic theoretical orientations and 
approaches to intervening in the mental, emotional a d behavioral disturbances of youth. 
For MHPs, the biomedical model leaves out much valuable and necessary information. 
While biomedicine contributes significantly to scientific understanding of 
epidemiological and course of illness of various disorders, mental disorders are defined in 
much broader terms in everyday community psychotherapy. For most practitioners, it was 
important to adhere to the specific needs and presenting problems of each child and 
adolescent.  
The mental health practitioners I interviewed overwhelmingly adopted 
theoretical orientations that took a broader perspectiv  of what causes mental health and 
illness – i.e., they considered multiple aspects as cau al in the creation and alleviation of 
mental disorders. Biomedicine, meaning the biological and genetic aspects of mental 
illness as well as the potential for chemical imbalances, is viewed as one aspect and thus 
potential cause of a disturbance, as well as one potential avenue for solution. 
Contemporary mental health practitioners neither embraced nor dismissed 
pharmaceuticals or behavioral interventions but often saw them as one aspect of a larger 
therapeutic treatment plan.  In other words, while in popular culture, the social world 
mental health practitioners with the most power (psychiatry) and the larger medical 
establishment, biomedicalization processes are rampant or dominate, it is far less 
influential than these cultural markers would suggest. The significant cultural turn toward 
biomedical explanations and treatments is not realiz d n psychotherapeutic practice. 




orientations and a valuing of social context, relationships and the complexity of 
personhood. 
The psychotherapists I interviewed recognized the importance of the 
interdisciplinarity of the field and the need to work towards greater collaboration. It is a 
sign of interdisciplinary professional maturation that each of the different disciplines both 
understand and value interdisciplinary contributions that are moving the field toward 
increased team-work and collaboration. With the rapid development of information 
technologies, not only will documentation, diagnosis and treatment planning be 
performed electronically, but each of the various types of health specialists and their 
information will be more easily linked, with more opportunities for collaboration.  
There has been considerable discussion about to what extent EBM and EBPs 
deprofessionalize the health care field via attempts to redefine or heavily shape the 
content and decisions of health providers. Timmermans and Berg (2003) argue that it 
makes more sense to figure out how EBPs can be implemented in ways that enhance 
health professionals’ forms of expertise, and better connect different types of 
professionals together for collaborative opportunities. While I agree with Timmermans 
and Berg’s (2003) analysis and recommendations, I al o think that within the mental 
health field, some professionals’ theoretical orientations and therapeutic approaches to 
treatment are valued more than others and some of this is directly correlated to the 
hierarchy of evidence discussed by Norcross et al (2006). Mental health professionals are 
just that – professionals who have gone through years of schooling and certification 
exams and their clinical expertise as well as the subjectivity and social circumstances of 




It is important to MHPs that psychotherapy continues to be valued as an art form 
as well as a science. MHPs valued scientific evidence and proven techniques, but not to 
the extent that they value the diagnosis or disorder more than individual patient 
subjectivity, background experiences, current values, concerns and social circumstances 
of their patients seeking treatment. This debate would be easier to address if it occurred in 
a context where profit motives and the power of the insurance companies was less 
embedded in the way that EBPs and the DSM have been instituted. Mental health 
professionals’ clinical expertise has been called into question and deprofessionalized to 
the extent that they are significantly less able to make decisions about the proper 





Chapter 4: Adolescent Mental Disorder Diagnosis:  
Taming and Unleashing of the DSM-as-technology in practice 
 
This chapter examines the social processes of diagnosis with a focus on the ways the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) is itself a technology that through the creation 
of diagnostic categories shapes the everyday clinica  work of diagnosis and therapeutic 
intervention. Two questions guide the analysis: (1) How do mental health practitioners 
negotiate social processes of diagnosis?  And (2), In what ways does the DSM, as a 
technology, shape the everyday diagnostic and treatment work of mental health 
practitioners? Addressing these questions begins with the assertion that diagnosis is a 
sociotechnical process and what is referred to as adolescent mental health care is shaped 
by and through this process. In what follows, I review two theoretical areas: 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF DIAGNOSIS 
Diagnostic processes reveal the ways medical institutions define and frame the meanings 
of mental health and illness; that is, “diagnosis captures what the medical institution 
currently believes to be ‘the way things are’” (Jutel 2009:14). Diagnosis is a work 
practice that hierarchically orders and organizes ways of being (see Bowker and Star 
1999). Sociologists have argued that the work practice of assigning a diagnosis have been 
made invisible through processes of routinization. Routinization obscures areas of 
disagreement over terms and meanings. Medical sociologist Eliot Freidson (1970), for 
example, examined the role diagnosis played in reinforcing medical authority and has led 
others to more recently analyze the ways diagnostic pro esses reproduce power relations 




The social aspects of diagnosis have received a gret d al of attention in 
sociology. In 1990, Phil Brown called for the sociology of diagnosis to become a 
recognized subfield of sociology due to the potential insight the subject matter can bring 
to bear on how we define and understand health and illness as well as the social processes 
that shape diagnostic knowledges and practices (Brown 1990; Jutel 2009). Most recently, 
the work of Annemarie Jutel (2011; 2009) and several other sociologists (see Blaxter 
2009; Gross 2009; Nettleton 2006; Sulik 2009; Van Dijck 2005; Whooley 2010) have 
revived Brown’s call through their work. Seminal publications, symposiums, class 
syllabi, special journal editions and edited book volumes focused on the sociology of 
diagnosis continue to assemble. Blaxter (1978) defines diagnosis as both a prescribed set 
of categories that indicate pathological conditions a d the process of judgment whereby a 
label is applied. Following Blaxter (1978) and Bowker and Star (1999), Jutel (2009) 
argues that the arena of diagnosis – that is, diagnosis as both category and process is the 
thing that organizes the clinical practices of medicine but also is a site of contest.  
Diagnoses and diagnostic processes are contested because of how different disciplinary, 
scientific and social understandings, explanations, values, beliefs and goals intersect.  
THE DSM AS A BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 
This analysis starts with a conceptualization of the DSM as an innovative 
biomedical technology. Revolutionary techno-organiztional innovations of one era have 
been found to transform into the invisible infrastruc ures of the next (Clarke 1988, 1991; 
Clarke et al. 2010). This is to say that while it mght appear obvious that the DSM is a 
technology supported by disciplinary science, over time, the ways in which the 




and medical assemblages such as the DSM and diagnoss, often become indiscernible 
(see biomedicalization processes, Clarke et al 2010). Thus, I examine the ways in which 
the DSM is socially scripted and interpretively flexible, and how meanings of the DSM 
emerge from practice (for other STS studies that take his approach, see Mamo 2007; 
Oudshoorn 1996; Petryna 2002).  
Within the mental health field, the profession of psychiatry is the dominant 
professional group with authority to codify diagnostic criteria and to transform a 
distressed person, into a biomedical identity, through the application of its diagnostic 
categories.  The legally and socially institutionalized DSM, created by the American 
Psychiatric Association, is a technological actant (non-human actor) that shapes 
processes of diagnosis. The DSM was initially develop d by the American Psychiatric 
Association as a communication tool for practitioners, with the goal of standardizing the 
language used to speak about what were, in the early 20th century, considered issues of 
mental hygiene. As discussed in Chapter One, the publication of the DSM III in 1980 was 
revolutionary in its forging of U.S. biopsychiatry as a mass, global approach to mental 
distress. 
Sociologist Jackie Orr adeptly argues that the DSM III solidified power-
knowledge entanglements between “psychiatry, psychotherapy, medicine, the 
pharmaceutical industry, the legal system, the insurance industry, social and self identity 
and popular discourse” (Orr 2010:354; see also Kirk and Kutchins 1992; Lowe 1995; 
Wilson 1993). The DSM has been firmly grounded in the medical model and biological 
psychiatry since the DSM III (the first two versions were more psychoanalytical and 




ongoing scientific efforts at operationalization and standardization of mental disorder 
diagnoses. The DSM III accomplished the routinization of diagnosis itself as an 
automated practitioner performance of systematically co lecting certain information to 
determine if standardized sets of criteria were met, including suggestions for treatment 
for each discrete mental disorder. In part, the field of psychiatry accomplished this by 
creating an informatics of diagnosis (Orr 2010), or a classification system with its own 
language of codable symptoms and computerizable criteria.  
Recognizing the tensions that have emerged at the level of practice due to 
psychiatry’s strategy to achieve scientificity through DSM standardization, and the 
organizational constraints external actors such as insurance companies have imposed on 
clinical practice, Owen Whooley (2010) interviewed psychiatrists in New York to find 
out how they negotiate the DSM’s institutionalization and standardization. He argues that 
psychiatrists develop strategies or work-arounds to cope with the ambivalence they feel 
regarding DSM diagnosis and the loss of professional authority that results from 
institutionalization of the DSM by outside agents such as insurance companies.  
Following Whooley, I interviewed mental health professionals about the social 
processes of diagnosis and how they negotiate the DSM and insurance company policies 
in their everyday clinical practices. While Whooley (2010) focused on psychiatrists who 
themselves have been heavily trained in the DSM, diagnosis and the biomedical model, I 
interviewed other mental health professionals whose primary theoretical orientations tend 





In what follows, I take the feminist concern with studying the experiences and 
voices of not only women, but groups in society located in subjugated positions of power 
seriously and examine the mental health professions fr m the view of those with the least 
power hierarchically. The psychologists, social workers, marriage and family therapists, 
counselors, nurses and paraprofessionals, whose daily work activities are significantly 
shaped by biological psychiatry and the DSM, but whose use of the DSM emerges from 
their own material-semiotic meanings and locations, are the focus of this chapter.  
FINDINGS: DSM AS A SOCIOTECHNOLOGY 
I asked mental health professionals an extensive set of questions about their 
diagnostic practices and the role the DSM as technoscientific actant plays in those 
practices. In my interviews, professionals often talked about diagnosis and the DSM as 
though they were the same thing. I would ask about diagnostic practices and hear answers 
about the DSM and insurance companies. Thus, it quickly became apparent that the DSM 
as a biomedical technology functions as what in the STS literature is known as an 
obligatory passage point—all initial patient-practitioner diagnostic encounters must pass 
through the DSM in order to accomplish diagnosis (for usage of obligatory passage point, 
see Callon 1986). 
I show how mental health therapists challenge or seek to undermine the cultural 
authority of the DSM and downplay the significance it has for their everyday clinical 
work thereby negotiating power relations among multiple institutions, actors, and 
technologies. I employ the sociology of diagnosis a a framework for analyzing 
interviews with mental health professionals about their everyday diagnostic work. Mental 




sets of social arrangements in the mental health arena. As an analytic framework, the 
sociology of diagnosis facilitates the identification of the multiple interests and issues 
shaping and shaped by the DSM and everything that enters the diagnostic process. This 
allows analysis of the complex interactions of the socio-technical negotiations within the 
work of mental health diagnostic and treatment practices.  
A Necessary Tool for Accomplishing Diagnosis 
While the majority of MHPs’ narratives depict the DSM as a simple tool that was 
necessary but insignificant for their everyday clini al work, some practitioners also 
discussed how the DSM technology enhances diagnostic clarity, interdisciplinary 
communication, collaboration with other professionals, nd patient education. Before 
turning to how the significance of the DSM was repeatedly undermined by practitioners 
in my interviews, first I focus here on the ways the DSM enhanced everyday clinical 
practices. 
I value the DSM. I do. I value having some form of thinking about symptoms and 
behaviors. I don't think it’s a pure thing, but it helps me for example think about the 
difference in anxiety versus ADHD which are often confused. It helps me think about 
insecure attachment instead of ODD. Psychologists are very well trained in the DSM and 
I think if the DSM is used very skillfully it’s a really great discriminatory tool. It helps us 
make discrepancies and pay attention to comorbidity. It also helps educate families and 
adults and even teens and it helps take the stigma away frankly. When people understand 
that there is a disorder, they are very relieved by it. 
 
This clinical psychologist describes the DSM as valuab e in that it helps her think about 
symptoms and behaviors, distinguish one disorder from another and address issues of 
comorbidity. Further, she characterizes the DSM as a discriminatory tool that can be used 
to educate families and the larger public about mental illness. “It’s helpful in that it gives 




sure.  When I’m just not sure what’s going on it can kind of open my eyes to ‘these are the 
possibilities’ and at least give me a starter path to what I might be dealing with, so it can 
be helpful in that aspect.” Similarly, this MHP’s description depicts the DSM as  useful 
tool that she can draw on for ideas of what might be he problem or the disorder of a 
particular patient, and thus gives her a good starting point for her treatment plan. While 
the extent to which the diagnostic process and the DSM actually shaped treatment 
practices was a contentious issue, multiple practitioners noted how they draw on the 
information the DSM and initial diagnosis provides in writing their treatment plans. Also, 
the DSM is a helpful tool in that it gives practitioners billing codes so they can get paid 
for their work. This was frequently cited as the primary way the DSM helps practitioners 
accomplish the bureaucratic aspects of their work. 
Every time I try to come up with a diagnostic impression I use it, every time. It refocuses 
me. Is it perfect? Of course not.  You always have to use your clinical judgment. I keep 
using it and I never feel like I know it very well. It’s not a perfect source. It can’t answer 
all questions because a person is very dimensional you and it is looking pretty 
specifically at behavior. You know does he do this, this, this, and this, and if he does four 
out of these six then it’s this. That’s not a perfect standard because what if he does 3 of 
those and then you can’t technically use it, there is a lot of clinical judgment mixed in. 
 
Here the mental health professional offers a narrative of the DSM as a necessary and 
useful tool in the accomplishment of diagnosis and documentation of progress in 
therapeutic treatment. Yet this professional also notes the ways in which the DSM is less 
than a perfect source or standard because human beings are multidimensional and do not 
always align with the discrete symptom criteria for one disorder category. This 
professional uses the DSM technology as a tool to help perform her work but notes that 





In addition to being described as a tool that enhances diagnostic clarity and helps 
professionals get paid, some practitioners noted th DSM as helpful for interdisciplinary 
communication and collaboration.  
I would say [the DSM is] helpful when I work with te schools because it gives us a 
common tool to look at, to explain some of the issues or limitations the client might be up 
against. [People at the] schools [feel the] need to perceive it as a bad behavior that the 
child has control over, but if I can show them in the DSM, no, this is an actual diagnosis 
and we’re up against this, I think that’s a different view for some of the [professionals at 
the] schools, and even for parents as well. 
 
Just as the DSM legitimated biological psychiatry and the field of psychiatry as scientific 
medicine, MHPs can draw on its cultural authority to help school professionals and 
parents understand the complexity of mental, emotional and behavioral problems of 
youth. “I do hundreds of mental health assessments a year. Th t’s how I always open a 
case up. Trying to be accurate with the diagnostic terminology today. I want the other 
interdisciplinary colleagues; I want to be able to think like them and use language that 
they can understand so we agree about this person.” Thus, while this MHP adamantly 
spoke out about the limitations of biological psychiatry, in his assessment work he draws 
on the cultural authority and terminology of the DSM to help him with interdisciplinary 
collaboration so all of the professionals in a teen’s life agree on the goals and treatment 
plan. 
I use it as a teaching tool too, because I can openit up to, like with a parent, a concerned 
mom let’s say, comes in and she doesn’t know what the kid’s dealing with, whether or not 
medication might help and I’ll pull that out and show her the list of things, the criteria for 
diagnosing let’s say obsessive compulsive disorder. I’ll read them to her, she can picture 
her kid in that situation, you know. Does Johnny have this, this, this and this? I’ll use it 
for that, and then I’ll use it with the kids with Oppositional defiant, I’ll pull it out and say 





Similarly, the professional above draws on the DSM technology and its cultural authority 
as a tool to communicate with parents and patients about the symptoms they are 
witnessing and experiencing to reach consensus about the most appropriate diagnosis. “A 
diagnosis can be helpful because if you’re working with other professionals or if a case is 
transferred they know what you saw to be the issue. B t again, that could be resolved, 
just presenting the initial problems, and then just transferring that on.” This practitioner 
(who works in both clinical out-patient and school settings each week), points out how 
the DSM helps with inter-professional communication and collaboration. However, she 
simultaneously questions the necessity of the DSM by stating that inter-professional 
communication and collaboration could also be accomplished by using presenting 
symptoms as a guideline for communication. Her framing and terminology of presenting 
problems (rather than standardized symptom criteria and disorder categories of the 
DSM), demonstrates there is much more at stake in social processes of diagnosis, 
including how mental health and illness is defined an  measured, and even how we 
intervene. 
This narrative was a popular one; that the DSM technology is a tool that can be 
helpful and even necessary for diagnosis and billing, but that it’s not really that important, 
i.e. it doesn’t really shape treatment plans, therap utic approach or everyday clinical 
work. As I will demonstrate, practitioners were quick to dismiss the significance of the 
DSM, yet they simultaneously (sometimes reluctantly) recognized its role in the 
accomplishment of their work, especially the cultural authority it holds in the mental 





Underdetermined Significance of DSM 
While some of the mental health professionals recognized the ways in which the DSM is 
helpful in the accomplishment of their work (as shown above), it was much more 
common for my interviewees to be dismissive when asked about the importance or value 
of the DSM, and the role it plays in their everyday clinical work. “. . . the DSM I really 
only get out if I have to do billing paperwork. Other than that, it’s really not that big of a 
deal to me.” Practitioners depicted the DSM as just a tool, something that doesn’t impact 
their treatment, as a means to an end, as the bible of th  psychiatric profession but not 
their own discipline, as mostly irrelevant when working with teens, and as simply helpful 
for billing.  
I pretty much divide that, I treat that as a paper wo k thing.  The label, the diagnosis that 
the insurance companies want to know to pay, so that’s my business paperwork aspect 
more than really how I go about treating and working with the adolescents. I use it [the 
DSM] probably in every client, to diagnose them, to give that label that they need. It does 
give me clarity on what I’m working with, but I don’t let that influence or change the way 
I work with them. 
 
Thus practitioners often talked about the DSM as a simple tool they use so they can get 
paid, have the proper paperwork, and even gain clarity about the disorder of their client, 
but they simultaneously discounted its significance in shaping their therapeutic treatment 
plans and practices. In addition to minimizing the importance of the DSM in treatment 
practices, several practitioners also discussed diagnosis itself as though it were an 
unimportant aspect of their everyday work with adolescents. 
We need it in order to do diagnosis, but in our field, specially our work with adolescents, 
we are constantly updating their diagnosis. Some of our kids have had, no joke, seven 
different diagnoses, and none of them really fit, so we try to find the best fit but that goes 
back to why we don’t, I don’t work with the diagnosis. I work with the child.  One kid 
right now is pretty clearly borderline personality disorder. However, he’s 15, so we don’t’ 




because then I have to use certain techniques. Like, if h  needs emotional regulation, he 
needs a lot of different kinds of work than a kid without borderline would have. One kid 
has had some pre-schizophrenic stuff going on. I definit ly considered that when working 
with him but it didn’t drive my treatment. 
 
Again, in their initial response to the role the DSM technology plays in their everyday 
work, practitioners most frequently discussed it as a necessary tool for diagnosis, but as 
insignificant for the way they conceptualize the adolescent and his or her illness and their 
development of a treatment plan. Yet, you also see in this quote that while she 
emphasizes that she works with children, not diagnoses, she also discusses how the type 
of disorder, as it is categorized in the DSM, is a consideration (at least in the back of her 
mind) when carrying out therapeutic work. Thus even when MHPs point out the clear 
influence disorder categories, and thus the DSM, have on their treatment plans, they 
discuss the DSM in ways that attempt to undermine its authority over their own clinical 
judgment and expertise.  
I offer two more exemplars below of how practitioners discussed the DSM and 
diagnosis as insignificant in shaping their everyday therapeutic work.  
I’m not sure it really shapes my approach. It’s a resource to help me confirm a diagnosis. 
The majority of cases I see have already been diagnosed, so I can go back and see if that 
is exactly what I’m seeing . . . With most practitioners, you can’t change a diagnosis but 
you can change your treatment approach because the diagnoses [or the symptoms and life 
problems] do tend to change. 
 
When asked specific questions about how the DSM and diagnosis shape their treatment 
practices, practitioners frequently dismissed their significance. “I’m trying to think of 
how it would be, because I’m aware now, as if I wasa client I would be aware I would 
probably want to insert a should here, it [the DSM] probably should be more relevant in 




any sort of intervention because it doesn’t really offer intervention.” Minimizing the 
significance of the role the DSM technology plays in shaping psychotherapy practice 
emerged as a primary way that mental health professi nal  negotiate the bureaucratic and 
biomedical ordering of out-patient clinical practice settings.  
The concept of negotiated order refers to the capacities of different actors to 
protect their own interests and to achieve their goals while acknowledging and acceding 
to others’ interests (Strauss 1978). Traditionally this concept has been used in 
interactionist sociology of health and illness studies to examine how meanings are created 
and sustained through human interactions in organizational settings such as hospitals. 
Interestingly, in my study, mental health practitioners create and sustain therapeutic 
meaning not only in interaction with their patients, other providers and insurance 
companies, but also in interaction with the DSM as a socially scripted, technoscientific 
actant. Mental health practitioners have conflicting i terests and commitments in their 
negotiations of diagnostic practices in general and the cultural and technoscientific 
authority of the DSM in particular. While most practitioners must operate under 
diagnostic standardization, there is interpretive flexibility within and across sites of 
practice.  
In his examination of the standardization of the DSM, Whooley (2010) utilized 
Clarke and Casper’s (1996) concept of workarounds to show the strategies psychiatrists 
employ that enable them to comply with the formal rules of insurance companies while 
maintaining their own professional discretion and autonomy. He analyzes three 
workarounds that were prevalent among the psychiatrists he interviewed in the state of 




numbers or codes on official documentation, and (3) negotiating diagnoses with patients. 
Each of these workarounds was used by the mental health practitioners I interviewed.  
Rather than illustrating that the mental health practitioners use these workarounds, I 
demonstrate how these and other workarounds such as Cribbing are necessary for mental 
health practitioners’ negotiations of biomedical and bureaucratic standardization 
processes that are embedded in diagnosis.  
Whooley (2010) found that psychiatrists employ alternative taxonomies because 
the diagnostic (theoretical) frameworks they apply in practice diverge from the 
standardized assessment of symptoms as laid out in the DSM. Thus, in using this 
workaround, mental health practitioners diagnose according to their own understanding 
of mental illness and then translate that into DSM terms after the fact (Whooley 2010). 
This strategy demonstrates that even psychiatrists hemselves, who are heavily trained in 
biological psychiatry and use of the DSM, critique th biomedical model, de-emphasize 
the assessment of symptoms, and privilege professional discretion in their everyday work 
with patients. Whooley (2010) argues that for psychiatrists this workaround isn’t 
unethical because the DSM’s categories don’t reflect what they are seeing in their 
patients, and thus it doesn’t fully guide their trea ment plans.  
The strategy of workarounds was also commonly used by the majority of mental 
health practitioners I interviewed. Employing alternative taxonomies serves as more than 
just a workaround that allows MHPs to keep face in their own professional authority and 
discretion while following bureaucratic policies. The alternative taxonomy workaround 
enables psychologists, counselors and social workers to continue to view mental illness 




In the second workaround, fudging the numbers, practitioners disguise actual 
practices while superficially complying with bureaucratic and biomedical 
standardization. The reason practitioners might fudge the numbers or the diagnostic codes 
is that they learn certain insurance companies havea history of denying particular 
diagnoses and thus might have to work around this through over-diagnosis. On the other 
hand, I found practitioners to be painfully aware of and concerned about stigma 
associated with diagnostic labels. When they could, they punted low, or utilized a strategy 
of under-diagnosis. The strategy of making diagnoses vague or giving what are 
sometimes called garbage can or waste-basket diagnoses, I argue, is also a form of 
resisting the biomedicalization and bureaucratization of the DSM. Insurance companies 
have standardized diagnostic policies that demand mental illness reimbursement hinges 
on proving medical necessity rather than social psychological suffering. However, the 
majority of MHPs I interviewed didn’t define mental health and illness from a biomedical 
or diagnostic theoretical framework.  
With the third workaround, negotiating diagnoses with patients, mental health 
practitioners undermine the biomedical model enshrouded in the DSM and, instead, 
privilege patient subjectivity and experiences of illness over objective clusters of 
symptoms and DSM guidelines. I found that practitioners frequently draw upon the 
cultural authority of the DSM in working with adolescent patients, their parents and other 
care providers, but simultaneously undermine its significance in shaping their actual 







This data section focuses on the different ways that practitioners negotiate the orders of 
biomedical and bureaucratic standardization in diagnostic practices. While the term 
standardization implies uniform diagnostic processes, the ways that insurance companies 
and individual care organizations structure or inform diagnostic practices through 
paperwork requirements and other policies are as varied s the kinds of mental health 
professionals who carry out this work, and the array of patients they see. “Of course 
because of insurance you have to come up with some diagnosis. Typically you have to 
make it vague. Medicaid doesn’t cover anything related to developmental disability or 
autism—basic developmental disorders— so even if a kid has that, you can’t diagnose 
him with that because it won’t be covered.”  
Bureaucratic standardization took on a different character or negotiated order 
across different types of care settings. Thus, the practitioner above discusses how in his 
out-patient practice setting, the insurance company that organizes Medicaid for this large 
Midwestern state has repeatedly denied authorizations f r treating childhood or 
adolescent patients whose primary diagnosis is a developmental disorder. The counselor 
above negotiates the insurance bureaucratization he exp riences in his work by “making 
it vague.” Whooley (2010:461) found psychiatrists make their diagnosis vague in order 
to disguise their actual practices of diagnosis and to protect their patients from harsher 
diagnostic stigma while superficially complying with organizational or bureaucratic 
requirements.  
As I conducted interviews across a Midwestern state and a large metropolitan area 




practitioners’ negotiations of types of disorder diagnoses they knew to avoid. While some 
disorder categories repeatedly came up as problematic, those that were often denied 
seemed to shift without any rational reason. While radical shrinking of the DSM (using 
way fewer diagnostic categories than those fully represented in the book) occurred as a 
workaround strategy of mental health providers I interviewed, it seemed to take on a bit 
more of a forced character when employed by mental he lth practitioners who are not 
psychiatrists. Whooley (2010) describes how psychiatrists often drastically reduce the 
number of categories they use to a few codes and examines all of the motivations for 
doing so. While some of these motivations such as using different theoretical orientation 
or logic of diagnosis in which broad classes of patients are created – those with more 
serious disorders and others to be shielded from the DSM, were heavily used, mental 
health practitioners I interviewed talked just as much about the ways in which health 
insurance company histories of denial created a collective knowledge about which codes 
to/not to use. Therefore, the shrinking of the DSM may exist as a workaround for mental 
health practitioners to abide by policies while operating under their own interpretations of 
mental illness and best treatment approaches, but it also serves as a workaround for the 
insurance companies to restrict payment or types of care to types of patients and 
disorders.  
Well it’s the bible for insurance companies. Again, you have to give a diagnosis to be 
reimbursed; they will only reimburse certain diagnoses. Like United Behavioral Health, 
which is one of the most annoying ones, they have this huge long list of codes they won't 
reimburse, like they won't reimburse, ADHD, ODD, Conduct disorder, behavior disorder, 
they'll reimburse this sort of nebulous term, which is disorder of infancy, childhood or 
adolescence.  313.9. 
 




forms of insurance have to make these negotiations. In each care setting, practitioners 
talk about their experiences of case authorizations and denials. These on-going 
negotiations create a collective knowledge that shapes future negotiations. I label this 
process “Cribbing,” because it signifies the collective knowledge-building and translation 
work required for MHPs to learn the correct answers or codes that will allow them to 
receive authorization so they may provide therapy to their clients. Further, the term 
cribbing represents the way in which MHPs’ professional expertise is treated as infantile 
compared to the reimbursement policies of insurers. However, the success of cribbing 
varied. Sometimes, even in the settings where practitioners learned from each other’s 
experiences, the rationale for insurance company authorization or denial remained a 
mystery. 
I have no clue what they’re thinking. All that I know is that they denied my request for 
authorization and said that they will review it because; well . . . that particular diagnosis 
is not covered according to them. It’s covered for others [insurers] so I don’t understand.  
And then they will review it. They don’t give you a time frame, so I don’t know what’s 
going on with it. 
This practitioner discussed how she had recently had a request for authorization (for new 
services) denied and was frustrated by the numerous h rs she had spent making phone 
calls and filling out paperwork that requested a review of their denial. Although insurance 
companies often have standardized policies that guide their authorization decisions, there 
are multiple insurance providers and different individual agents who make these 
determinations. What are designed to be rational, standardized decision rules about 
mental health care are experienced by providers as irrational, at best, and incongruent 
with how they conceptualize and intervene in mental illness, at worst. This is why 




with insurance companies over therapeutic service authorizations and denials. Cribbing 
processes are on-going in diagnostic work of the mental health professionals and help not 
only with bureaucratic standardization as demonstrated bove, but with the biomedical 
standardization of mental health and illness. 
In order to see me they have to have a diagnosis. I have a DSM. I use it for every client. 
We all do. For all the managed care purposes, you have to. You can’t see a client if you 
can’t prove they have an illness of some kind. Sometimes it’s a matter of looking into 
grey areas to come up with a diagnosis. Like, clearly this client has issues and concerns 
they need to work on but putting your finger on a specific diagnosis can be difficult, but 
you’re forced to. Sometimes I really hate giving a client a label, for the purposes of 
getting refunded for the service, because it might not be completely descriptive of that 
individual, but you have to. 
 
This mental health professional described diagnosis and the DSM as a routine part of her 
everyday clinical practice, i.e. a bureaucratic requirement. She doesn’t describe the DSM 
or diagnosis as a meaningful aspect of her therapeutic work but frames it as necessary 
tool for getting reimbursed for services. Not only does she question the significance the 
DSM and diagnosis hold for her therapeutic work, but she also rejects the idea that a 
diagnostic (biomedical) label is capable of describing an individual patient. In other 
words, she subverts the value of the diagnostic label by positioning personhood as the 
more meaningful aspect of her everyday clinical work with patients. This subversion acts 
as resistance to the biomedical model by reasserting an alternative taxonomy. 
Rejecting the DSM and its role in diagnostic processes on the grounds that the 
categories didn’t seem to fit or fully describe indivi ual patients was a common response 
to the biomedicalization and bureaucratization of mental illness. The invisible translation 
work of cribbing, i.e. translating professional logics and valued knowledge about a 




aspect of diagnostic processes and the ways the DSM as a sociotechnical actant shapes 
those processes. “It’s hard to categorize anybody so there’s, I guess it  just going through 
the process of diagnosing and putting a person in a category and that’s kind of a 
hindrance but its not huge. I’ve learned to separate it from the person.”  Sometimes it 
was the very process of diagnostic categorization (or translation work) itself that mental 
health practitioners struggled with, as represented in the quote by the mental health 
practitioner above. Other times, practitioners struggled not with the process of diagnosis, 
but with the result of diagnosis, the label.  
[The DSM is] a hindrance because lets say I give this kid depression [diagnosis], but his 
depression might look different than the next kid’s depression. This kid might act out in 
anger because he’s depressed and this other kid might be a recluse and hide himself 
because he’s depressed. He has the same diagnosis but the symptoms are different. Just 
because they have the same diagnosis doesn’t mean you treat them the same. I think that 
can be a hindrance. People just expect them to look the same. 
 
While labeling stands out as an obvious result of diagnostic processes, mental health 
practitioners were painfully aware of the material consequences labeling can have for 
youth and frequently cited it as a concern that shaped how they performed diagnosis. 
Thus, some practitioners struggled with the ways in which diagnostic categories come to 
represent something about the adolescent person they are treating (see Hacking 2001). In 
this way, mental health professionals engage in multiple workaround strategies 
simultaneously. MHPs might fudge the numbers to mini ize the consequences of 
labeling while they also negotiate diagnoses based on patient concerns rather than simply 
relying on standardized sets of symptom criteria laid out in the DSM. Diagnostic 




It feels like unless you meet the letter of the criteria, then you’re kind out of luck. Then 
you’re stuck trying to figure out where to put a person. They don’t meet the criteria for 
major depression, so you feel like it’s not quite a depressive disorder, they don’t have five 
[symptoms of the criteria set],so what do you do with someone who has four, then you 
give them depressive disorder NOS [Not Otherwise Spcified]. But what if while they’re 
short [four instead of five symptoms], they still have frequent suicidal ideation? That to 
me seems like a major depression, but they don’t have five, so that’s when it [the DSM] 
feels like a hindrance. It’s so black and white; there is no real room for gray. Sometimes I 
feel like it misses out on people. 
 
The difficulties of characterizing new clients and their presenting problems in the 
language and categories of the DSM was a reoccurring theme in practitioners’ responses 
to the ways in which the DSM technology and diagnostic standardization hindered their 
work.  
The point of standardizing biomedical categories of mental disorder in the DSM is 
to give all social worlds a uniform language and unerstanding of what they are dealing 
with. However, as described by the practitioners in the quotes above, sometimes 
depression looks differently on one kid than another, or some kids might have only three 
or four of the five symptoms from the checklist to qualify for a given diagnosis. Problems 
of fit have to do with heterogeneities in patient personhood and experiences of mental 
illness. For some practitioners, the process of fitting a person and their symptoms into a 
diagnostic category is uncomfortable for these reasons, but for others, the process of 
diagnosis and the categories of illness represented i  the DSM are in conflict with their 
theoretical orientation to mental illness and therap utic approach to healing.  
“I hate giving diagnoses. I hate them a lot. I just really don’t feel that they are 
appropriate. I would rather someone sit down and talk o me for an hour about a client 
than just five minutes and a diagnosis.  I’ll give you my time if I feel like its going to be 
effective, but you are just kind of a hindrance to me because it’s another phone call I have 





Thus, for this practitioner, the process and content of diagnosis is an aspect of her clinical 
work that she despises. While she might not detest th  process of coming to some 
conclusions about the presenting problems of patients, she dislikes having to fit clients 
and their problems into biomedical categories. Further, she devalues the information that 
DSM diagnoses collect and offer to insurance providers and others through the medical 
record. She resists the biomedicalization of mental he th and illness by reasserting the 
importance of patient personhood and information left out of the framework of 
contemporary standardized mental health practice. As several mental health practitioners’ 
descriptions of diagnosis and the DSM have revealed, practitioners resisted the 
biomedical model embedded in the DSM and bureaucratic policies by working from 
alternative taxonomies. 
ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS IN DIAGNOSIS 
Mental health practitioners struggled with the burea cratization and biomedicalization of 
their work that the DSM and insurance companies facilit ted in a number of ways. At the 
heart of many of these struggles were knowledge-tensions or alternative paradigms in 
conceptualizing and intervening in mental illness.  
No, it’s, you have problems communicating, so we’re going to work on communication 
skills today, not, why can’t you control your emotions? Or, we’re going to do skill 
building so you can control your emotions. In some ways its like yeah, don’t get to the 
root cause, just put the band aid on and do it quickly and that will save the entire system 
money. If you make these people better, make them better fast. . . I feel like we’re really 
doing good work, important work, and then you kind of hit up against the DSM wall of 
the, you can have 1 of 6 diagnoses and all of your g als will come straight from the 
DSM. 
 
In the quote above, a psychologist who works for a mixed (public and private 




biomedical model of the DSM and insurance company policies value and encourage 
practitioners to work on surface level symptoms rather han deeper communication or 
emotional issues. This was often a primary way that mental health professionals 
problematized the influence insurance companies and the biomedical perspective 
ingrained in the DSM had over their everyday clinical practices.  
Several MHPs critiqued how insurance company reimbursement policies limited 
their work. For example, insurance companies would nly reimburse for some disorder 
diagnoses but not for others, and required treatment pla s and goals be written in the 
biomedical and behavioral language of the DSM. Thus, cribbing isn’t just about learning 
what diagnoses are likely to be covered or denied. Cribbing also describes the collective 
knowledge building that goes into MHPs’ translation work; they must translate their 
everyday clinical goals, practices and outcomes into the preferred language of 
psychiatrists and insurers. 
It’s constrained not by the DSM but by the insurance companies. I think it’s interesting 
because the DSM has changed so much in the past 20-30 years. It used to be that 
homosexuality was considered a mental disorder, and now PMS has a variation and is 
considered a disorder, which has caused quite controversy. You know it’s a manual for the 
profession, but it’s put out by the American Psychiatric Association, not the American 
Psychological Association. That's a different approach. It’s a medical model. 
 
Again, the mental health practitioner above is conflicted over whether to discuss her work 
as being constrained by the DSM or by insurance companies. She starts out discussing 
how it’s the insurance companies rather than the DSM that constrains her work, but then 
goes on to point out how the DSM itself is a manual put out by the Psychiatric rather than 
Psychological Association. Psychiatrists have demonstrated diagnostic ambivalence due 




their own professional autonomy and expertise (see Whooley 2010). Thus, psychiatrists 
themselves built the DSM and are heavily trained in its usage and the biomedical 
paradigm, but experience diagnostic ambivalence due to the countervailing forces of 
insurance companies and their policies of reimbursement. In contrast, MHPs I 
interviewed experienced ambivalence about the cultural authority of the DSM. As 
demonstrated in the previous data sections, MHPs draw on the cultural authority of the 
DSM to enhance communication and collaboration with their patients and other 
providers. However, they also resist and undermine the cultural authority of the DSM and 
the ways it further legitimizes a biomedical perspectiv  of mental health and illness, 
thereby minimizing their own eclectic and psychodynamic perspectives. 
Mental health practitioners struggled in negotiating the biomedical and 
bureaucratic order established by the union of the DSM technology and insurance 
companies’ policies because of their cultural, legal and scientific authority, and because 
the biomedical paradigm that authority legitimates are dissimilar from their own. None of 
the mental health practitioners I interviewed subscri ed to a medical model as their 
theoretical orientation or approach to psychotherapy, yet the majority of MHPs are forced 
to negotiate their work practices within biomedical and bureaucratic orders. “I probably 
under-utilize it.  You know if I had good training in it I might more fully appreciate it. My 
trainer from child guidance, I asked him for training on it and he just poo poohed it. He 
was Minuchin trained in family systems, which leaves little room for the need of a DSM 
when you’re looking at things from a family systems perspective.” 
Mental health practitioners also frequently expressed that they thought maybe if 




often simultaneously described that they weren’t trained on it as much because it never fit 
with their theoretical framework. Instead, the DSM and the contemporary form of 
diagnosis that insurance companies impose are positioned as an alternative rather than 
hegemonic framework.  
The only time it hinders my work is [when] you know you get a patient that a psychiatrist 
or another practitioner has taken the DSMIV and you know it’s pretty vague but they 
tried to make it very specific to the illness. You say ‘that’s not what I’m seeing,’ and they 
go, ‘but the DSMIV says. . .’ We only see one aspect of part of that disorder diagnosis 
rarely, and they will say yeah but it’s there, and the DSM IV says that if it’s there then 
it’s this. It’s hard because . . . we say it’s our bible but another practitioner might really 
believe that. 
 
In the quote above, a psychiatric nurse practitioner discusses how sometimes the 
authority of the DSM is taken too seriously by other practitioners and how that is when 
the DSM hinders her work. Mental health practitioners preferred to discuss the DSM as a 
tool they utilize, and as demonstrated in previous sections, undermined its significance in 
shaping their work and in ways, resented its cultura  authority. As demonstrated in the 
passage above, the majority of MHPs valued clinical judgment and an in-depth 
understanding of the patient over the categories of symptom criteria in the biomedical 
DSM, or the diagnostic label that results from the processes of diagnosis.  
We don’t treat a diagnosis, we treat the person. Everyone has their own story. Everyone 
has their own caveats, ways of thinking and perceptions of the world. Getting to know 
that person, I found to be the most valuable part of treatment. When someone really feels 
like you know them and understand them, whether you agree with them or not isn’t the 
issue. It’s just getting to where they’re at, and then they’re going to be more open to 
learning where to go next, or open to suggestions, r open to change. No one wants to 
change when they’re on the defensive.  
 
Thus, mental health professionals valued clinical judgment and understanding the patient 




allows therapeutic change, not understanding the disor er diagnosis. Guided by the kind 
of patient that has the disorder, or patient heterog neity and complexity over disorder 
categories, the MHPs I interviewed often reiterated what Messer said about balancing 
EBPs and clinical expertise: “In other words, it is frequently more important to know 
what kind of patient has the disorder than what kind of disorder the patient has” (Messer 
2006:39). The criticism that disorder categories in the DSM fail to account for the 
complexity of patient experiences of mental illness was at the heart of MHPs’ resistance 
to standardization.  
I think it would definitely be more helpful and more valid to be able to include V codes 
because often that’s how I see the world, I mean each clinician, that’s why it’s so 
subjective, each clinician sees the world through their lens of training, but V codes are 
often how I see, how I understand the client before me, and it’s really hard, and I think 
part of my disdain for using the DSM is that I can’t really be honest in my viewpoint 
when I’m billing, because you might have to say oh there’s an adjustment disorder, with 
depression, when it’s really a parent-child conflict. 
 
Practitioners undermined the significance of the DSM because how they viewed the 
world and mental illness wasn’t adequately represented in the DSM, but even more so 
because the relevant parts of the DSM weren’t recognized by their clients’ insurance 
providers. This is one of many therapists I interviwed who discussed the need to provide 
counseling to patients who have undergone or are exp riencing specific, stressful, life 
events, which the DSM labels “V-Codes.” V-Codes refe  to things like neglect or abuse of 
a child or adolescent, relational problems such as with a sibling or parent, school 
problems, bereavement or other social environmental stressors. The DSM specifies that V 
codes may be given as diagnoses when an individual is suffering from one of these 
problems but has no behavioral health condition. However, insurers do not recognize V 




representing the views of MHPs I interviewed, but their ability to work as a successful 
workaround was limited. 
Practitioners negotiated the DSM and diagnostic pratices in ways that opened up 
alternative meanings of mental health and illness and allowed them to continue seeing 
and treating patients the way they understood mental ill ess, patienthood and the world.  
While the biomedical model of illness remains the dominant paradigm in society, MHPs 
resist biomedical and bureaucratic standardization in their everyday clinical work. In 
order to continue to conceptualize and intervene in me tal illness and emotional healing 
in ways more closely aligned with their own theoretical orientations, workarounds and 
cribbing processes were almost necessary for most MHPs.  
I hate the DSM.  It’s a tool I have to use because of third-party payers. It limits and 
doesn’t begin to define the complexity of what I see in the room with me. It also labels, 
and I hate doing that. I heard a psychiatrist; his name is Bessel Van Der Koch, from 
Boston, (Harvard). He was on the committee for the last DSM and the one before that. He 
said ‘it was only meant to be a tool for discussion amongst clinicians, so you could have 
language to describe a cluster of symptoms, and not have to describe the same thing over 
and over again when you try to coordinate care. Now it’s become this labeling machine 
that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, at least with adolescents, if they’re given a label.’  
I have a young adult now who was labeled as borderline when she was 13, on an Axis II 
and she’s locked into the belief that she’s a borderline personality disorder when I’m 
really not seeing it, but, she believes it. It’s a tool, but it’s only a tool. 
 
Again, mental health practitioners resist the biomedicalization of their work, and 
challenge its significance for guiding treatment and capturing patient personhood 
complexity. By treating the DSM as a bureaucratic tool, or a means to a necessary end, 
practitioners are able to continue to do the work they love while adhering to formal 
regulations. These patterns of negotiation demonstrate he ways in which technologies 
have unintended consequences. As the practitioner above stated, psychiatrists intended 




processes, it has taken on its own form and cultural power. Practitioners repeatedly 
expressed their concerns over the material consequences DSM labels have for their 
patients. Thus, practitioners undermined the significance of the DSM not just as a form of 
resistance in the name of their own professional autonomy, but in the name of what is in 
the best interest of their patients. In the following data section on mental health 
practitioners’ negotiations of diagnostic processes, I focus on demonstrating the ways in 
which practitioners ‘fudge the numbers,’ or stretch diagnosis to enable them to perform 
the work they really value— providing psychotherapy to patients.  
Adjusting Disorders: Bureaucratic Means to Therapeutic Ends 
Mental health practitioners regularly stretch diagnoses on paperwork in order to 
accomplish their therapeutic goals while complying with bureaucratic policies of 
insurance companies that shape contemporary diagnosis. While less frequently discussed 
by the practitioners I interviewed, one way practitioners may have to stretch the numbers 
is through the practice of over-diagnosis. This strategy is depicted as a last resort for 
practitioners to be afforded authorization for providing important patient services. 
We cannot as a primary diagnosis, give anything along the Autism spectrum, because 
managed care will not reimburse, because they feel that is a disability issue. There have 
been times that we will pull diagnoses that really re encompassed by an autism diagnosis 
like intermittent explosion disorders, impulse contr l disorders or ADHD and we’ll make 
those the primary diagnosis. I have a kid right now who is classic PDD [Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder], but I cannot make that his primary diagnosis.  So his 
secondary diagnosis is PDD, but he’s intermittent explosive and he’s ADHD, and that 
comes into the managed care issue, because otherwise all his services will be denied. 
Even if you put them on as secondary, you’ll get denied the first time and you’ll have to 
go through the review process a second time.  Which I do, because it’s an appropriate 
diagnosis.  I’m not going to just leave it off.   
Thus, practitioners only stretch diagnosis in the dir ction of over-diagnosis when 




much more common direction of stretching a diagnosis was toward under-diagnosis. “I’m 
of the practice where I like to, if you want to call it, diagnose low.” As this example 
shows, when possible, practitioners often try to give the least severe disorder 
classification possible that will garner their patient services.  
The most popular form of diagnosing or punting low, according to the mental 
health practitioners I interviewed, was to assign a new adolescent client with an 
adjustment disorder. “I love adjustment disorder. It’s more benign. You hate to sock up 
major depressive diagnosis on someone, and I wouldn’t do that if they didn’t have the 
symptoms.” Thus, whenever warranted, mental health practitioners err on the side of 
under-diagnosis because of their concerns over the mat rial consequences of labeling 
youth with more severe disorders like major depression. 
More recently, the adjustment disorders, they will give us six months, which I think is 
appropriate, but there are a lot of clinicians who want to see clients longer than six 
months but they don't have the need to give them more of a diagnosis, but managed care 
expects that if you’re going to treat longer than six months that they need a little more 
than an adjustment disorder. We do have kids that are in foster care, that are adjusting to 
new situations constantly, and so we have to be careful with adjustment disorders and we 
usually have to find something more, which, we don't want to label kids. You might start 
with adjustment disorder but then we have to find something else. We have to give them a 
more severe label, which we don't want to do. Especially with kids in foster care, it’s just 
an adjustment disorder.  They’re adjusting to new situations.  But M [name of insurance 
company] doesn’t see it that way. 
Again, practitioners stretch diagnosis in favor of diagnosing low in order to avoid 
labeling youth with more severe disorder diagnoses. Many practitioners didn’t feel this 
was lying or cheating the system because they genuin ly recognized the social 
circumstances of the youth’s lives and how they were “adjusting to new situations.” This 
is a good example of Cribbing because practitioners have to translate their own 




regulations of insurance companies. Due to recognition that social environmental 
circumstances shape the mental problems of youth, and the response of insurance 
companies to V codes, adjustment disorders are the go-to diagnosis for many 
practitioners working with youth. “Adjustment disorder is the one specifically I’m 
thinking of, because ‘the DSM’ says adjustment disor er should go away in 6 months.  
Well then managed care, says, you can’t diagnose them with that now because it’s 6 and 
½ months later.” This practitioner was discussing what was problematic not only about 
the DSM, but about the way insurance companies haveinterpreted the DSM literally and 
use it in order to deny authorizations.  
While it is common for practitioners to diagnose low in the form of adjustment 
disorders, there are discrepancies across insurance providers about how adjustment 
disorders are interpreted and how long providers are authorized to treat adjustment 
disorders. Commonly, insurance companies give practitioners six months of treatment 
authorization for an adjustment disorder, but someti es they give less. As the practitioner 
below describes, the insurance companies that oversee her patients frequently only 
authorize three months of coverage for adjustment disor ers, and with the insurance 
provider for Medicaid in this particular state, there was increasingly a push to not 
authorize treatment for adjustment disorders at all. “I can justify a lot under adjustment 
disorder, that’s kind of a global diagnosis. Except now with Medicaid, well, in all 
insurance, you can’t hold that very long. You need to show after three months if there is 
movement from that or not. Medicaid has a big push to not use it at all. So you’re forced 
to hang a heavy duty label on a kid.” This is another good example of the cribbing work 




sheets that help them negotiate which insurers authorize services for three or six months 
for Adjustment Disorder Diagnoses, and which ones such as the company in this area that 
covers Medicaid patients, are pushing to make Adjustment Disorders illegitimate 
diagnoses. Adjustment disorders became the go-to diagnosis not only because 
practitioners were concerned about the consequences of labeling but also because for 
many, it was an accurate representation of the social circumstances in patients’ lives that 
influenced their social psychological disturbances or ymptoms.  
Also, practitioners discussed using adjustment disor ers as a common initial 
diagnosis because it allowed them more time to get to know patients and thus more time 
to make a more accurate diagnosis for something more severe. Some practitioners felt the 
insurance requirement that they diagnose in the first session, or in the first hour of 
meeting a patient, was unethical and undermined the importance of building rapport with 
a patient upon the first meeting. Thus, stretching dia nosis by giving patients adjustment 
disorders was a bureaucratic means to a therapeutic end, but one with several 
justifications following professional expertise. 
I don’t necessarily look at it as though I’m being forced to lie if I can’t bill out a V code 
when I give an adjustment disorder. It’s been my experience that those kids generally 
present with some pretty significant depression or anxiety or, they’ve got enough chaos 
or drama in their life to need a v code. Generally that’s going to impact them enough 
emotionally, so I can justify giving them a diagnosis for [Axis I or primary disorder]. 
Although what I think is problematic about that then is the kid is the one again who walks 
around wearing the label. They’re the one that is depressed. That’s what this is all about 
rather than, no they’re depressed because there’s all this other stuff going on. The v code 
can help account for all that other stuff where the Axis I code, you know the adjustment 
disorder, the major depression, anxiety disorder, conduct disorder, those only apply to one 
person. 
  In addition to commonly diagnosing youth with adjustment disorders when their 
social circumstances heavily contribute to what they experience, several practitioners 




situational problems such as relational, sibling or parent problems or abuse. V codes 
frequently came up during my interviews with mental health practitioners because they 
are not considered legitimate diagnoses. V codes can only be used as secondary 
diagnoses to help give more specificity or context o their primary or Axis I diagnoses, 
which are required for billing purposes. The quote from the practitioner above details 
how she views adjustment disorders and v codes as legitimate and the problematic thing 
about only being able to give v codes as a secondary di gnosis is that mental health 
professionals are forced to label a kid even when it is his or her social environment – 
family, siblings, or relationships, that are the cause of psychological conflict or mental 
suffering. 
Thus, similar to the psychiatrists in Whooley’s (2010) study, the mental health 
practitioners I interviewed used several workarounds i  order to comply with 
bureaucratic requirements and biomedical language of the DSM while opening up spaces 
for resisting biomedical psychiatry and the commodification of health. However, rather 
than having ambivalence about the DSM similar to that of psychiatrists who desired 
professional autonomy as much as the scientific legitimacy the DSM bestows upon their 
profession, other mental health practitioners such as psychologists, marriage and family 
therapists and social workers had to negotiate more serious tensions in their diagnostic 
work. None of the practitioners I interviewed identified with a biomedical model as their 
theoretical orientation to diagnosis or treatment.  
The unintended consequences the American Psychiatri Associations’ biomedical 
DSM has created for psychiatrists that led to their situation of sociological ambivalence 




MHPs. Sociological ambivalence arises from “a tension experienced by psychiatrists as a 
member of a profession and as an individual  professional, from the tension between 
capturing professional authority in a system of mental health professions and the d sire 
to exercise individual professional autonomy in practice, free of external meddling” 
(Whooley 2010:455). Psychiatrists experience sociolg cal ambivalence out of their 
simultaneous respect and repugnance for the DSM, for their wanting to have their 
legitimate scientific authority as psychiatric professionals, but not have the tool that 
bestows them this hierarchical authority – the DSM, used against them. “It cuts to the 
heart of the identity of psychiatrists as the DSM is both a guarantor of psychiatry’s 
position in the mental health field and a tool wielded against individual psychiatrists to 
monitor their practice” (Whooley 2010:456).  However, the tensions for non-psychiatrist 
mental health professionals are much more complex than those between the collective 
membership in a profession and their own individual desire for professional autonomy.  
While not all psychiatrists subscribe wholly to thebiomedical paradigm, it is 
dominant, the focus of their training and of the DSM classification system. For other 
mental health practitioners focused on psychotherapy, their ambivalence is much more 
complex and based on the ways in which the cultural authority of the DSM helps their 
diagnostic work while the biomedical model it legitimates and the operationalization of it 
by insurers, hinders it. Psychodynamic MHPs tend to have more repulsion than respect 
for the biomedical model of the DSM technology and its unintended consequences. 
Alternative mental health professionals, or all non-psychiatrist professionals, experience 
what I call diagnostic dissonance, which is different from what Whooley (2010) describes 




Any classification system valorizes some point of view and leaves another 
unvalued, unrecognized, or even erased from the record. Clinical, scientific evidence that 
guides psychotherapy is not at the heart of the DSM or bureaucratic standardization. The 
diagnostic dissonance non-psychiatric mental health practitioners experience evolves out 
of a conflict between their own theoretical orientations to health and illness and the 
biomedical model enshrouded in the DSM technology and insurance company policies. 
The power, knowledge and experiences of alternative mental health professionals, in 
comparison to those of psychiatrists, are marginalized by the assemblage of the DSM and 
insurance company policies. 
DIAGNOSTIC DISSONANCE: MARGINALIZED KNOWLEDGES, ERASING THE SOCIAL 
In this analysis section, I focus on how mental healt  practitioners experience diagnostic 
dissonance. The MHPs I interviewed enact workarounds not simply out of a simultaneous 
respect and repulsion regarding the DSM and its cultural and scientific authority, but 
because their theoretical orientations and background disciplines are marginalized by the 
assemblage of biomedical and bureaucratic standardization. In addition to discussing the 
ways they negotiate diagnostic practices to fall in line with biomedical and bureaucratic 
standards, practitioners also share their frustrations with how standardization minimizes 
the importance of the social environment in shaping mental suffering of their adolescent 
patients.  
[V codes] are not recognized by any non-clinicians. Anyone who does not work directly 
with clients doesn’t need them, but this is the outpatient hallway, and we’ll have a lot of 
conversations in this hallway. I’ve said it more than once and I know other people have 
said it. If V codes could just be recognized. This is the problem. This is what we’re going 
to form the treatment plan around. It’s going to be sp cific to the diagnosis, because the 
diagnosis is actually appropriate in this situation. Adjustment disorder unspecified. These 




can be part of another diagnosis. If I read adjustmen  disorder I have no idea what that 
means for that client, whereas if I see they have a lif  problem I have a better sense of 
what’s going on. You have to look at page 736 to find those. 
 
In the above description, the practitioner bewails that V codes, as opposed to adjustment 
disorders, are unrecognized by insurance companies. I  other words, V codes are found 
in the DSM (although in the back), but are not considered legitimate diagnoses by 
insurance companies. Insurance companies will not reimburse for using V codes as a 
primary, or Axis I diagnosis. Yet, for practitioners, the information they bestow is 
incredibly valuable to clinicians.  This discussion points to how the DSM is guided by 
diagnostic rather than clinical concerns. Most of Nrth America’s mental health 
professionals being non-psychiatrists are not paid directly for the work they are trained to 
do. That is, they have to translate their clinical concerns into diagnostic (biomedical and 
behavioral) terms. Thus, the DSM actant and the way the insurers enforce its usage as a 
biomedical information technology, focuses on issue of classification rather than 
therapy. In this way, the DSM technology is reinforced as an obligatory passage point in 
diagnostic processes by the external actors of insura ce companies.  
In the following exchange, I had asked the mental he lt  practitioner about the 
relevance the DSM holds for her everyday diagnostic work. In her response, she 
demonstrates diagnostic dissonance over this translation work. She notes how 
unfortunately, it is very relevant for her daily clinical work; while at the same time notes 
she doesn’t look at it very often and goes onto describe all of its inadequacies. 
A lot, unfortunately, a lot. It doesn’t make it off the shelf much. We have to give a 
diagnosis the first session. Even for non-Medicaid kids we have to do that, and 
unfortunately, V codes don’t count for anything, even though that’s what’s actually 
appropriate. We will joke you know that most people here will just get an adjustment 
disorder. I have a paperclip on that page because, it’s 309.something. I hate to brand 




than seeing another client with depression. I hate those commercials for depression 
medications because they show people in the grey swat suits and they are lying like this 
and that’s not what it always looks like. I usually, especially with adolescents, I’ll tell 
them, ‘I’m going to have to give you a diagnosis, from what I’ve heard so far, it sounds 
like this kind of thing is going on.’ Sometimes I’ll give dysthymic disorder or adjustment 
disorder. This is what that means. It comes from this book. This is why I’m giving it to 
you. This does not mean you’re crazy or anything like that.  This just means you have 
some rough stuff going on in your life and you’re having a hard time dealing with it. And 
that’s okay. So I approach this as a necessary evil and I try to have that transparency with 
my clients. I’m going to have to write this down; it’s going to maybe show up on billing 
paperwork at some point. I want you to know what this is so you don’t freak out and 
think that I’m saying you need to be institutionalized. I think a lot of times people are like 
oh if I get a diagnosis that must be really bad. No. That mean’s you’ve seen me once and 
I have to give you one. 
 
In this quote, the practitioner demonstrates how she employs diagnostic workarounds or 
strategies that fulfill her obligations toward insurance companies and her patients, such as 
making a diagnosis in the first session by giving a legitimate primary diagnosis such as 
adjustment disorder or dysthymic (mood) disorder in order to qualify her patient for 
treatment. At the same time, she also discusses the flaws in this system of categorization, 
and the difficulty of immediate diagnosis when even a well-studied, well-understood 
disorder like depression can appear completely different in each patient, especially 
among adolescents.  
I think it would definitely be more helpful and more valid to be able to include V codes 
because often that’s how I see the world. That’s why it’s so subjective. Each clinician sees 
the world through their lens of training. V codes are often how I see, how I understand 
the client before me, and it’s really hard. I think part of my disdain for using the DSM is 
that I can’t really be honest in my viewpoint when I’m billing, because you might have to 
say oh there’s an adjustment disorder, with depression, when it’s really a parent-child 
conflict 
 
This marriage and family therapist’s disdain for the DSM is a great example of 
diagnostic dissonance because biomedical standardization leads her to feel dishonest in 
her bureaucratic paperwork. In other words, she expriences diagnostic dissonance 




wellbeing. This description signifies a very different process from the diagnostic 
ambivalence demonstrated by the psychiatrists in Whooley’s (2010) study. The mental 
health practitioners I interviewed experienced dissonance more than ambivalence, and 
professional marginalization (in their own forms of scientific and clinical expertise and 
training), than legitimization. While the above practitioner lamented her inability to get 
reimbursed for treatment of V-codes (which stand for specific life events and are tucked 
away in the back of the DSM), this next quote comes from a therapist who actively 
engages this marginalized literature, only to be forced to crib around it: 
I use them.  Unfortunately, and I think it’s absolute y ridiculous that we cannot use them 
as a billing code. If we have a kid that comes in that meets the criteria for a V code, we 
have to find other criteria that meets a standard diagnosis, which I think is absolutely 
ridiculous.  A parent-child conflict is a valid diagnosis. Sexual abuse of a child is a valid 
diagnosis. But it’s a v code, so we have to come up with another diagnosis. I think it’s 
absolutely ridiculous. I think that would be something that the DSM committees should 
definitely be looking at. I think that definitely comes back to managed care issues. 
They’re in the DSM.  They are buried in the back, but they are in the DSM.  They are 
issues and they are therapeutic issues that can be dealt with and treated. 
 
Practitioners strongly disagreed with the illegitimate status of V codes. According to their 
theoretical orientations and treatment plans, parent-child conflicts and sexual abuse are 
valid diagnoses, or problems that warrant psychotherapy. Further, multiple practitioners 
pointed out how V codes, which were more in tune with their definition of adolescent 
mental illness and the problems around which they form treatment plans, are buried in the 
back of the DSM. This locating of the V codes that were undervalued by the DSM (based 
on them being all the way in the back near the appendic s), and unrecognized by 
insurance companies, illustrated the knowledge-power-experience relationships of non-




more holistic theoretical orientations to adolescent mental illness are hidden from view 
by powerful actors in the mental health arena.   
The psychologist on our team just gives somebody an Axis I diagnosis as adjustment 
disorder unspecified because that is like the least severe disorder you can find in the 
whole thing. She also gave a V code. You can give them as a secondary diagnosis, but 
these are what they are. They are relational problems. They are on page 736 so they’re, 
like, hidden, kind of, you know after neuroleptic induced tardive, a word I can’t even say, 
it’s all the way back here. [Reading from the DSM:] ‘They may be a focus of clinical 
attention,’ yeah, they are – so ‘parent-relational-chi d, physical, sexual abuse, neglect,’ we 
see a lot of cases of neglect that aren’t reportable but they are still very neglectful. . . 
‘academic problems, identity problems, religious problems,’ this is a big one with my 
adolescents, you know they’ve been brought up Catholic and then they’ve gone to a 
Methodist church and they’re like, Blasphemy! You know that kind of a thing. 
‘Intellectual functioning,’ that can really start to come out in like middle school, what 
class you’re placing in, tracking, I’m in the dumb class, and everyday life problems. 
These are all huge huge problems for adolescents. 
 
Again, the practitioner describes how V codes can only be given as secondary diagnoses. 
Similar to others, she argues they are valid therapeutic or clinical issues that can be dealt 
with and a major focus in psychotherapy with adolescents. She takes the time to list to me 
all of the important life problems that fall under the illegitimate category of V codes: 
parent-child or relational problems, physical or sexual abuse, neglect, academic 
problems, identity problems, religious problems andmore. While each of these are 
clinical issues that mental health practitioners I interviewed valued as important 
presenting problems, they are not valued by their positioning in the DSM or insurance 
companies’ reimbursement policies. They remain “buried” in the back of the book, and 
are not billable codes. V codes are not currently considered valid or valuable diagnostic 
codes, and this was the main way practitioners problematized the marginalization of their 





RE-ENVISIONING PSYCHOTHERAPY: RELATIONAL BEING AND THE SOCIAL 
Mental health clinicians were asked what they would revise if they were the chair of a 
committee tasked with modifying the classification of adolescent mental disorders for the 
DSM-V. My analysis reveals three areas of significance: (1) A need to legitimize 
disorders caused by relational problems or the social environment (such as V code 
diagnoses), (2) A need to create a scientific basis and understanding of normal versus 
pathological functioning in adolescents, including how the adolescent stage in the 
lifecourse impacts mental suffering, and finally (3) A need to recognize the power 
insurance companies hold over DSM utilization and diagnostic processes. 
Legitimize Relational and Social Environmental Conditions of Mental Disorder 
First, it was common for practitioners to discuss why V codes should be made 
into valid diagnoses in the new and upcoming DSMV. Practitioners reasoned that several 
of their adolescent clients suffer from relational problems that impair their daily 
functioning. Further, practitioners argued that mental health and illness itself is relational. 
I think they [V codes] should be valid diagnoses because if you have relational problems, 
and that’s a V code right there, if those relational problems are causing significant 
impairment in your daily functioning or academic functioning, then there is something 
going on and because you are in that situation you may not have the tools necessary to 
make improvements in that relationship.  You may not have the tools necessary to move 
beyond or seek out help, so yes I think those are vlid codes. 
In addition to recognizing the relational component of mental illness, practitioners 
emphasized the ways in which the social environment or social conditions of adolescents’ 
lives shaped their emotional well-being.  
I’d like to see something where somebody’s disorder is caused by somebody else’s 
behavior, somebody else’s attitude. More like an adjustment disorder but not necessarily. 
I’ll give you an example. I have a kid and he’s 12 years old and a lot of his behaviors and 




has a lack of respect towards her, a lack of respect towards authority, lack of respect 
towards law enforcement, because they’re not doing anything about mom. Giving him a 
disorder on his own, it doesn’t have any kind of part, its impartial to what’s going on. An 
environmental diagnosis, you know? If he’s oppositinal, I could also put in a diagnosis 
of something like mom’s a drug addict, in and out of prison, etc. I should be able to 
diagnose something related to the mom; it’s not the kids fault. That’s what I’d like to see 
change. 
 
Again, this male Psychologist practitioner, who works in a mid-sized town in a 
Midwestern state, discusses the importance of the relational aspects of mental health and 
illness. He discussed at length with me several of his cases, especially male adolescents, 
who had significant impairment of functioning in school and at home due to their parental 
or other relational conflicts. Some of the adolescents he spoke of were coping with 
neglect issues from home, and others just had poor relationships with their parents and 
were displaying oppositional behavior. Yet, in all of the cases he described, there were 
significant social environmental circumstances thatneeded addressed in (and outside of) 
psychotherapy. That adolescents often experience negativ  social circumstances that 
contribute to their emotional well-being is an accepted social fact among the mental 
health professionals I spoke with. Their professional expertise suggests that labeling 
adolescent youth with a disorder but ignoring the social circumstances that shape their 
well-being was an inadequate therapeutic approach; one which is heavily facilitated by 
the biomedicalization entrenched in the DSM and insurance company policies.  
I guess this isn’t specific, but its just if those V codes could start being recognized, I don’t 
know if that means removing the Vs or getting other p ople to pay for them, but you 
know parent-child relational problem, well that’s app rent in a lot of the problems we see 
here, conflict with mom, or they’ve changed schools or omething like that.  Yeah, just a 
greater recognition of all of the other stuff that is going on besides just the chemical 
imbalances in their head, the games in the schools, the drugs in the schools, the sex in the 
schools, all that other stuff and how it, the huge social and educational environmental 
stuff, the primary support group, all that axis IV stuff, I don’t know why they are all the 




couple of adolescent clients dealing with their own sexuality and some troubles they’ve 
had with that too, because it is such a time of discovery of who you are and how you, ya 
know, all of that kind of thing.  The two of them that I am thinking of actually they were 
pretty at peace with, that that’s how they are, and they were both in relationships and so 
forth but it wasn’t okay for the family 
 
Several practitioners focused on how the social enviro ment of youth’s lives 
impacts their emotional well-being, and how the current DSM and insurance company 
policies fail to recognize, value or reimburse for therapeutic focus on the social 
conditions of mental illness of youth. This theme was discussed in a number of ways, as 
illustrated by the practitioner quoted above. Some youth that were in treatment had 
relational problems with parents or peers at school; others had recent life changes or were 
struggling to cope with life at school. Practitioners focused on how the DSM-V revisions 
need to recognize V codes or the social environmental aspects of mental illness. Often, 
this concern was linked to describing particular features about adolescent personhood or 
stage in the lifecourse and how it lends itself to social environmental disruptions and 
identity struggles more than those found during adulthood or childhood.  
Normal versus Pathological Adolescent Functioning: The Science of Adolescence 
While practitioners discussed relational disorders as important for all people, 
some criticisms of the DSM focused on how irrelevant it is for types of problems they see 
most often in adolescents. “The DSM is, you know with your typical kid you don't have to 
look at it. I mean you have to know your diagnoses but if you work with children and 
adolescents you don't use half of the DSM.” This description of the DSM as being largely 
irrelevant for diagnosing and treating adolescents wa a reoccurring theme. Yet, it wasn’t 
only the DSM that was being questioned, but the extnt to which adolescents experience 




questioned the extent to which adolescent mental health problems themselves may be 
fleeting or dynamic enough to question the necessitation that every patient receives a 
disorder diagnosis. 
If you look through a file, when a child has been assessed 5 or 6 or 10 times, that 
snapshot of where that child is right now, if they just ran out into the middle of the street 
and vandalized a car and almost jumped off a bridge you’re going to see this kid as much 
more high risk, suicidal, you know all that stuff then if you catch them at a time in their 
life that they’re assessed that things are going relativ ly well. A child is very dynamic. 
They don’t just stay in one spot. 
 
Practitioners often discussed adolescent mental health and illness as though it was of a 
different, more dynamic and temporal nature than the mental suffering experienced by 
adults. While psychic pain and the stressful social conditions of adolescent lives were 
never minimized, the way in which children and adolescents are dynamic, and are 
developing, constantly changing people was stressed a  an important aspect of adolescent 
diagnosis and therefore, the (ir)relevance of the DSM in adolescent diagnostic processes. 
Aside from being described as irrelevant for adolescents, practitioners critiqued 
the lack of clarity in the DSM on the differences between what is normal or abnormal for 
adolescent emotions and behaviors. 
 They have a section on children and adolescent disorders. It would be wonderful if the 
DSM could really branch out an Adolescent section to distinguish adolescent defiance 
from normal adolescent anger or angst, and to distinguish depression that’s not hormonal 
or mood based or separation from family; to do more distinctions, a section that is truly 
about adolescence, what’s normal and what’s pathological. 
 
While there were several ways in which practitioners questioned the extent to which the 
DSM represented the most common social psychological problems of adolescents, 
adolescent identity issues stood out as significant, especially in the interviews I did with 




I know what I would revise. I've had a couple of kids that are questioning or kids that 
consider themselves transgendered and you have to go right into the adult section and I 
think it could be more sensitive just the varying stages, you know. Instead of saying, 17 
year old male has this disorder, well, is it a disorder?  And then finally, I was just like I'm 
not going to diagnose him with that anyway because if it goes through insurance, Blue 
Cross Blue Shield would say, I'm not covering that. I just went with depression but, I 
hope they expand that. 
 
In the passage above, the social worker discussed how adolescents that are exploring their 
gender and/or sexuality (outside of the prescribed heteronormative options) often 
presented with social psychological concerns, but it was unclear whether issues of 
adolescent sexuality warrant an adult disorder diagnosis. Mental health professionals 
practicing in the Midwest frequently brought up issue  of treating adolescents with 
identity issues and many of these concerns focused on gender and sexuality. While a 
homophobic culture is rampant in much of the United States, gay, lesbian, bisexual and 
transgender youth living in Midwestern states, especially in rural areas of Midwestern 
states, may present to therapists with more social psychological concerns because of the 
more conservative, and often more homophobic, enviro ments in which they are living.  
I mean a therapist has to say this person's mental health is affected by this. When I was 
treating this kid, I went to Planned Parenthood to talk to the gender educator or whatever, 
and she gave me some great information and asked if I wanted to be put on the list of 
recommended therapists. I said the only reason I'm even treating this kid is because he's 
two hours away from [city with access to mental healt  practitioners], and there is 
nobody else out here. So ethically I can treat him but this is not my area, and when he 
went off to college, I hooked him up with [professional at state college in said city], she's 
the head of the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, etc etc. and just gave him a list of 
therapists and you know, and I always said, this is not my area, but this is what I've found 
out and you know so in that case, the DSM is not very h lpful. 
 
Again, this behavioral psychologist who often travels to rural areas to provide behavioral 
assessments and psychotherapeutic treatment to children and adolescents in a Midwestern 




As adolescent identity issues in general and adolescent sexuality in particular, emerged 
repeatedly as a focus of discussion in my interviews across both rural and urban areas in a 
Midwestern state, I began asking practitioners to assess the state of the field with regards 
to its development of psychotherapeutic resources and networked connections for 
questioning youth. They often told stories about how certain therapists would gain a 
reputation of getting out their bibles, and others would gain a reputation of being willing 
and even capable of providing treatment. None of the practitioners discussed the 
contemporary situation with confidence. While the handful of practitioners that raised 
these issues noted that there had been some improvement in the area of psychotherapeutic 
resources for adolescents with gender and/or sexuality issues, they were all in agreement 
that there remains considerable need for development.  
 Mental health practitioners emphasized several ways in which the DSM 
technology and biomedicalization of mental health and illness failed to address the 
unique aspects of the adolescent stage of the life course. As demonstrated in the analysis 
above, many practitioners stressed the importance of relationships, the social contexts of 
adolescent lives and the distinctive aspects of ident ty explorations. While some 
practitioners felt adding v codes, or diagnostic categories that refer to relational or social 
aspects of health would make adolescent diagnostic processes more accurate, others felt 
there also needed to be a better clinical guide for understanding normal versus 
pathological adolescent functioning across their everyday environments, and how they 
are different from those of adults. 
I would love for them to really look, and I know that they have the GAF scoring, the 
global assessment of functioning.  You can find them out there for children and 




need to have a revised GAF scoring for children and adolescents and it’s not in the DSM.  
They have one that’s supposed to be used for everybody, and it’s not applicable for 
adolescents in my opinion.  So I would love to see them look at that a little further. 
 
Thus mental health practitioners thought adolescent’ contexts of life are different enough 
that the DSM should take into consideration those diff rences. Several practitioners 
discussed the ways in which adolescent functioning in schools is a prevalent problem of 
presentation upon adolescents entering treatment.  
Well I would definitely revise the GAF score, one for adolescents as well as one for 
children.  I think that would be hugely helpful. Because even though that’s just a number 
and I keep saying more information is better, but it is, when you’re trying to find the 
number, it looks at the functioning in all of the different areas, which is more helpful 
probably than just that first Axis I diagnosis of bipolar disorder. So I think an 
individualized GAF. 
 
Again, while it is widely acknowledged in the literature that domains of functioning or 
everyday life contexts of adolescents are different from those of adults, the DSM to date 
has largely based disorder categories based on research on adults and then adapted them 
for children and adolescents. In comparison to the DSM as a whole, the GAF score is 
valued as a tool that assesses everyday life functioning. Practitioners value the 
information the GAF score is able to provide, but want it to be more reflective of the 
adolescent life experience. Further, similar to wanting the larger field to recognize and 
value V codes, relational disorders and the social environmental contexts of adolescents’ 
lives, many practitioners discussed how the Global Assessment of Relational Functioning 
(GARF) is an underutilized diagnostic tool. 
When we request more sessions we have to give a current GAF score, Global Assessment 
Functioning, the Axis IV of the diagnosis, so I’ll pull it out just to kind of see where they 
are on that. Most of the clients we see are between 40 and 60 but sometimes if its an 
atypical client I’ll be like oh maybe they are, they have a global assessment functioning 




doing, but the other one that is used and recognized by insurance and stuff is the one that 
is just made for individual adults, so it’s so hard. No, they haven’t lost their job, because 
they’re 12. So I would love to see, and a couple of my colleagues and I have talked about 
this, a global assessment of functioning for adolescents, or for children that is much more 
appropriate.  
 
Again, practitioners wanted the DSMV to take into consideration the distinctive contexts 
of adolescent lives, including a valuing of how relationships and their unique social 
environments shape their emotional well-being.  On the other hand, as is pointed out also 
in this quotation, in addition to the DSM having its own shortcomings, the way in which 
insurance company policies privilege some diagnostic codes or tools such as the GAF 
over the GARF, also was a focus of the change the practitioners envision when they think 
about a DSMV or a better way of classifying adolescents with mental health issues. 
Disentangling the Power Insurance Companies Have over Diagnostic Processes 
For practitioners, it is not simply the DSM in itself that is in need of revision. 
MHPs were cognizant of the ways in which the DSM and insurance company power have 
become entangled: 
I would focus on managed care and funding because that seems to be a huge barrier for 
clinicians to where some clinicians will not accept Medicaid clients at this point but that 
is what they have to do to survive. If you have a private practice you have to get paid and 
if you’re doing your billing on your own. . . the investment of time . . . would be more 
focused around that and, then, the diagnoses. They inform treatment but the way, and this 
goes back to managed care, we have to have those within that first hour of meeting this 
client and gathering this information where you are just doing so much writing and your 
interaction is limited. I don’t think that its ethical to provide a diagnosis that first hour, 
even though with your training, you’re able to see those interactions between the parent 
and the child, hear how the child responds, you do get the history and through more 
experience you are able to provide a diagnosis that fits but its still-- I think doing it within 
that first hour is not okay. 
Practitioners argued that modifying the DSM itself is not a solution in itself. Issues of 




public forms of insurance or Medicaid cannot be fixd by focusing on the DSM itself. 
Further, the insurance company requirement that MHPs make a diagnosis in the first 
session of meeting a client prioritizes biomedical coding of information over building 
clinician-client rapport.  
 I guess I would change the rigidity of diagnostic criteria. The hold that insurance 
companies have [on the mental health care system] you know like [name of local 
insurance company], which is Medicaid. You have to do so much paperwork. You have to 
create two reports, a treatment plan and a request for ervices after the first initial 
evaluation. That's a hell a lot of paperwork and a hell of a lot of time and they put a lot of 
stipulations on who can see whom and the whole purpose of that is to make it so hard to 
see people so they don't have to pay for it, and they would argue otherwise of course but I 
would change that. You need to have accountability u  to make it so prohibitive for 
people to see [name of insurer’s] clients? Like [another provider’s] practice, I think they 
are going to stop seeing [name of insurer, or clients with that insurance] because it’s so 
much work. They pay a lot in the beginning, the first evaluation, but it goes down over 
time. They don't want you to see people for very long, so after a certain amount of visits 
its down to under $60 bucks. In line with the national debate, the power of the insurance 
companies is what also needs changed. 
 
Several mental health professionals agonized over the power insurance companies have 
over their everyday clinical work. While psychiatris s experienced diagnostic 
ambivalence because as a result of the way external actors such as insurance companies 
have adopted the DSM for their own billing purposes, mental health practitioners trained 
in alternative theoretical orientations experienced diagnostic dissonance. The assemblage 
of the biomedical model enshrouded in the DSM and insurance company power 
marginalized MHPs’ own professional knowledge-practices and expertise. Revising the 
DSM to account for the social, relational and adolescent specific aspects of mental health 
and illness will not in itself, address the issues of the Psychiatry-Insurance-
Standardization-Assemblage that dominates the contemporary political economy of 





In this chapter, I examined the following two research questions: (1) How do mental 
health practitioners negotiate diagnoses? And (2) In what ways does the DSM shape the 
everyday diagnostic and treatment work of mental het  practitioners? I employed the 
sociology of diagnosis and biomedicalization theory frameworks to illustrate how the 
processes of diagnosis capture how the existing mental health establishment defines and 
measures mental illness. I argued that the technoscientific classification system of the 
DSM orders ways of being and contemporary thinking about mental health and illness. 
While the DSM technology was originally designed as a diagnostic communication 
device, it heavily structures not only contemporary diagnostic processes, but clinical 
work.  
Biomedicalization theory facilitated a disentanglin of the interests and power of 
different social actors engaged in processes of diagnosis. It elucidates how the role of the 
DSM as technoscientific actant in diagnosis, and its meanings, emerge from on-going 
clinical practice interactions. Thus, the DSM is a ocially scripted technology, yet its 
significance is interpretively flexible and negotiated in concrete sites of action. The 
heterogeneities in type of mental health care provider, care setting, and patient, all shape 
how the DSM is used and thus how diagnostic practices are carried out. While the 
biomedical model is dominant within U.S. society, everyday psychotherapeutic practices 
of adolescent mental health care work challenge cultural authority. Despite the growing 
assemblage of biopsychiatry via the DSM, Evidence Based Practices, the growth of 
privatized managed care and big Pharma within a larger neobliberal healthcare economy, 




diagnostic work is constrained but far from determined by the biomedical model and 
bureaucratic standardization. 
Social processes of diagnosis and the interpretive flexibility of the DSM as 
biomedical technology are different for mental health professionals who are not 
psychiatrists. The mental health professionals I interviewed interpreted the DSM 
technology as a necessary tool that sometimes enhances diagnostic clarity, permits 
reimbursement for services and can help with interdisciplinary and patient 
communication. The psychiatrists in Whooley’s (2010) study experienced diagnostic 
ambivalence as a result of how the DSM technology bestows scientific legitimacy upon 
their profession while being used by insurers to undercut their professional authority.  
In contrast, the mental health professionals I interviewed were ambivalent about 
the way in which the cultural authority of the DSM technology simultaneously helped 
them communicate and collaborate with patients, parents and other mental health 
professionals while hindering their professional authority. Even more significant though, 
was the way in which the biomedical model legitimated by the DSM technology 
marginalized their theoretical orientations and eclectic approaches to psychotherapy. 
While alternative mental health professionals recognized the ways in which the DSM 
technology was helpful for their work, there was much more at stake in social processes 
of diagnosis for them. Clinical interests and practices are guided by definitions and 
measurements of mental health and illness. Further, definitions and measurements 
influence societal and professional response as well as experiences of, mental illness.  
Despite the multi-sited character of biomedical standardization, the most common 




treatment practices. MHPs had several ways of being dismissive of the importance of the 
DSM. They labeled it as just a tool, as the only wa they could get paid, as something 
that only facilitates diagnosis but doesn’t impact treatment, as a means to an end, and as 
the bible for the profession of psychiatry, not their own profession(s). Mental health 
professionals’ talk about the DSM technology undermined its authority over their own 
clinical expertise.  
Like the psychiatrists in Whooley’s (2010) study, the mental health professionals 
I interviewed employed several work-arounds, or loca  solutions to the problems posed 
by biomedical and bureaucratic standardization. First, mental health practitioners utilized 
alternative taxonomies in order to diagnose according to their own understanding of 
mental illness, and then translated those interpretations into DSM or biomedical terms 
after the fact. This workaround was more than a locl strategy that allowed MHPs to fall 
in line with standardization while maintaining some professional authority. The 
alternative taxonomy workaround enables psychologists, counselors, social workers and 
other non-psychiatrist professionals to continue to define mental health and illness in 
psychodynamic ways.  
Second, MHPs fudged the numbers or diagnostic codes in order to disguise their 
actual clinical practices while falling in line with he formal rules of insurance company 
standardization. Fudging the codes often involves practices of over or under diagnosis. 
MHPs I interviewed viewed themselves as conservative in diagnostics and when possible, 
diagnosed or punted low, thereby protecting their patients from more severe diagnostic 




Finally, MHPs negotiated diagnoses with adolescent patients, their parents and 
other providers. In this work-around, alternative MHPs shored up the cultural authority of 
the DSM while undermining biomedical and bureaucrati  standardization. In addition to 
employing these work-arounds, MHPs participated in a process I term cribbing. Cribbing 
signifies the on going collective knowledge building and translation work required by 
MHPs to learn the correct answers or codes that will facilitate therapeutic service 
authorizations and minimize coverage denials. The term cribbing also describes the way 
in which alternative MHPs’ professional expertise i treated as infantile or illegitimate 
alongside the reimbursement policies of insurers. Cibbing processes reveal the collective 
knowledge building that goes into MHPs’ translation work; they must translate their 
everyday clinical goals, practices and outcomes into the preferred language of insurers. 
Thus, cribbing negotiations develop out of on-going interactions with insurance 
companies. 
Mental health professionals resist and reject the biomedical model of the DSM, 
and bureaucratic standards of insurance companies through workarounds and cribbing. 
For some professionals, diagnostic processes of fitting their patients and their patient’s 
symptoms into disorder categories are uncomfortable due to issues with labeling or 
problems of fit. For others, the process of diagnosis and the categories of illness 
represented in the DSM and legitimated by the insurance companies are in direct conflict 
with their theoretical orientation to mental illness and therapeutic approach to healing.  
At the heart of much of the resistance to biomedical and bureaucratic 
standardization were knowledge tensions between altrn tive paradigms in 




oriented insurers privilege a therapeutic focus on urface level symptoms and behaviors 
whereas the mental health professionals I interviewed ere trained to focus on deeper 
communication, relational and emotional issues. This non-fungibility of the DSM and 
insurance company policies is so problematic for the MHPs I interviewed that they 
experience what I term diagnostic dissonance. Diagnostic dissonance describes the 
conflict between mental health professionals’ own theoretical orientations to health and 
illness and the biomedical model legitimated in the DSM technology and insurance 
company policies. The power, knowledge and experiences of alternative mental health 
professionals, in comparison to psychiatrist professionals, are marginalized by the 
assemblage of the DSM and insurance companies.  
A key example of how the theoretical orientations ad professional knowledges of 
non-psychiatrist mental health professionals are margin lized in this assemblage is the 
way in which social environmental conditions and causes of mental illness are devalued 
in the DSM and considered illegitimate diagnoses by insurers. For example, V codes, 
which represent social context conditions and/or relational disorders such as parent-child 
or sibling conflict, sexual abuse or neglect, are found in the back of the DSM under Axis 
IV. Further, insurance companies will not reimburse m ntal health practitioners for V 
codes as primary diagnoses. Yet, for the mental health practitioners I interviewed, the 
information V codes bestow is incredibly valuable and clinically relevant. Further, mental 
health professionals view social environmental and relational issues as important to the 
emotional wellbeing of all people, but especially adolescents. Thus, practitioners strongly 




In re-envisioning a different way of doing psychotherapy, practitioners focused on 
three aspects of the DSM and diagnosis that needed to change. First, MHPs argued that 
the social environmental and relational aspects of mental illness need recognized and 
legitimated in diagnostic policies. Second, they argued that the DSM-V and the mental 
health field as a whole needs to develop a better understanding of the normal versus 
pathological functioning of adolescents. Finally, practitioners argued that fixing the DSM 
alone will not be enough. The power insurance companies hold over DSM and diagnostic 




Chapter Five The Political Economy of Mental Health Work:  
Over-Managed, Stratified Care 
 
In what ways does the political economy, specifically, managed care, shape 
contemporary adolescent mental health care? This chapter examines the larger, macro-
political economy of the adolescent mental health field and the institutional forces that 
shape the conditions under which screening, diagnosis and treatment of adolescent 
disturbances occur. In out-patient expert mental het  professional settings, managed 
care is a major, external countervailing force thatshapes the everyday care work of 
practitioners. This chapter examines the common links across care settings and how the 
biopolitical assemblage of the insurance industry, the DSM, and state governance 
structure and stratify adolescent mental health care. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN THE US, 1980-PRESENT 
The contemporary mental health care system is fragmented, stratified, and faced 
with old and new challenges that relate to and are unique from the larger health care 
system. The majority of shifts in health care systems in the past few decades are the result 
of larger shifts in the political economies including the end of the deinstitutionalization 
movement, the rise of managed care organizations, the biomedicalization and 
commodification of health, advances in technical and technological apparatuses and 
services, increasing disparities in access to and quality of health care services, declining 
trust in and power of physicians, a consumer movement that has resulted in more active 




distinctions and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Cook and Wright 1995; Rosich and 
Hankin 2010; Stevens 2007).  
Neoliberalism  
Beginning in the late 1970s and strengthening through t the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan, a new pro-business activism and ethic seized the primary institutions within the 
U.S. (Duggan 2003). Neoliberalism is a theory of political and economic practices 
positing that social well-being is best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills (Harvey 2005). Neoliberal policies and practices have deceptively 
constructed economic policy as a matter of neutral, technical expertise that has nothing to 
do with politics or culture, thereby shielding its policies and practices from political 
accountability or cultural critique (Duggan 2003; Moncrieff 2006). However, any good 
analysis will show that the political economy does not operate separately from other 
social institutions in society. Economic goals are embedded in and formulated through 
political and cultural meanings that shape social organization and cultural context 
(Duggan 2003). Within healthcare in general, and mental health care in particular, 
neoliberalism has facilitated the privatization of health care, a shift to mental health 
policies driven by fiscal rather than social goals, nd rising, profitable industries such as 
the insurance and pharmaceutical regimes.  
National Governance of Mental Health Research Funding  
In alignment with the rise of a neoliberal ethic of individualism throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, sources of research funding for mental healt and illness such as the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH)  increasingly 




and, instead, increasingly embraced the disciplines and methods of biology, neuroscience 
and genetic mapping as the right way to investigate mental illnesses (Orr 2010; Pilecki et 
al. 2011; Schooler 2007).  
Even a quick glance at the list of Intramural Research Programs (IRP) titles 
demonstrates the disinterest or even disdain the NIMH has towards investigations of how 
the social environment affects mental health and ill ess. Schooler (2007:60) points to 
multiple causes for the decline in funding and devaluing of social science within the 
NIMH across the past few decades: 1) the value system that underlies the prestige 
hierarchy within the sciences such that the more micro the phenomena under 
investigation, the higher level of esteem attributed; 2) the perceived successes of 
methodologies of studying micro level phenomena such as brain imaging; and 3) the 
increasing influence of corporations and lobbying groups that steer funding towards 
research on finding cures for specific diseases.  
The Rise of Managed Care and Complex Health Corporations 
The emergence, rise and dominance of managed care structures and strategies designed to 
reform the financing of health care has drastically ltered the US health landscape. 
Managed Care (MC) emerged in the 1980s as a response t  declining government support 
for public sector health care and the soaring costs f p ychosocial and substance use 
treatments in the private sector (Frank, Salkever, and Sharfstein 1991; Scheid 2003). 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) 
and other group insurance entities were established and have multiplied as have their 




services (Manderscheid and Henderson 1996; Manderscheid, Henderson, Witkin, and 
Atay 2000).  
In addition to controlling costs by limiting access to services, MC companies 
changed the financial structure from the traditional fee-for-service payments to one in 
which providers are paid a set capitation fee based on a specified range of services 
(treatments deemed most effective) for a predetermined length of time (Mechanic 1999). 
Capitation fees are significantly lower in comparison to traditional fee-for-service (30% 
lower according to one estimate) (Moffic 1997).  
Other predominant strategies of cost-containment include: gatekeeping, 
precertification, case management and measureable outcomes. Gatekeeping requires 
patients to get referrals from primary care providers. Precertification or utilization review 
requires that services be authorized before they can be provided to clients. Concurrent 
review or case management is when insurance companies scrutinize client cases, 
documentation of treatment services, and evaluation of treatment outcomes of providers 
on a regular or on-going basis. Further, managed care corporations emphasize 
measureable outcomes and require that patients fulfill criteria of ‘medical necessity,’ 
which results in denials of reimbursement claims. Often these denials are for therapies 
that have yet to be proven efficacious. Just as often, therapists are denied payment for 
their services because their patients suffer from disor er diagnoses that are devalued by 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) (Mechanic 1999; Scheid 2000).  
While MC organizations started out primarily in the private health insurance 
market, over time they have moved to dominate the public, state and federal market 




of mental health services is just beginning to be studied for different types of services and 
populations, but hallmark changes include a decline of inpatient care and increase in 
outpatient care.  
In comparison to the previous health landscape, advocates argued MC would 
improve mental health services by increasing effectiv  use of economic resources. The 
logic is that by holding mental health providers accountable to high standards of care, 
treatment outcomes would improve and costs would go own. However, past Deputy 
Executive Director for public policy at the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) 
E. Clarke Ross (2000), examined the application of managed mental health care in the 
public sector and concluded: 
. . . other than constraining costs, most managed behavioral health programs have not 
lived up to their promises. . . In poorly performing public managed care systems, often 
the managed care vendor lacks a social commitment because of primary obligations to 
private shareholders or the bottom line [which contribu es to the] problems faced by 
consumers, families and enrollees. (Ross 2000:203) 
 
Thus, the primary criticism of MC is that it undermines social justice through its 
commodification of health and in the process devalues professional ethics (Scheid 2004). 
In two articles and a book titled Tie a Knot and Hang On: Providing Mental Health Care 
in a Turbulent Environment, medical sociologist Teresa L. Scheid illuminates the ways in 
which managed care practices threaten professional l gics of health care, autonomy and 
ethics (Scheid 2004, 2003, 2000). Scheid conducted qualitative interviews and survey 
questionnaires with mental health providers who worked in both private and public 
sectors. She argues that managed care significantly ltered the paradigm operating in the 
health landscape from one based on professional ethics and commitment to community 




“Providers at CARE felt they were not able to provide the treatment or services they 
believed their clients needed, and they have raised serious concerns about the quality of 
care” (Scheid 2003:158). Rather than adhering to a social r biopsychosocial model of 
mental illness, MC imposes a medical model of illness on its providers by privileging 
treatment goals that focus on short-term improvements at the expense of deeper changes 
that would provide longer-term stability (Scheid 2003). In addition, a critical 
“consequence of MC is the greater reliance upon psychiatric medication as opposed to 
more intensive forms of therapy or skills training” (Scheid 2000:709).  
In Scheid’s analysis of interviews with providers in the private sector, she found 
MC significantly impacted the everyday therapeutic work practices, to the extent that 
some therapists were considering leaving private practice (2000). Providers in the private 
sector were working longer hours to augment their incomes due to the significant decline 
in reimbursement fees and yet had increases in administrative duties such as paperwork 
and phone calls for treatment authorizations (Scheid 2000). However, it wasn’t just the 
intensity of administrative labor that providers reented; it was that these duties took 
focus away from patient care, proper supervision, ctinuing education and the quality of 
the therapeutic relationship (Scheid 2000). Further, MC is a coercive threatening system, 
because if providers spoke out against a managed car  insurance company, they were 
often dropped from mental health panels or put on aprovider excluded list (Scheid 2000).  
Managed care subjects the treatment decisions of providers and provider-client 
relationships to increased managerial, financial and bureaucratic scrutiny to the point 




compromised. In addition to harming therapeutic relationships, managed care threatens 
professional autonomy over their own work.  
Theorizing Professional Dynamics: Countervailing Powers and Zones of Discretion 
The attention on studying the dynamics of professions, that is, their 
interdependence with the state, and more recently, corporate and other external actors, led 
to studies of the power relations embedded in professionalism. Important theories of the 
decline of professional dominance emerged such as deprofessionalization (a loss of 
control over the content or form of one’s work), proletarianization (a downward shift of 
status from self-employment to wage labor), and corporatization (the transformation of 
health care from charitable pursuit into profit maximizing business), to better understand 
the relationship between the medical profession and the state and/or economy (Abbott 
1988; Larson 1977; Light 1995; McKinlay 1988; Wolinsky 1993). While each of these 
concepts capture an important feature of the shifting dynamics between the medical 
profession and the political economy, Light and Levin  (1988) argue these theoretical 
approaches mistake the part for the whole, thereby failing to capture the complexity of 
actors and relations in the larger arena of action. Building on studies of the professions 
that emphasize the interactions of professions withother actors, especially those of 
Johnson (1972 and Larson (1977), Light challenges investigations of professionalism 
based on the assumption of professional autonomy and instead posits the theory of 
countervailing powers (see Light 1991, 1993).  
The theory of countervailing powers locates professions and the strategies of 
professionalism within a larger field of institutional and cultural forces, and facilitates 




their positions and interests in health care (Light 2009). “As a sociological concept, 
countervailing powers is not confined to buyers andsellers; it includes a handful of 
major political, social, and other economic groups that contend with each other for 
legitimacy, prestige and power, as well as for markets and money (Light 2009:241). The 
sociology of the professions work today starts from the assumption that each medical or 
mental health profession is one of several countervailing powers in society invested and 
interested in health care. In addition to the awareness of multiple interested stakeholders, 
contemporary analyses attend to how these relations change in response to social, 
political and economic values and priorities.  
The Role of the Professions in Transformations of Health Care  
In the past few decades the organization and delivery of health care has 
undergone significant interconnecting transformations (Hafferty and Light 1995) leading 
to questioning whether or not health care is best organized through the professions 
(Feldman 2003; Martin, Currie and Finn 2009; Timmerans and Oh 2010). Opening up 
the role of the professions in the organization and delivery of health care services is in 
part based on the fear that professional norms and cli ical decision making have been 
corrupted by the logic of the market and increased consumerism.  
In addition to increased attention to the role of organizational contexts and 
professional norms in shaping the terms and conditions of health care delivery, scholars 
have investigated external (the state, the economy, insurance companies, pharmaceutical) 
and internal (diversification, specialization, substitution, oversupply) countervailing 
forces and the ways they intersect. All of these changes are important and demonstrate 




the role of the professions in the organization and delivery of health care, and in order to 
better understand the paradox of the expansion of medical sovereignty and decline of 
professional autonomy, professionalism needs examined within the larger macro context 
of the political economy (its relations with the state, economy, other professions, all 
external actors) and within the micro politics of interaction in day-to-day work within and 
across varying organizational settings (see Light 2009; Timmermans and Oh 2010). 
The combination of tightening revenue streams, rising costs, competitive markets 
and patterns of variation in both availability and quality of health care situate the role of 
the professions in the center of the contemporary healt  care controversy. While the 
government, (federal, state and local) is the biggest purchaser of health care, it is only one 
among corporate purchasers (insurance and managed cre companies), corporate sellers 
(manufacturers of medical technologies and drugs such as pharmaceutical companies), 
consumers (including special interest and other consumer groups) and other providers 
that have been designated as external forces of power and interest within the Medical-
Industrial Complex (Hafferty and Light 1995).  
While the theory of countervailing powers has led sociological studies of the 
professions rightly in the direction of examining the historical and situated complexity of 
actors and power relations in contemporary health cre, the distinction between external 
and internal forces falsely separates actors into distinct collectivities. Instead of focusing 
on external and internal actors and motives, I argue that we need to examine the co-
constitution of health care organization and delivery through specific situations of care 
that involve professional negotiations and interactions across levels of the social. In 




neoliberal and biomedical discourses are part of the cast that shape the contemporary 
health care arena, with their power structuring the daily practices of health care 
professionals.  
Theoretical Framework: The Biopolitical Economy of Health and Illness 
Medical sociologists have been examining what they see largely as technoscientific 
changes in biomedicine since the mid 1980s (Clarke et al 2010, 2003). If medicalization 
was the first major transformation of the organization and properties of health care in the 
U.S. (Bauer 1998; Clarke and Olesen 1999; Conrad 1992, 2007), biomedicalization is the 
second major transformation (Clarke et al 2010, 2003).  
Biomedicalization is our term for the increasingly complex, multisited, multidirectional 
processes of medicalization that today are being both extended and reconstituted through 
the emergent social forms and practices of a highly and increasingly technoscientific 
biomedicine. . . That is, medicalization is intensifying, but in new and complex, usually 
technoscientifically enmeshed ways. (Clarke et al 2010:47)  
The designation of this transformation alludes not only to technoscientific 
innovations of molecular biology and biotechnologies, but to Foucauldian theories of 
biopower and biopolitics (Clarke et al 2010). Biopower and biopolitics refers to the 
emergence of political knowledges, techniques and technologies that enable analysis of 
processes and forms of life, and thus also, health and illness. For Foucault (1977), 
biopower and biopolitics signaled a major historical break in the ideas and practices of 
politics, leading to the reformulation of political sovereignty through the emergence of 
new forms of political knowledge. Prior to the 17th century, a sovereign repressive control 
over death reigned, whereas contemporary forms of power now make regulative 




economy.24 Thus, biopolitics refers to the ideas and practices of government and state 
institutions that attempt to administer and regulate ife processes. Foucault’s theoretical 
constructs of the disciplines, disciplinary society, the life sciences, biopower, the 
individual and social body (population), and normalization, produce a theoretical frame 
from which social theorists examine how new technoscientific knowledges intervene in 
not only life, but processes of life such as health nd illness.  
In hopes that biomedicalization theory will be used as an analytic framework for 
future studies, Clarke et al. (2010, 2003) delineate five key interactive processes of the 
second major transformation of American medicine. I briefly review the interactive 
process relevant to this chapter: the biopolitical economy of health and illness. This 
process encompasses how the health care organizatio is increasingly profit oriented, 
corporatized, and how new biomedical knowledges, technologies, services and capital are 
co-constituted. “Biocapital is the study of the systems of exchange d circulation 
involved in the contemporary workings of the life sciences, but is also the study of those 
life sciences as they become increasingly foundation l epistemologies for our time” 
(Rajan 2006:12). Rajan argues that epistemic and technological assemblages such as 
genomics (and therefore biomedicine and neuropsychiatry) are impossible to understand 
without attending to the political and economic frameworks within which they emerge 
(Rajan 2006:280). Following this, I examine how the assemblage of managed care 
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companies and the state structure and stratify adolescent mental health care. I employ the 
biopolitical economy of health and illness as an analytic lens in this chapter, building on 
the few studies that have demonstrated the ways that the biopolitical economy further 
stratifies health care (Clarke et al 2010; Scheper-Hughes 2004; Shim 2010, 2005, 2002).  
BIOPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH CARE: DSM, INSURANCE AND STATE POWER 
As demonstrated in chapter four, the assemblage of the biomedical model enshrouded in 
the DSM technology, and insurance company power margin lize Mental Health 
Practitioners’ (MHPs) own professional knowledge practices and expertise. Revising the 
DSM to account for the social, relational and adolescent specific aspects of mental illness 
will not sufficiently address the issues MHPs find problematic about how the biopolitical 
economy shapes their everyday clinical work. The power, knowledge and experiences of 
alternative mental health professionals, in comparison to psychiatric professionals, are 
marginalized by the assemblage of the DSM and insurance companies. Here, I offer an 
analysis of MHPs’ experiences of countervailing forces to the professions—MC, the 
DSM and state governance. I asked a psychologist about the ways his work is shaped by the 
DSM and instead he critiqued the privatization of health care: 
I think that the diagnostic codes, I don’t know whenc  they came. I don’t know if they 
were generated because of some pressure from insurance companies, but insurance 
companies use them the way businesses use any tool. They use them to save money; this 
is not putting a client’s interest first. Every mission statement from every third party 
payer says we’re looking out for you and your care matters to us. No it doesn’t. What 
matters is saving money and they’ve begun to use that [t e DSM] to manipulate to save 
money because that’s what business models do. I don’t think it’s the fault of the 
diagnostic codes that this happens. There is something wrong with the privatized for-
profit business of health care.  
 
MHPs critiqued the biomedicalization of the DSM and how it constrains their 




been taken up by insurers as a tool to save money. Similarly, when asked about MC and 
the contemporary health care system, a clinical psychologist discusses privatization: 
I think it’s owned by business. Americans didn’t want government involved in their 
health care and they got what they asked for. Americans feel very strongly about 
government not being involved but what they fail to recognize is that if its not 
government regulated, its going to be regulated by private business industry. Its 
capitalism at its best and mental health is a humanistic endeavor, it’s a social science. 
Mixing business with social science is not a good ccktail; it’s not a good mix. It’s a 
disaster, but if the conservative, anti-government r gulation of mental health wins over, 
there is enough good will in non-profits. The problem is, you really do need money to 
back up almost anything that is worth while; to get the professionals that all went to 
school forever, right? You can look at it as a lot of links, why are we going to trained 
professionals to get doctorate degrees to then offer car  for what if you don’t pay them?  
Why go? We’ll just have a bunch of paraprofessionals running around, it’s all linked. If 
you want a quality mental health program, you have to pay for it. If the private industry 
had taken over mental health and they actually paidus well we’d be fine. The fact that 
they took it so they could have a yacht and then wated to profit and hold back the mental 
health provisions, that’s why it’s a disaster. If they truly cared about mental health and 
put the money into it, it would be fine. 
 
In the description above of the role managed care pl ys in shaping everyday clinical 
work, a clinical psychologist working on the East Coast critiques how mental health care 
has been taken over by business. She notes that priv ely run health care could work if 
money were actually invested in the system, but not u der the system of capitalism in 
which insurers have incentives to hold back on provisi ns. Below, a social worker who is 
also involved in state government and policy work describes how MC represents what is 
wrong about a political economy of health and illness guided by profit rather than health 
and illness: 
I think it’s a crock. Managed care is the epitome of what is wrong with the health care 
system. It’s why we need a public option. It’s why t e rich are getting richer and poor are 
getting poorer. Especially at the state level it only creates incentive for the guy at the top 
and his minions to get a bonus. It’s an incentivizing type thing. Deny coverage and you 
get a great bonus. The guy who runs managed care for M f r this state, well, multiple 
states’ Medicaid programs, his bonus last year was 65 million dollars. When I read it [in a 
local reputable newspaper], I called my boss and said ‘did you hear me screaming from 
this side of the state?’ Think about how many services you could give people. Managed 





In my interviews with providers across this large Midwestern state, many MHPs referred 
to a particular insurance company, which I refer to as M, that had the the most 
problematic policies. In the midst of debates about pending health care reform bills, she 
argues that a public option of health care would alleviate some of the trouble of the 
current assemblage of state and insurance power. Below, she goes on to tell me about this 
Midwestern state’s republican governor’s decision to hire someone to help their managed 
care and Medicaid systems save the state money. 
The gal we [the state] hired to implement these changes her name is ---.  She’s lovingly 
referred to as the ice queen of the legislature. Sh’s a very nice lady but she was brought 
here to be the hatchet. She was hired out of [state]. What they did there, we liked. She’ll 
tell you that the 75 sessions is not a lifetime cap and that LMHPs can continue to apply 
for services. Do you know how much paperwork and red tape they create? Nobody wants 
to deal with that. Think about a kid who is presenting with early signs of schizophrenia or 
any of the major mental diagnoses. They probably should do therapy at least two times a 
week if they’re not in a residential setting by now.  
 
Again, the social worker above who also works in ths state’s legislature as a legal aide 
describes how the on-going state/MC assemblage focuses on how to save the state 
money. While this social worker clearly knew more about the local and state political 
governance structure and how it and MC co-constituted the local health care delivery 
system, other MHPs such as the following Psychiatric Nurse Practitioner also recognized 
the ways in which local, state and federal government had previously and are currently 
involved in shaping the health care system: 
It’s changed mental health care for the worse because it’s all about the money. The whole 
idea behind managed mental health, the original ide, which actually President Kennedy 
is the one that started community based services. H started the managed health cycle. He 
had great plans for it and I think it would have been very successful, you know nation 
wide if he had lived. What I see now is that we get paid for this service and only this 
service and you only have this amount of time to do it. 
 
MHPs articulated that the assemblage of the state or f deral government and MC may 




capitalist system, insurance companies’ practices primarily aim to save money through 
capping services, setting annual and lifetime coverag  limits and by decreasing service 
provider fees. 
Our fees have gone down over the past 5-10 years, and only one company I can think of 
has raised them consistently. There are a lot of companies that have dropped it even by 
half. If they’re saying okay lets pay you less, and lets make you spend even more time on 
the phone with these Turkeys and now its going to be a federal turkey. . . The state may 
have saved but M is profiting very richly. If they fire M which I think they probably will 
do, they may find some company like C which will come in here and be worse. C is the, I 
think they probably do get more people covered, I wouldn’t know, there are areas in the 
country that have it and it’s spoken of as the worst. I’m almost worried that this is going 
to fall into the hands of . . . 
 
Above, the strategies MC companies utilize to save states money while profiting are 
described. What is important here is not only that ere are lower fees for services, but the 
complexity of the relations between the federal government, public social programs such 
as Medicaid, MC specific MC insurance companies, and the strategies that particular 
states take in governing their mental health care markets. When I asked MHPs about the 
DSM as a technology and how it structured their work, they articulated the ways in which 
MC and the DSM assemble to create a unique form of technoscientific power that 
requires complex on-going negotiations. Similarly, when asked about MC and how it 
shapes their everyday clinical practices, MHPs discus  the ways in which MC operates 
within a larger context of state and federal power and influence (or lack thereof).   
 Another feature of the political economy of mental health care is that it has been 
necessary for distinct professions to secure a segment of the market through lobbying and 
other politicking work. MHPs argued that some of the disciplinary professions within 
mental health care such as psychiatry and social work have done a better job at lobbying 




Practitioners who use intrapsychic and individual models have gone to bat harder. In 
comparison, the social workers went really hard to fight to get on Medicare, years ago. 
Other schools of thought didn’t fight to get represented and they didn’t get represented. 
Social workers got, are the only ones who were ableto be credentialed with Medicare. 
Not that I care personally, that’s really not a gigI want, but I think the same thing 
happens when it comes to which fields of thought are acceptable. Are people out there 
fighting to get random controlled trial studies of their issues and their approaches? If they 
can get something that works then people can say here, it’s in this outcome book, now 
use our approach. I think Systemic approaches haven’t b en fighting as hard, until lately, 
to get that. I think that’s one of the reasons why people are willing to treat things with 
medications, because doctors have always had say so. The people who are really good at 
individual therapy would like to be paid for that thank you. But there is a lot of research 
that shows that there are systemic treatments that go long with medication that can help 
a myriad of issues.  
 
 Thus, some of the mental health professions have legally, socially, politically and 
economically secured a stake in the market of providing health care in ways that some of 
the other professions (including the recognition of their theoretical orientations and 
treatment techniques), have not. For example, a newly licensed Marriage and Family 
Therapist (MFT) discusses how the government program Medicaid recognizes them as 
desirable providers but Medicare does not. 
My field was one of the later ones to be formed. We weren’t formed until the 60s or 70s. 
We are still that little kid on the football team trying to prove that we are just as good as 
everybody else. Medicare very quickly recognized counselors and social workers as 
being able to help but we aren’t recognized. I have a sted interest in that because I 
know just as much as the next LMHP. Now Medicaid likes us, Medicare does not. They 
are both government funded healthcare so we’re gooden ugh for poorer younger people 
but not the elderly?  
 
The section of quotes above illustrates that selection of providers and theoretical 
approaches is organized by political economic structu es and relations. The lobbying 
actions or lack thereof of the professions impact their ability to receive government 
support and reimbursement for their mental health care services. In the contemporary 




Medicare program and several types of therapeutic treatments are devalued or are not 
recognized by insurers as EBPs and therefore are not reimbursed.  
Because of managed care, and the general trend in society, people want a quick fix. They 
want answers. Everything is cognitive behavioral. Unfortunately people eat up the media, 
and their understanding of mental health work is quite superficial. We live in an era 
where while we know as much as we do about mental health, and way more then we used 
to, everything is very medication oriented and quick fix. . . I end up staying on the 
surface a little bit more. I think we refer out formedication more than we would if people 
were devoted to working. 
 
Thus the power of the media and MC in shifting the type of mental health care provided 
is recognized as much as are the relations of power between the DSM, MC and state and 
federal governance. In what follows, another MHP notes how MC has shifted the field of 
mental health care away from interpersonal psychodynamic transformations and towards 
short-term behavioral and medication treatment approaches: 
The three years in the in-patient program back in the day before managed care, we had 
fabulous treatment for adolescents. The staff that worked at -- Psychiatric Institute in 
[state] were so profound and amazing. The work was very intense, a kind of systems-
object relations approach. You can’t find programs like that anymore because of managed 
care. Things became quickly revolving door; behavioral medication oriented starting in 
the late 1980s early 1990s. 
 
Again, the impact that MC has had on the field of mental health care is discussed as 
significant. In this analysis section I demonstrated how MHPs are critical of the 
privatization of care. MHPs recognize the complex rlationships of power between the 
DSM, MC and state governance and critique the ways in which the current system is 
guided by administrators and bureaucrats interested in saving states money and making 
companies profit, at the expense of patient care. MHPs argue that MC companies need to 
be regulated at the federal and/or state level. Further, some MHPs recognize that their 
own stake in the market is dependent on politicking. Before turning attention to the 




practices of providers, I first demonstrate the few(yet still contested) aspects of the 
managed health care system.  
MANAGED CARE RECONFIGURES TREATMENT PLANS AND PRACTICES 
Managed Care Enhances Professional Accountability and Treatment Plans 
In my interviews, while MHPs were overwhelmingly negative about the ways MC has 
changed the mental health care field and their everyday practices, there were a handful of 
practitioners who talked about the positive changes managed care has made.  
Probably because I’ve done this work so long, I see th  world as gray not black and 
white. Years ago I would have said its [MC] just horrible, but now I’m saying there is a 
place for it. It makes our lives as clinicians more complicated but it also holds us more 
accountable. I think in a well run managed care system, it can help a clinician be a better 
clinician. By well run, I mean fair, having the best interest of the client at heart and really 
understanding what needs to happen for that client. There was a time when Medicaid in 
the state of -- had no management. Clients could have as many sessions as they wanted. I 
certainly had clients that had more sessions than tey probably needed. I had one client in 
particular who had multiple Axis I diagnoses, lots f trauma, I could literally justify that 
she could benefit from therapy for life, but I think because it wasn’t managed, neither of 
us were motivated to say, how are we going to know when we’re done? Let’s get that 
figured out. I’m not sure in the end if it served her.   
 
Practitioners often remarked that the positive change managed care has made to the field 
of mental health care is that it has instituted professional accountability. In the quote 
above, the MFT argues that MC ensures that professionals are clear about therapeutic 
goals and are mindful of the financial aspects of treatment. MHPs agreed that before 
managed care, some professionals abused the system: 
Before managed care came along I think some people abused the system. People maybe 
misused the system a lot and worked it to their advantage and weren’t always very 
diligent. Then there are people that have always been v ry diligent and done it the right 
way and they get hammered along with the rest of everyone else. What happens with 
managed care is that they give guidelines and no wiggle room. It’s really hard to break 
them out of their box so to speak. I think having checks and balances is not a bad thing 
necessarily. It’s when the managed care system says, we’re not dictating treatment we’re 
dictating what we will pay for. They’re not saying that, they’re saying the decisions of 
treatment still lie in hands of physicians and therapists and stuff, but they won’t pay for it. 




we’re talking about a family who has 4 children and  income of less than 20,000 a year, 
they can’t do that. That leaves it to us. If we think it’s clinically necessary, we’ll do it 
anyway and not get reimbursed for it but how often ca you do that? If managed care 
could have a little bit more leeway in how they view things, and be open to things rather 
than as structured and rigid, it would be better.  
 
A common narrative about the impact of managed care is that it is good to have a system 
of checks and balances, but that in the management of fi ances, MC companies too often 
over-manage clinical aspects of treatment as well. In addition to improving professional 
accountability, practitioners discussed how managed care policies have improved 
treatment plans (although this is a highly contested issue): 
Within our agency, our treatment plans are phenomenal, I’ve read treatment plans from 
other agencies, from private practitioners, and they’re very basic and I think that with M 
or the managed care insurer in this state, they’re requesting more on our treatment plans. 
We have a goal and we have objectives on how we meet that goal. We have how this goal 
will be measured, how long they have to meet this goal, who will be measuring the goal, 
and who is responsible for implementing these objectiv s. We’re very thorough in 
creating these treatment plans. That is in response to managed care, and getting paid 
basically, but that truly does improve the services that are provided. 
 
Below, another practitioner discusses how managed care has improved their treatment 
plans. However, the narrative they offer is that while managed care has improved some 
aspects of mental health care work such as treatment pla s, managed care companies are 
going too far, or are over-managing. 
I see the need for it and I definitely think it has its benefits, the way our treatment plans 
have evolved. I’ve gone through struggles with seeing a child that clearly is not getting 
his needs met in the home and making the recommendatio  for a higher level of care is 
not acknowledged by a reviewer from managed care for whatever reason they may have. 
But they haven’t worked with this client. They don’t know the dynamics of the family. 
Even though you try to provide as much history as you can in these referral forms. Once 
managed care reviews it, well you’re spending too much money on this. It can definitely 
limit the services, and I think at this point you’re allowed 24 sessions or maybe its 12. 
Some of the limitations, some of what they’re managi g oes a little too far I think. 
 
In another example about how managed care has improved treatment plans, a master’s 




a response to managed care requirements. However, he also mentions that a particular 
insurance company that is predominant in this state h s such strict treatment plan 
guidelines that practitioners are forced to follow their policies even when they aren’t the 
insurer or authorizing the services provided. In other words, it is another example of how 
managed care has improved treatment plans yet is viewed as over-managing clinical care 
work. 
I think we do a really good job at quantifying it when we are required to do treatment 
plans that meet up with certain standards. M, one of the companies that has far more 
power than anybody should, over the private non-profit where I work. Even when they 
are not covering it or authorizing the treatment you still have to follow their guidelines 
when you’re making up treatment plans.  
 
Finally, there was one clinical psychologist I intervi wed on the East Coast who, in 
comparison to most of the practitioners I interviewed, was overwhelmingly positive about 
managed care. Yet during our interview he discussed how he rarely documents the way 
insurers would prefer, choosing to focus on client care rather than documentation. His 
experiences did not seem to mirror those of the practitioners I interviewed who were 
working in the Midwest (or others on the East coast whom had stopped accepting some 
forms of insurance because of how much they limited care). When I asked him about 
these differences, he determined it was because sompractitioners are prejudiced about 
managed care. Perhaps this is true. I also think a plausible explanation is that some 
insurance companies “over-manage” or enact policies of capitation and deny services 
more than others. Of course, that he was a previous director for a managed care company 
might shape his very different perspective as well: 
I think you’re dealing with people prejudiced about anyone doing a review of what 
they’re doing. I was director of Behavioral Health for blue cross blue shield of 
Connecticut. I was chief of mental health services for a community health care plan 




disposition as a result of some of my professional experience from someone who has 
never been involved directly with insurance companies or dealt with any of their issues. I 
have patients who have limits on sessions but then I write a review and I get more 
sessions. It’s a pain in the neck I have to god damned write the thing after six sessions but 
okay. As a citizen thinking about practice in the field, I think these things are important 
and won’t go away.  
 
While his perspective on managed care didn’t fit the most common narrative, I think he 
rightly acknowledges the positive aspects and perhaps original intentions of the creation 
of a managed care system. The rest of this chapter focuses on how managed care has 
changed clinical care in ways that are predominantly viewed as negative or harmful to 
clients’ best interest. 
Managed Care: More Work for Less Pay 
 
A common complaint about managed care is that theirdocumentation requirements have 
decreased the time clinicians have for direct care. Documentation is required more of 
therapists. Therapists spend a lot of time on paperwork, versus working. You know if you 
have to do this, this, and this paperwork wise, that akes time and limits the number of 
clients you can see. If it pigeon holes you or makes you lose sight of other interventions 
then it can be a bad thing. This quote illustrates how MHPs resent spending more time on 
documentation or paperwork and less time on direct clinical work. Further, while most 
MHPs agree that treatment plan guidelines can be helpful, they frequently voice the need 
for clinical flexibility in their treatment techniques.  
Managed Care drives everybody nuts. They claim to make improvements, to make it 
easier to obtain services and for providers to givethat service, but it’s having the opposite 
effect. It requires a lot more paper work, it’s a lot more time consuming on the clinical 
side. That’s burning people out really fast. Practitioners become overwhelmed with it, 
because it is too much. Access to services too is pretty huge, because there are a lot of 
loop holes to jump through. 
 




clinical care work. Yet, what they argue is the bigger problem is that they spend more 
time on paperwork but are also increasingly limited in acquiring access to services for 
their patients. “Right now more than anything, managed care is hinder g a lot of 
services. There is a lot of frustration, a lot more documentation that goes into a lot of 
behind the scenes work. We’re already filled with client caseload so we don’t have time 
for all of the administrative side of it but it’s an addition. That’s one of the biggest 
frustrations.” MHPs recognized that the increases in administrative or unpaid aspects of 
clinical work was a significant effect of MC and expressed their frustration over the 
difficulties of balancing the increase in unpaid an undesirable work over their preferred 
direct clinical work. 
The productivity requirements are really high. Clinicians are supposed to have five and a 
half hours a day of billable time. It’s a lot on top f all the paperwork because so much of 
what we do is not billable. We can’t even bill for phone calls. We had an audit and they 
marked us down on networking. You want to say to them, “why do you think that is?” If 
you’re only going to pay us for face to face contact, of course the networking is going to 
go down. Also, you are so overloaded with twenty-five clients, and you have to meet all 
of their needs. You’re just putting out fires for those twenty-five people. I think some of 
that networking can seem extraneous. You know, ‘I’d love to do that. Just give me four 
more hours in a day and I’ll be able to.’ Part of my job is training. I was in Minneapolis 
last week and one of the things I say to them is, if you’re not doing trauma treatment 
yourself, you at least need to find out who is, so that you can make referrals. Some people 
came up to me after these trainings and they’re like, “we don’t know anyone in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul.”  There have to be providers in Minneapolis-St. Paul.  You can’t 
have a large metropolitan area like that and not have people who are doing that, but again 
they just felt bereft at not knowing, ‘where do I begin?  How do I find…?  Who’s doing 
this?’  
 
The shortcomings of the mental health field when it comes to networking with other 
professionals were frequently raised during my interviews. It made a lot more sense as an 
issue once this professional discussed how all networking, communication and 
collaboration with other professionals and parents, is unpaid work. In a field that is 




with other professionals and adolescent clients’ parents, families or school providers, 
seems to be a significant oversight that reduces th quality of care. Practitioners usually 
discussed these frustrations as a result of how MC is guided by profit rather than the best 
interest of their clients. Another significant issue with what guides managed care policies 
is the way they focus on capping or limiting services. 
Commodification of Care: Capitation of Services and Spending 
 
Similar to the findings of Scheid (2000), MHPs complained about how capitation 
strategies limited the services they could provide and the patient-client relationship. Here 
I offer a few examples of MHPs’ experiences with capitation. 
One of the examples, I had seen a three year old with lots and lots of environmental crap, 
there is just no other word for it. I had written our big assessment and I had done a 
treatment plan and all that sent to M. They said you can have five sessions total with him. 
Mom’s having a baby this month; dad’s getting released from jail soon. This kid just got 
returned to mom’s custody last January. In March mom’s partner moved in and he has 
nightly sleep terrors. They [MC insurance company M] said you can have five sessions. 
Deal with it. What managed care is doing is putting a cap on spending by eliminating 
sessions. It doesn’t make any sense. 
 
In other words, practitioners were frustrated with how MC companies limited the number 
of therapy sessions they could provide. The reason why capitation and other cost-
containment services are problematized is because clinicians operate under a professional 
logic of care whereas MC companies commodify care. Somehow I became the agency 
guinea pig, with all of this M crap. I was the first one to have kids denied outright without 
anymore sessions. Right now the director is reading o e of my files because I have to fax 
some paperwork over to M, so that’s been kind of stres ful.  MHPs discuss various cost-
containment strategies of MC organizations and how that impacts their clinical work. Not 
only do MC companies contain costs by limiting the number of sessions, but they also 




MHPs frequently discussed precertification or on-goin  reviews by MC organizations as 
the most stressful part of their everyday work. 
Managed care, I’m lucky in the sense that my [school program] kids are through a grant 
so I don’t worry about insurance or have to fight to get sessions. My other outpatient kids 
are on insurance and once their insurance sessions run out they have to stop unless we 
can waive their fee or make arrangements. For managed care to dictate who gets what 
services and how many sessions they get, I just think it’s ridiculous.   
 
 Again, the clinicians I interviewed discussed how MC companies used multiple 
cost-containment strategies that interfered with their everyday work. However, in the 
contemporary biopolitical economy, it is difficult to make firm conclusions about how 
managed care effects mental health practice. This is because there are several insurance 
companies, different cost-containment strategies, and as noted above, multiple sites of 
therapeutic care. Often, the practitioners that work in the schools or in in-patient 
residential treatment centers do not have to deal with MC capitation strategies similar to 
those that out-patient therapists struggle with everyday. While at times the cost-
containment strategies of MC companies are described more as a nuisance to MHPs’ 
clinical focus of work, other times these strategies actually hinder what providers see as 
critical care.  
The most confusing thing is that you get different a swers from them. I can call in and 
ask one thing and another colleague can call in and ask the same question and they get a 
completely different answer. That’s statewide. When you talk to people at groups we find 
out we’re all having the same issues. They’re maxing people out now, lifetime sessions. 
We’ve had patients with major mental health issues that MC says can’t receive any 
further services. It’s a money thing; it’s all a money thing. I have one patient I used to see 
two times a week. She has major mental illness, other substance abuse issues, lots of 
things, and now you can’t see them more than once a w ek. Sometimes it’s more cost 
effective to do some of the work we can do here than ese people ending up in the ERs 
because they’re suicidal. 
 
Thus, while MHPs operate from logics of professional ethics and care, MC companies 




the eyes of MHPs, this often costs the system more oney in the long run. In both the 
description above and below, different MHPs provide narratives of how clients with 
major mental illness are being unduly impacted by the cost-containment strategies of MC 
companies.  
Most private insurance companies allot a certain amount of sessions per year; 24 or 12 
sessions a year. That’s what, two sessions a month (at most)? For some kids that’s not 
going to be enough.  But that’s all you get and then it’s up to the client to figure out how 
they are going to fund the rest. In terms of Medicai , it’s about making almost monthly 
phone calls to M (that manages Medicaid), to hear if they are going to let you see that kid 
or not, and how many times they are going to let you see that kid. It’s jumping through a 
lot of hoops. They require you, after so many sessions, to submit progress notes, 
treatment plans, and pretreatment assessments, to whoever is on the other end of the 
phone. Then they get to decide. So the game is being v ry careful what you write in your 
progress notes but you also don’t want to be too revealing because that breaches 
confidentiality. I struggle to find that happy medium. You want to say enough to make 
sure they are aware your client needs the services but you don’t want to say too much.  
 
Managed care has changed the field of mental health by requiring more unpaid work such 
as documentation and phone calls, while exercising multiple cost-containment strategies 
that limit the number and type of services clinicians can provide. Cost-containment 
strategies are frequently discussed as a nuisance and as restricting the quantity of care 
patients with major mental illness are able to receive. However, the way MC has 
reconfigured treatment plans, goals and techniques is often argued as changing the quality 
or content of everyday clinical work. 
OVER-MANAGED CARE  
 
The ways in which MC reconfigured treatment plans, goals and techniques was a 
significant issue that was raised in my interviews. MHPs problematized this 
reconfiguration in different ways. One major critique was that MC policies that governed 
what were acceptable treatment plans privileged langu ge and techniques that were 




When I first started in mental health treatment plans were more long term psychodynamic 
and systems oriented. They allowed for fair amounts of herapy and were more global 
process oriented, focused on reducing conflict and decreasing depression. As managed 
care came into the world we have had to do treatment pla s that are very behavioral. 
Everything has to be stated with a behavior, everything has to be numbered, and the 
behavior has to be specified: the patient will have thr e friends by the end of three 
months. 
 
In addition to governing the language of treatment plans in a way that expunges 
psychodynamic  and constructivist theoretical orientations, MC policies privilege 
treatment techniques that are behavioral and biomedical: 
We have a certified play therapist and an art therapist nd they don’t like those to show 
up on interventions anymore. We’ll still do them because it’s been found to be helpful but 
whatever study they were looking at says it wasn’t. We can’t use the word maintain 
anymore in our plans, so we have to find other ways to say it, and its going to say the 
exact same thing. We always have to figure out, you know, communicate with each other, 
well I just got denied because I said I did play therapy. Now don’t say that and you can 
do it because it’s going to be helpful but don’t say that anymore. We kind of have to code 
what we’re doing in a way, you know. If we just write helping kids, that’s what we do, 
no, they want to see ‘as measured by.’  I start my progress notes before clients even come 
in, reported functioning regarding,  and then I fill in the goal _____ has been impaired or 
good, as measured by . . . or as evidenced by . . . We have to have those specific words 
that they are looking for.  We’ve always given this information but now they want 
specific words. We just all roll our eyes and go to meetings. 
 
Again, MC policies privilege biomedical and behavioral theoretical orientations and 
treatment techniques. MHPs exercise numerous work-ar unds and processes of cribbing 
to figure out how to “pass” MC regulations.  Several MHPs described this 
reconfiguration of treatment plans as cookie cutter: 
Well because our agency serves so many Medicaid clients, we kind of change our policies 
as they change theirs. Treatment plans have to be measureable, objective, and something 
else. You have to use the words that they want you to use. It has become a lot more 
cookie cutter. To be perfectly honest as an agency when they change their goals, we have 
to keep figuring out how can we keep providing the care that we need to provide to them 
in meeting (or fitting) these goals (or rules). If that means we need to close their case for 
30 days and just use no money and our time to continue to help that family along and 
then reopen them in 90 days, then that’s what we need to do. It’s more work for us but we 
have to fit within these stipulations. 
 




and behavioral and thus, ignore patient personhood and heterogeneities. MHPs rely on 
their collective knowledge about MC authorization and denial histories to successfully 
enact cribs that help them conform to what MC wants in order to be able to continue 
providing psychotherapy.  
[Name of local non-profit organization] has a contrac  with [public schools] that if we’re 
in certain schools where the need is high, we can provide the mental health services. 
That’s my employer, and then I work closely with [te public schools]. We’re getting a lot 
of pressure right now from the financial aspect, and them not wanting to cover services, 
so that’s definitely changed. Also, our treatment plans need to be more directive and 
behavioral. Instead of ‘Bobby will work on anger management skills,’ ‘Bobby will 
identify appropriate ways to deal with his anger 9 out of 12 times,’ it has to be more 
specific.  It appears it’s financially driven. We’r not able to see children that need it, as 
much as they need it because of that aspect; we’re not getting the authorizations to see 
them. 
 
For many school psychologists and social workers, MC hasn’t fully made its way into the 
funding streams of how they provide services in those settings. However, for some, MC 
was beginning to fund their programs and thus they w re starting to have to deal with the 
same financial issues clinicians who work in out-patient offices have to deal with. For 
these practitioners, the cribbing processes – figurin  out the preferred language of 
treatment plans and learning how to do that translation work, is new. For others, their 
agencies continue to change their treatment plan guidelines as MC changes their policies: 
We redid our treatment planning process at the agency to—all of the goals follow just 
about exactly what the DSM says, so that our treatmn  plans are sort of audit proof. It’s 
like death to an agency to have paperwork that is wrong. Do you know that when they 
come in and do an audit, if they find 3% [wrong], so they look at certain charts, and if 
they find 3% mistakes what that means, we bill 7 million a year. The [east coast state] 
department of mental health, so if we have 3% mistakes, which doesn’t seem bad right, 
that’s $210,000. In our case it would be the agency that pays it back which is better than 
an individual therapist, but it’s still a lot of money, even though it’s a big agency, that’s 
still a lot of money. 
 
Again, individual MHPs, community health centers and private practice groups have to 




in order to get reimbursed and continue to be able to provide their services. MC 
governance of treatment plans was discussed as though it causes a lot of fear. MHPs felt 
like disciplined subjects rather than expert professionals under the culture of surveillance 
created by MC policies and responses to treatment pla s that didn’t conform to their 
behavioral, profit-logics. As one therapist put it, audits make expert practitioners feel: 
Threatened. I went through their audit last year and was just astounded by what came 
back at me, that I needed to word things just as they say, exact wording. Some people 
don’t have to deal with that so they just don’t.  Yeah they have to change their way of 
wording things and their approach into the Medicaid an  M [insurance company] 
language and if you don’t really learn it or, you’re caught with it when you’re audited and 
then they’re saying, no this doesn’t work you have to word it this way you have to word 
it our way. The scary thing about that is the financi l piece, the business piece because 
they then will go after you and say you didn’t do it ur way, you owe us. I had to pay 
back $900.00. They said that I was contracted with them and I didn’t do the paperwork 
the way they wanted it.  
 
Thus, not only do practitioners have to deal with reconfiguring the language of treatment 
plans and techniques from psychodynamic into behavior l and biomedical terms 
(cribbing), but also with constant surveillance of their plans and documents with the fear 
that they might have to pay back money they worked for if their cribs, or paradigmatic 
translations aren’t good enough to satisfy MC preferences. 
I think they need more clinicians, more people in their program that know what’s going 
on. Now the intake interview, pretreatment assessment is going to take us about 3 hours. 
How is somebody going to focus for that long? How is a practitioner going to join in any 
kind of bond with that person when they’re asking them every detail? It’s black and white 
for them. You know on the 12th of September, (this is December), what kind of treatment 
technique did you use? It may change day to day, so I don’t know, so then they might 
come back and say well we’re not going to pay for that session because you can’t tell us.  
 
In the quote above, the MFT discusses how a new change in MC policies of pretreatment 
assessments will make it more difficult for practitioners to form a therapeutic bond with 
their client when their first session together is guided by MC questions rather than a 




more clinicians as their administrators or care dirctors. I heard this argument several 
times—that the MC personnel making treatment decisions were unqualified to be doing 
so, didn’t collect or care about the “right” information, and didn’t put the client’s interest 
first. Here is another example of this kind of critique of MC:  
I think it’s unfortunate, that the people who are writing these laws, and working in 
behavioral mental health policy have no mental healt  experience. They are 
administrators and they don’t understand mental health at all. I look at the administrator, 
the director of behavioral health services here and he’s an administrator. He has no 
mental health background at all, and its like, what m kes you qualified to say this is how 
the system should work?  
 
 While there were several aspects of MC regulations that reconfigured treatment 
plans and techniques in ways that MHPs argued were against professional ethics of care, 
perhaps even worse was the seemingly irrationality of MC rationalization.  Even when 
MHPs want to figure out the guidelines and make sur they are using the right language 
in their treatment plans and performing EBPs in their therapeutic techniques, they 
struggle to figure out the MC rationale: 
It’s a total guessing game with them.  I’m trying to keep ahead of them, you know you 
call in; I stopped calling in to get answers because it was worthless. I’d get an answer and 
do that and get reprimanded and I would call back and say so and so told me this and they 
would say no that’s not the way it is, it’s this way. It’s just a huge game play and its 
frustrating and not worth it. If you’re not getting straight forward answers, how can you 
work with them? 
 
Thus, while MHPs operate under professional logic of are, they attempt to understand 
the authorization decisions and regulations that govern treatment plans and techniques. 
Yet several mental health practitioners discussed MC decisions as irrational and 
inconsistent. The inconsistencies in rationale add to the culture of fear. 
I can understand the questions that they’re asking, because someone from the 
administrative or operational side, you know they tll us these care managers are licensed 
mental health practitioners. That’s what they say, but they’ve really been removed from 
the clinical side. I can understand somebody from the operational and financial side 




side that’s not what is important. I would be happy to have them come in and sit down 
with me, and the file, and go progress note by progress note and say on April 12th you 
wrote this and I could say this is why I wrote this, this is what we did, this is what was 
going on. I would love to do that, give me the chance to do that. This client we’re talking 
about today, I got authorized for three more session  with her. She is not on any 
medications but they said, maybe she would be appropriate for medications.  And I kind 
of thought well, you could pay me to see her once a week or medications, I’m a lot 
cheaper.  So even some of the decisions they are making financially don’t make sense.  
 
Again, MHPs discussed how there are different logics operating. MHPs are guided by 
professional logics of care and tend to privilege psychodynamic and eclectic orientations, 
working on deeper issues of client relationships and focusing on their long-term 
emotional well-being. MHPs discussed how their organiz tion or agency would find a 
way to pay for a client’s treatment for awhile so they could close and reopen a case in 
order to get access to care for their clients. It was clear from my interviews that the large 
majority of MHPs continue to operate under professional ethics of care.  
One of the things that have been in place for a long time with Medicaid and M is family 
authorizations are only given to one member of the family, and I have a couple of sibling 
sets. For one of the children, I can have family sessions under their name, the other child 
I can’t. During that family session you should be addressing changes the family can make 
so the environmental changes take place. But the specific siblings, the sister is older, they 
have different fathers, she has a very difficult relationship with her father and his side of 
the family, and she has witnessed a lot more abuse that has occurred. They are just so 
different that a family session for one is nothing like a family session for the other. 
Clinically it doesn’t make sense, and they [MC] don’t care. I know I can’t change their 
minds, because I’ve tried. They really dictate our treatment and they have no idea what 
our clients are going through. They ask who the legal guardian is, I’ll say, its mom, and 
then they move on— that’s their family aspect, and I’ll be like hold on a second. There’s 
a new step-dad, a new baby brother, a biological dad who is really abusive and has come 
back into the picture. You might want to consider that too. They’re just not aware of how 
important all of those different pieces are. They have their questions to ask, they ask them 
and their job is done. In that phone call, they say, you get 6 more sessions, you get 9 
more, I’ve gotten zero, I’ve gotten 3, I’ve gotten 6 and 12 is the most that they can give 
you.   
 
The information this MFT deems most important in the governance of care isn’t 
considered important by MC personnel making treatmen  d cisions. She struggles with 




guardian is, not any psychotherapeutic specifics about the dynamics of the family, the 
quality of their relationships or the social circumstances shaping their different individual 
treatment needs. This conflict emerges because MHPs are guided by clinical information 
and professional logics of care whereas MC companies commodify and rationalize care.  
I’m having a hard time thinking of the positive ways managed care has affected our 
practice. It’s been really hard going to managed healt  care and fee for service. Most of 
us, we did not come into this field to do billable s rvice, we would have become lawyers 
if we wanted to bill in 15 minute increments. We artold more and more in mental 
health, this is a business, yet most of us didn’t go o school because we wanted to go into 
business. . . I have some friends who work for for-profit companies and to me that just 
seems crazy. It’s an oxymoron. How can there be a for profit health provider, how do you 
make money, we can’t even, our agency can’t even make ends meet with managed health 
care, but how do these corporations expect to make oney? I don’t get it.  
 
Thus, several practitioners discussed the commodification of care and how their 
professional training and motivation for becoming psychotherapists is at odds with a 
business ethic. Unfortunately, in a for-profit health care system, treatment authorizations 
and denials are determined by profit. The culture of f ar, constant surveillance and 
disciplining for improper treatment plans, have led increasing numbers of 
psychotherapists to leave practice settings where they accept insurance from managed 
care companies that handle Medicaid, or leave managed care insurance payments (panels) 
all together. This shift in the field has stratified care for providers and patients.  
STRATIFICATION OF CARE 
 
Mental health practitioners are perhaps most disturbed by how MC policies create a 
stratified system of mental health care. In this section, I demonstrate all of the ways in 
which MHPs problematize MC policies and how these policies lead to the stratification 
of care providers and patients; with the most impoverished, intense cases of mental 




This system of stratification acts like a reverse continuum, where the more money or the 
better health insurance plan you have, the more accss to practitioners and a wider range 
of services you receive. In comparison, Medicaid patients and those with more restrictive 
HMO plans have access to fewer clinicians that are less experienced. Thus, the quantity 
and quality of mental health care is stratified.  
We handle Medicaid and private payers. [names of three local insurance companies, 
covering both of these niches]. My hourly rate is $95 and I get paid I think its $65 a 
session for Medicaid but its one of those deals that if you don’t like it then don’t be in 
their group. There are a lot of people that complain about that. [Name of practitioner] 
upstairs, he doesn’t take Medicaid, one of the ladies in this office, she doesn’t take 
Medicaid, they don’t want to work for $65 dollars and hour and they don’t need to. 
They’ve been working a long time and they’ve got a reputation in this town for being 
good and they don’t need to. They do pay less. There are a lot more guidelines and 
controlling features of it. 
 
The practitioner above describes some of the most frequently discussed issues revolving 
around why some MHPs choose to stop accepting Medicaid clients, or patients who use 
certain types of insurance, usually (privatized) public, and usually from HMO insurance 
companies that not only pay providers less, but govern health care decisions in ways that 
providers dislike. For example, the following practitioner discusses how it used to be that 
MC companies annoyed a lot of MHPs but with a new st of restrictions put in place, 
more practitioners are choosing to leave Medicaid or other public forms of insurance: 
I think its going that way right now because of this change in March. Before that there 
were complaints, but practitioners would still see M dicaid clients. But they are just over-
managing. They make you call and talk for a half an hour to another licensed mental 
health professional and explain. It’s almost like you’re having to defend your treatment 
and you’re being looked upon as not good enough, as a therapist.  
 
Several MHPs discussed their decision to stop accepting Medicaid clients as a result of MC 
governance. Practitioners were annoyed at how they were being over-managed and their own 
professional authority and expertise was constantly being questioned or rejected. 




Managed care makes too many decisions, rather than being a funding source, they are 
care directors and that’s a problem. They don’t have ny business having anything to say 
about care. Specifically these are all things, this is why I don’t do that work anymore 
because I can honestly feel myself getting angry and irritated just with the thought of it. 
These are people who, these aren’t people who attend mo thly meetings, they couldn’t 
pick these kids out of a line up yet they’re the ons taking all of my information and 
jotting it down and deciding okay you get 30 more days or you get 2 more weeks, or nope 
they’re done tomorrow. There’s no continuity of care, they’re not interested in what 
makes transitions better for kids, and so it is definit ly a hindrance. I think that system is 
so broken I wouldn’t even know where to begin to fix it. Just sort of scrapping the whole 
thing and trying to find something better.  
 
Again, MHPs think the level of oversight into their treatment practices and techniques 
and care decisions is a problem. MHPs understood that a funding source needs to have 
oversight, but they did not agree with how significant the oversight was, and that MC 
Company decisions appeared to be guided by cutting costs rather than what is in the best 
interest of the child or adolescent. Following, I offer some dialogue between a LMHC 
and myself as she described her decision to leave her previous RTC work setting and how 
it had to do with MC and the way they regulate treatment decisions: 
It was about not being able to get services because I’m really aware that there was one 
case in particular that was going on which is why I actually, I shouldn’t say its why I left, 
it was the culmination of all the things that gave m a headache about MC and all of the 
reasons I just couldn’t do it anymore. 
 
This LMHP and I worked together at an RTC setting. The client case she discusses below 
is one where we were both involved in the adolescent female’s treatment. The following 
description details how MC decisions guided her treatment and how this scenario 
represents how MC companies make decisions based on profit rather than care logics: 
What was so frustrating about that was they placed her with us. She was a girl that came 
from a long line of sexual abuse and I’m giving thestory to illustrate my point. She was 
somebody who they, M [insurance company that governs Medicaid in Midwestern state], 
came to us and said, ‘would you interview her?’ Nobody will take her because she has 
some acting out tendencies. She never fully perpetrated on anybody but she was just so 
sexualized that she was a risk just to have around. I can’t even remember the levels but 
she was on the highest level forever. So they placed her with us, I remember S [name of 




seem like a good idea. We got pressured to take her, so we took her. I felt like we were 
doing the job we could do, and we asked for her to be able to receive individual therapy 
with someone who specialized working with girls who have been victims of sexual abuse, 
so she would have therapy with me, have specialized th rapy with them, this other 
clinician, and then family therapy.  They decided to move her from our facility because 
they didn’t want to pay for that specialized therapy nymore and they could just move her 
to a different facility where there was someone there that could offer that. I remember 
saying to them but you forced us to take her! You put her here because nobody else would 
take her and now that we’ve made progress enough that another facility will consider 
taking her, because she’s not acting out, you’re going to move her so that you don’t have 
to pay for this extra service. It was strictly about reimbursement and them wanting to pay 
less. They weren’t disputing we were saying she still needs this level of care.  
 
Several MHPs discussed leaving certain types of care settings such as Residential 
Treatment Centers (RTCs) other in-patient or hospital settings where MC companies 
over-manage, restrict and even harm care. The LMHC quoted above moved to a less-
restrictive out-patient clinical setting in order to be able to provide care that was less 
governed by the financial decisions of MC.  
I do accept Medicaid clients. I am trying to wean off that just because I am trying to run a 
business here but a lot of my other people do and I still have some Medicaid clients and 
now of course M is managing care it’s gone from oneextreme to another. I wouldn’t say 
they have found a happy medium in being really fair with clients. It’s become more of a 
legalistic management system versus what’s the best int rest of the client. 
 
 Another reason practitioners opted-out of accepting Medicaid clients was due to 
the fear of audits. MC organizations that governed care for Medicaid systems were 
described as extremely restrictive in their decision  about treatment: 
I cannot personally keep up with all of the requirements in the record keeping and its fear, 
to be honest, its fear, and I’m not proud of that, but they’ve made it – if you don’t dot 
every I and cross every T, they have requested sometimes up to $30,000 or $50,000 back 
pay from cases that they go over the record and thigs aren’t exactly in the right order. If 
they find something wrong they, I mean, it’s become almost absurd. There are a lot of 
clinicians in the state that say they are no longer going to serve Medicaid people, because 
the risk is so big. I don’t have time to spend hours on all of that. I mean we want to keep 
a good chart and we do keep good charts in my opinin, but they always, they go in there 
and look and they can always find something; an I that isn’t dotted. 
 
Here, the director of a non-profit mental health insurance agency that accepts mixed 




other restrictive funding sources because of the significance of their regulations and the 
fear of audits and having to pay back money rendered for services. The culture of fear, 
the headache of keeping up with all of the restrictions, the increase in unpaid labor, all 
added up to make “leaving Medicaid” and other MC companies that governed public 
forms of insurance, a rational, even ethical decision for many providers. Another provider 
that is also considering “leaving Medicaid” or MC Company M (who governs Medicaid 
care in a large Midwestern state), framed the decision in an eerily similar way to the 
practitioner quoted above: 
The guidelines that M is putting us through are just atrocious. No insurance company 
asks us to do this, and then they audit you and you get called on the carpet because you 
missed you know crossing a t and dotting an I and there isn’t enough time to document 
the files the way they want you to document. 
 
Again, this MHP describes how the decision to stop accepting Medicaid clients or clients 
whose care is reimbursed by MC Company M, is not just about reduced fees or ridiculous 
guidelines, but the fear of audits and having to pay b ck money. It is a combination of all 
this that creates an undesirable, even unethical context of care for providers and their 
patients. In the next quote, I asked a clinical social worker that works in a private group 
practice what she thought about the increased regulations of MC and how it might be 
impacting the field. She responded by arguing that MC Company M is getting what it 
wants— to squeeze expert professionals out of the market: 
It’s already happening. One of my therapists has some penings and she said I want some 
day time referrals but I don’t want Medicaid, I don’t want a Medicaid client. What’s 
happening is we’re just not going to take it.  Basic lly I’m booked, I see about, I bill out 
at least 40 hours a week, and I work 4 days, so that tells you what my schedule is like, I 
start at 7 in the morning and I usually end at 6 or7 at night and I usually don’t take lunch 
hours. I don’t have to take Medicaid, I believe in the work, and want to take Medicaid 
and want to do that work because I think its an important mission in my life, but they’re 
setting up so that the people on Medicaid are not going to get as good of services because 
the seasoned therapists are going to say I just don’t need it. Add to that the fact that 




Medicaid clients-- the people that have room in their schedule to take Medicaid patients. . 
. That’s the point; I don’t think they want them helpd. They’re trying to squeeze it out 
because it’s costing money and its working because ll of us here are very mission driven 
to help that population and be a part of it but we’re all getting to the point where we just 
can’t take the stress anymore. It’s working. 
 
The theme that MC organizations were purposefully trying to push experienced providers 
out of the market was significant. I had a difficult time understanding at first how MC 
companies benefit from getting providers to stop accepting their insurance. This was 
explained to me in different ways, as the following quotes demonstrate: “The biggest way 
that it affects practice, I would say is because of the low reimbursement and not being 
able to hire individuals who have master’s degrees. I think that’s probably the biggest 
impediment for being able to provide the level of services that we would like to provide.” 
This practitioner who works for a community agency on the east coast describes how 
they are increasingly frowned upon for hiring Master’  level clinicians. Another 
professional describes the same thing happening at her care setting: 
And I think it’s also important because I know that one of the things that’s happening at 
our agency because of managed care is that we are hiring more people with only an 
undergraduate degree, because MC doesn’t reimburse us at a high enough rate.  We can’t 
afford masters level people. When I came to [this community organization], they only 
hired people with masters degrees.  Also the Department of Mental Health doesn’t require 
that our community support specialists have a masters d gree and they almost look at us 
like, ‘your people are overqualified.’ 
 
Again, in public settings of care, whether they are community outreach organizations, 
hospitals, group homes or RTCs, the trend is toward hiring less experienced and qualified 
paraprofessionals and case managers rather than expert mental health professionals that 
have graduate educations and/or clinical experience. Following is one last example of 
how MHPs view this shift in care: 
Now they hire a psychiatrist to sign off on the charts nd paraprofessionals and social 
workers, not even social workers, mental health workers, undergrad students to sit with 




somebody runs the group who, you know we psychologists have too much training, they 
would have to pay us too much. Programs would be way better but since they are 
revolving door programs and its all about spending less, they’re not really valuable 
programs. They are crisis, put the fire out programs. Our field is in trouble and the private 
practice market is flooded with social workers and licensed counselors and pastoral 
counselors and everybody’s a therapist so that psychologists have been diluted in the 
private practice world. Our field has been diluted. We’re trained to do testing and 
assessment, to do a kind of level of psychotherapy; there is no where for us to go 
anymore. Teaching, we can go into academia. 
 
Thus, MHPs argued that MC was purposefully driving seasoned, expert professionals, 
from the field, especially in public care settings. This leads to the patients that tend to 
have the most intense or serious mental health issues to receive care from providers that 
have the least educational training and professional expertise. Further, this pushes those 
seasoned professionals towards private practice and out-of-pocket care contexts.  
I think M is way out of line and overboard and I think their agenda is to get rid of 
providers.  I think they’re trying to do capitation so they put the money in their own 
pockets. I think managed care is a bunch of bullshit. T e private non-profit, they are 
gradually just eeking more dollars out of, by denying and making us spend more time on 
the phone. More unpaid hours, what they want, they want to be able to limit, a lot of 
people jumped off, they said screw you, I’m not goin  to work, to take M people 
anymore.  I know somebody else who just sent that letter, and that benefits M. 
   
As I was unsure how MC companies that oversee Medicaid clients would benefit from 
providers leaving, I asked some follow-up questions. He explained: “If there is less access 
to services, there will be lower utilization and they will save money. The less utilization, the more 
money that they save.” I then asked if that meant that seasoned professional  would switch to 
seeing different types of clients or just work in dfferent settings. He chimed in:   
The worried well, that’s right. When practitioners start thinking unethically like that, in 
terms of unethical business, they’re acting just like CEOs who are. . . It’s a matter of 
being able to manage a practice, I want you to know y u’re sitting talking to a 
practitioner who takes M, I take Medicaid. I take [names list of health insurance 
companies] even though those companies don’t treat p ac itioners well. The point is you 
have to be able to manage a practice, you have to bable to take care of yourself first, I 
don’t mean financially. What I do is, I know how many cases of what I can take, I will 
take a very low number of severe cases. I will take on  domestic violence case, but I also 
make sure I take sliding fee cases; they can be multiple, depending on a formula. I know 




currently work with a [public clinic], to make sure that I’m going to consistently have one 
pro bono case on my caseload. If we all did that nobody would have to be burned out, but 
the public sector does not treat its people well. Caseloads are too high, the cases are too 
acute. The pay is way too low; the job satisfaction is way too low. You know that. It’s just 
like tax burden. If we just distributed the tax burden according to what we can handle. So 
yeah, less experienced practitioners should have less of that not more. I think there’s 
something backwards about it. It’s like, dude I paid my dues, so now it’s your turn. It all 
rolls down hill. 
 
The above practitioner describes how he manages his caseload to make sure he treats 
diverse types of clients so he can continue to accept public forms of insurance as well as 
pro bono cases without getting burned out. However, he was the first practitioner I 
interviewed that made a case for how practitioners could manage their work in a way that 
allowed them to continue accepting public forms of insurance without getting burned out. 
As a follow-up to his characterization of some mental health practitioners acting like 
CEOs, implying that some practitioners make decisions about who to treat based on profit 
rather than professional ethics, I presented him with rationale I had heard from other 
professionals about why they have stopped accepting (privatized) public forms of 
insurance. He responded: “I can’t have a million dollar house and see these people. I 
can’t have my American junk culture dream. I’m not g ing to pass judgment on anybody 
but I don’t like the word can’t.  There is kind of won’t and don’t know how.” Again, he 
argues that it is both managed care, i.e. the way the  encourage providers to stop 
providing the services, and the way that MHPs manage their practices and are influenced 
by for-profit logics that is to blame for the current stratified system of care. He offers me 
the following formula: MC increases restrictions and unpaid labor time hoping more 
practitioners will leave their panels, this limits access to services for Medicaid or publicly 
funded clients, which then leads to lower utilizations. Lower utilization saves MC money 




 In comparison to his view of MHPs as playing an important role in this system of 
stratification, most MHPs that had made the decision to “leave Medicaid” or public 
settings of care, described it as though they had been placed into a corner and didn’t want 
the system that way but they didn’t see another altnative for themselves. 
I should say that in my private practice I am out of p cket and off the insurance panels 
because the only way I can work with families the way I really need to work with them 
was to quit being dictated by the insurance companies. I am out of pocket, people come 
to me, they pay upfront, they can submit their papers to insurance companies and see 
what they get back but I quit mostly out of severe frustration, professionally, especially 
working with eating disorders being told you can see p ople 10 times to treat anorexia, 
yeah. When you leave managed care, when you leave hospital programs, you become a 
little bit elitist. Not that I’m happy about that, but you end up treating populations of 
people who can afford to come to you and this is the metropolitan area. There is a lot of 
wealth here. When I was in the hospital programs or when you’re a graduate student 
doing internship programs, you are working with the most troubled, emotionally 
deprived, chaotic families. In private practice you are still getting significant mental 
health issues but it largely feels different and it’s focused on anxieties, the worried well, 
eating disorders, depression, teens who are acting out of anger, children of divorce. What 
we get in our office really matches what is going o in a metropolitan sort of upper 
middle class sector of society. . . What we were trained for we can’t do anymore. 
 
Thus, this clinical psychologist works in her own private practice on the east coast and 
only accepts out-of-pocket payment for her services. She argues that she couldn’t do the 
kind of work that she was trained for under MC regulations and governance. At a 
different point in our interview together she told me about a turning point she had that 
changed the way she provided care. At the time of the turning point, she was practicing 
under a managed care regime. A college student client of hers that suffered from anorexia 
committed suicide. She described how the intensity of services she was able to provide to 
that population was severely restricted by MC and while she knew her patients were at 
risk, this event had a formidable impact on how she restructured her own care work. 
While I wholeheartedly agree with the previous practitioner who argued that if all 




system wouldn’t end up stratified with the least exp rienced treating those with the most 
intense issues, I can also empathize with all of the practitioners that argued that MC 
governance was too restrictive, too threatening, and too harmful to patient care.  
It was clear during my interviews that the seasoned professionals who had opted-
out of Medicaid and other public forms of insurance cared about those patients they were 
leaving behind, and wanted to be practicing in a different system that wasn’t set up to 
encourage stratification: 
Things shifted for me in my practice at one point when I realized you couldn’t fight MC 
anymore. I was no longer part of the team and in the system I was outside the system. 
Social workers, we know you have to enter the system to make change and it was a very 
deflating, powerless situation. I decided, I’ve gotto make a shift here, I can’t do this 
anymore. I felt bad because I am a good therapist and I felt bad that these kids who are 
state wards and don’t have families were no longer going to get good services, because 
that’s what’s happening to a lot of people. 
 
Again, this social work practitioner that had been in the field for almost 20 years does not 
accept clients with some forms of public insurance. She didn’t make this decision based 
on finances and receiving lower reimbursement for her services. Instead, she made the 
decision because the way MC was governing her treatm nt made her feel powerless in 
her care work. I offer one final description of how care has become stratified. The 
following PsyD was the only practitioner I interview d that was a salaried employee who 
worked in a publicly funded care context. I had done some research about the community 
mental health center before arriving, as it was surprising for me to find it after finding so 
many more private and mixed-insurance care settings. I asked her to describe how 
patients (including people without insurance), get access to services at the site (located in 
an East coast metropolitan area): “ The way that people can get in is, if you have no insurance 




serve a lot of folks with Medicaid and fewer with insurance. I would say 60% of my caseload is 
Medicaid and the other third are sliding scale.” Following up on the issues of provider burn-out 
and how at times that was described to me to be a result of caring for more low-income, higher 
need clients, I asked whether this situation led to high practitioner burnout at this community 
mental health center. She responded:  
I think the burnout comes from the caseload sizes. As the county population has grown, 
the number of staff in the mental health services has stayed the same, so the caseloads 
have risen. I think the intensity of the cases alsomatters. There’s a certain level of 
intensity that comes with serving you know lower income families that have a lot more 
risk issues. I think it’s really, it’s the numbers and the lack of time to discuss and prepare 
to the extent that you might like to. It seems we have high turnover among the newer 
younger staff and then there are folks that have been around. I’ve been here for a little 
over 10 years now. A lot of newer staff will come by and get their feet wet and then go 
into private practice, which is unfortunate because then you don’t get more experienced 
people treating really troubled families. 
 
I was so pleasantly surprised to hear she had been th re for 10 years but that she 
recognized the stratified system of care, I wanted to find out more about what she thought 
about this. I followed up by commenting that many of the practitioners I had interviewed 
who had been in the field for over 10 years had stopped accepting Medicaid patients: 
In some ways we’re very fortunate in [this east coast] county because we’re salaried 
employees. So you know whatever the insurance is, it doesn’t impact me. In [county of 
state nearby], they have fewer clinics that take Medicaid. It was maybe 5 years ago, I had 
gone to some training they were using to try to lure people in to get private providers to 
treat Medicaid cases and it was clear they were having a tough time with that. I think a lot 
of it is the pay and the paperwork for it you know, for less money. 
 
At a different point in the interview, the PsyD MHP that works in this public care setting 
described how serving this population is critical to her life mission and purpose. While 
the professional ethic of care appeared to be alivend well and was demonstrated in 
several ways, there is no doubt that as MC restrictions and hoops increase and their pay 
decreases, the system will increasingly become stratified. There is only so far you can go 




and more threatening surveillance of your everyday clinical work. The rationale MHPs 
gave me for the trend in the increasing stratification of care was that MC companies and 
their decisions were based on for-profit rather than a professional logic of care. It’s hard 
to imagine a system that wouldn’t become stratified un er these conflicting logics. 
CHANGE THE POWER INSURANCE COMPANIES HAVE OVER CARE 
 
During the last section of my interview, I asked practitioners the following question: If 
you had a magic wand and could change the field of ad lescent mental health services, 
what would you change? MC immediately emerged as the aspect of care MHPs want 
changed. The undue power MC holds over treatment pla s, practices and the structure of 
mental health services in contemporary society was criticized. The analysis demonstrates 
that MHPs want care decisions to be guided by what is in the best interest of each 
individual client. Practitioners call for changing the mental health field so that individual 
children, adolescents and their families will be thfocus of the system rather than MC 
regulations and profits. Practitioners argue MC regulations are in need of their own 
regulation: “It’s got to be regulated. Anytime a capitalist is allowed to do what he or she 
wants to do, they will make money. They will pocket as much money as they can and it’s 
actually the customer that will get stuck.” Similarly, another MHP argues that the for-
profit aspects that have corrupted mental health care h ve to be fixed. However, this 
practitioner related this concern to the contemporary U.S. debate over health reform and 
whether adding a competitive public option might help r structure the system of care: 
It’s got to have those problems and pitfalls taken out of it if it’s going to work. I don’t 
think we need a competitive option. They can use it if they want, they [MC 
organizations] need to be regulated and they need not to have made the regulations with 
their own lawyers.  If there was some way to make sur  that it wasn’t corrupt to the point 
where these business men and women are politically in bed with congress men and 





Again, out of anything in the adolescent mental heat  care that could be changed, the 
larger political economy of a for-profit system was at the heart of what practitioners with 
a magic wand would change: 
I would focus on managed care and funding because that seems to be a huge barrier for 
clinicians to where some clinicians will not accept Medicaid clients at this point, but that 
is what they have to do to survive. If you have a private practice you have to get paid and 
if you’re doing your billing on your own, thinking about the investment of time for that. I 
think it would be more focused around that and then, the diagnoses, and this goes back to 
managed care. We have to have those [diagnoses] within that first hour of meeting this 
client and gathering this information where you are just doing so much writing and your 
interaction is limited. I just don’t think that it’s ethical to provide a diagnosis that first 
hour. 
 
This LMHP argues that the way MC companies govern halt care is unethical. She 
argues that managed care funding restrictions not oly limit care and encourage 
practitioners to stop accepting Medicaid clients, but also undermine the therapeutic 
relationships through their diagnostic regulations. Another practitioner also characterized 
MC regulations of diagnostic processes as problematic. 
I would change the rigidity of diagnostic criteria. The hold that insurance companies have 
[on the mental health care system] like M which is Medicaid. You have to do so much 
paperwork; you have to create two reports, a treatmn  plan and a request for services 
after the first initial evaluation. That's a hell a ot of paperwork and a hell of a lot of time 
and they put a lot of stipulations on who can see whom and the whole purpose of that is 
to make it so hard to see people so they don't haveto pay for it, and they would argue 
otherwise of course but I would change that. We need to have accountability but to make 
it so prohibitive for people to see M clients? Like [another practitioner’s] practice, I think 
they are going to stop seeing M [clients with that insurance] because it’s so much work. 
They pay a lot in the beginning, the first evaluation, but it goes down over time. They 
don't want you to see people for very long, so after a certain amount of visits it’s down to 
under $60 bucks. In line with the national debate, I would change the power of the 
insurance companies. 
 
Again, the power of insurance companies to restrict ac ess to services and govern expert 
mental health professionals’ everyday treatment decisions was a focus of what MHPs 




companies have to influence mental health care was a very contentious issue for 
practitioners that want the care of their patients to be guided by professional rather than 
financial ethics or cultural logic.  
Another aspect of professional logic of care that ws undermined by MC 
company regulations was patient heterogeneity and a focus on preventive or proactive 
care. In other words, MC companies required MHPs prove medical necessity. Yet, the 
logic of medical necessity necessitates waiting until there is a serious identifiable 
problem. A significant amount of research, including the latest IOM report on MEB 
disorders of youth, argues that financially speaking, our money would be better spent on 
prevention efforts. The following MHP argues the same: 
I would change programs so that instead of being pathologizing where its just for kids 
who are sort of bad or are already lost I would promote a focus on empowerment. Mental 
health programs would be very proactive for building resilience and social competence in 
teens, educating them about substance dependency and mental health. I would be very 
proactive. Move it into the education system and normalize it more, so that families 
maybe sign their kids up for programs in mental heat  but it would be in the school 
systems. In the private industry. . . if there were government mental health support, there 
would be programs for adolescents [divided into three] tiers so that the highest tier would 
be severe, the clinical kids that are hard anyway, the abandoned ones, the ones that are 
really impaired. Then there would be something in the middle and then there would be 
the tier for empowerment and resilience to make youth better in terms of their mental 
health, to optimize their mental health. That’s how I ould design it. 
 
This practitioner, who has actually stopped accepting Medicaid or public forms of 
insurance, would shift the focus of mental health care, from a focus on the 
pathologization of adolescent mental illness through diagnostic labels and requirements 
of medical necessity, towards a proactive system that focuses on prevention and 
enhancing positive aspects of mental health. Her suggested changes for the field of 
adolescent mental health care include a larger system change that normalizes care and 





 The following two practitioners envision an adolesc nt mental health care system 
that focuses on patient heterogeneities, or individual patient personhood and the 
dynamics of the family system. “I would really push for a way to include family 
assessment, to allow family intervention, and I would love to see that become an evidence 
based criteria.” Similarly, another practitioner argues that the m ntal health care system 
needs to empower adolescents and their families to be active participants in their own 
healing processes. “I would put the focus back on the individual child and the family 
rather than all the paperwork and insurance.  I’m a simple person. Let’s look at each 
case individually and put the power back into the family and individual instead of trying 
to overpower and change from the outside.” As a final characterization of how mental 
health practitioners want to change the current stra ified MC system to something new, 
the following MHP argues that if MC is going to continue to “manage” care, it should be 
done with the patient’s best interest in mind.  
I’m aware there’s not a limitless pot of money. If they [MC] would make decisions 
genuinely in the patients best interest were willing to talk to the people who have 
relationships with the patients and spent time with them or were aware of their family 
dynamics, or the other situations in their lives, so they’d be able to make a better, more 
educated guess about what’s in their best interest, then they [MC] could do that. There’s 
no expectation that they do that. They’re just a funding source and because the dollars are 
in their hands they get to create all the hoops and we all have to jump through them until 
we get the dollars. They should simply be the funding source. Instead of it being this 
whole power thing, it should be a privilege. You have to be a part of this child’s care. 
How do you want to live up to that responsibility? Managed care should have to come to 
the table at every treatment team meeting. They should have to be a real presence and 
stop in and make visitations. What if you called these kids and found out how they’re 
doing? What if you actually participated? You know, what if you were really a part of 
their care? 
 
Thus, MHPs argued that MC holds undue power over treatment plans and practices. They 




client. In order to fix the current system, MC needs to be regulated, have their power 
checked, or actually get involved in client care. MHPs argue that the funding structure, 
the way they guide diagnostic processes and ignore pati nt heterogeneities, relationships 
and family dynamics harms care practices. MHPs desire MC to make funding decisions 
not solely on financial or for-profit logics but based on clinical issues and information 
pertinent to individual clients. The conflict between professional and business ethics is at 
the forefront of how MHPs struggle with providing quality mental health care services 
under a threatening, privatized, management regime. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The power, knowledge and experiences of psychotherapeutic mental health care 
professionals are marginalized by the assemblage of the DSM, insurance companies and 
state/federal governance. This analysis of MHPs’ experiences of the countervailing forces 
to their professional autonomy and everyday work demonstrated conflicting logics at 
work in the biopolitical economy. MHPs feel threatened, over-managed and 
deprofessionalized to the extent that their professional training is questioned as treatment 
decisions are guided by financial rather than clinial motivations and ethics. Insurers 
have taken up the biomedical DSM technology and utilized it as a tool to save money. 
The privatization of mental health care in a neoliberal, capitalist political economy leads 
to incentives for MC companies and state governance systems to hold back provisions to 
save money and reap profits. These assemblages of in urance/state power co-constitute 
local health care organization and delivery systems. The system is complex with multiple 




The mental health professions are extremely interdisciplinary, with multiple types 
of background disciplinary training, socialization, theoretical models and approaches to 
treatment. It is necessary for professions to secure a segment of the health care market 
through lobbying and other politicking work. This applies not only to types of 
disciplinary profession such as social workers or counselors, but to various theoretical 
orientations and treatment techniques as well. The political economy shapes which 
providers see which patients and which theoretical orientations and treatments are 
utilized (or at least privileged). MHPs argue that MC has shifted the field of mental 
health care from interpersonal, psychodynamic, and transformative types of 
psychotherapy towards short term, behavioral and meication treatment approaches. 
MHPs recognize the complex relationships of power between the DSM, MC and state 
governance and critique the current systems administrators for over-managing and 
stepping beyond their role as funders into the role of being care directors.  
 MC was recognized for the ways in which it has enhanced professional 
accountability and improved treatment plans. The ext nt to which the MC system has 
improved treatment plans was contested though becaus  some MHPs expressed concern 
over how current treatment plans have to be worded in behavioral language and therapists 
need to be flexible to changing the approach and goals of treatment as mental illness 
disturbances and context emerge from the therapeutic relationship and the context of the 
patient’s life. Thus, the MC system is acknowledged for its effect on professional 
accountability and its facilitation of clear treatment goals, but MHPs argue the pendulum 
has swung too far via over-management of theoretical orientations and treatment 




and how some treatments are privileged or devalued, an  their overall regulations have 
reconfigured treatment plans into formulas devoid of recognizing heterogeneities across 
patients and unique personhood and social context within the care of each individual 
adolescent.  
 A significant criticism of MC was how there is increasingly more paperwork, 
documentation, phone calls and networking to meet their regulations, while 
simultaneously, fees for service have decreased. In a more work for less pay scenario, 
what MHPs struggle with the most, beyond burnout, is hat cost-containment strategies of 
MC reduce the quality of mental health care practitioners can provide. While MHPs 
operate under professional ethics of care and are guided by clinical information of 
patients, MC bureaucrats focus on short-term needs an  medical necessity. MHPs argue 
these conflicting ethics lead to reduced quality of care, especially among patients with 
major mental illness. While the on-going cribbing work required by practitioners to keep 
up with shifting regulations regarding how they can t lk, write and report on their 
everyday clinical practices is frustrating, the culture of fear created by on-going 
documentation reviews and potential audits creates unpleasant, if not unethical, 
organizational work contexts. For instance, MHPs argue that new pretreatment 
assessment requirements neglect the importance of establishing a bond with new patients 
in the first session, and that many MC policies such as this one appear irrational and 
based on administrative rather than clinical expertis . In a context of oppositional logics 
where MHPs are guided by clinical information and professional ethics of care but must 




commodifies care, it’s not surprising the results are irrational rationalization and 
increasing stratification.  
 The privatized, over-managed care regulations of MC facilitate organizational 
work settings (contexts of care) where providers mut negotiate more guidelines or 
controlling features of their work, defend their professional expertise and get paid less for 
doing so. MHPs argue that MC system is systematically squeezing expert seasoned 
professionals out of the market. The MC system privileges undereducated and 
underqualified professionals for public mental health programs that focus on short-term, 
medical necessity cases. Some MHPs argue the field is being diluted, i.e. that there is 
nowhere for highly trained psychotherapists to go except private practices and out-of-
pocket markets. MHPs argue the MC agenda is to get rid of providers in order to decrease 
access to services, which lowers utilization rates nd saves money. The MC formula 
leads to seasoned professionals treating the worried well while new clinicians with the 
least professional training and field expertise treat the most intense and troubled clients.  
 At least one MHP argued that this system could be better if MHPs themselves did 
a better job at managing their practice through diversifying the types of clients they 
accept at any given time, including taking on Medicaid and pro bono client cases. Despite 
where you place the blame on the mechanisms of stratification, all MHPs agreed that the 
public sector insurance panels do not treat provides w ll. The caseloads are too high, too 
acute, while the pay and job satisfaction are too low. Yet, many MHPs would deal with 
the issues of pay and intensity of cases if there wasn’t also a culture of fear and shift in 
the kind of psychotherapy a practitioner can provide. The MHPs I interviewed that 




in the mission of that work and wanted to treat clients that were not just the “worried 
well,” but found they were unable to do the kind of work they were highly trained and 
skilled at doing, under the MC system. The stratification of care leads to newer therapists 
treating the most troubled, emotionally chaotic families while the seasoned professionals 
treat the worried well who can afford out-of-pocket s rvices. 
Stratification is a result of complex, fragmented, relations of state/industry power. 
MHPs resent the constant surveillance of their professional work not only because of the 
loss of professional autonomy, but because treatment pla s have been reconfigured to 
privilege biomedical and behavioral orientations and treatment practices are governed by 
profit rather than clinical expertise and a logic of care. 
In performing a psychotherapeutic approach to studying the field of adolescent 
mental health care, I asked professionals what they would change if they had a magic 
wand. The power that insurance companies have over daily care practices of providers 
was critiqued as corrupt. The MC system has unregulated power over treatment plans and 
practices and MHPs desire a system that directs care based on the best interest of each 
individual adolescent client and their families. In order to achieve this care, practitioners 
want care to be managed by clinical rather than financial decisions. Practitioners want the 
professional autonomy and flexibility to perform the work they are highly trained, and 
from the eclectic theoretical orientations and approaches to treatment in which they have 
spent time becoming skilled in and that are the best fit for each unique adolescent, their 
family dynamics and social environmental circumstances. Regulating MC will not 




Chapter Six Conclusion 
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Theoretical Orientations in Contemporary Psychotherapy 
While biological psychiatry continues to be the dominant paradigm of health and 
illness in U.S. society, none of the psychotherapeutic practitioners I interviewed 
identified it as their theoretical orientation. Several theoretical orientations and 
therapeutic approaches were presented as important al ernatives to the biomedical 
paradigm, but often practitioners were resistant to name just one that was the most 
important. Frequently, practitioners discussed the importance of an openness to multiple 
models and described their own therapeutic approaches as eclectic. 
Theoretical orientations that were described most often include family systems, 
strength based, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), biopsychosocial, 
psychoeducational, psychoanalytical, solution focused, constructivism and relationship 
based. Rather than describe the ways in which theirorientation, approach or goals of 
treatment built on or contributed to the biomedical model, practitioners frequently located 
their therapeutic approach in opposition to biomedical and behavioral theories and 
treatments. Practitioners discussed aspects of psychotherapy, diagnosis and treatment that 
have been devalued by the psychiatric profession’s DSM, insurance companies and the 
majority of mental health care research funding. My analysis revealed practitioners 
resisted the biomedical model of illness in the following three ways: (1) by describing 
their theoretical orientation and approach as eclecti , as different from, or actively in 
opposition to, the biomedical model, (2) by (re)focusing on strengths of adolescents and 




rather than pathologizing them with labels, negative language, or focusing on their 
weaknesses or bad behaviors, and (3) by valuing the importance of the social aspects of 
mental health including relationships, the family and reaching an understanding of the 
adolescent as a whole, complex person.  
 While the mental health practitioners I interviewed valued multidisciplinary 
models and an eclectic approach to adolescent mental ill ess intervention, they also 
critiqued biomedical and behavioral models/approaches for being too focused on the 
diagnosis, behaviors and surface level symptoms, rather than on the deeper social 
relational issues in adolescents’ everyday lives. Practitioners privileged theoretical 
orientations broad enough to allow for multiple perspectives and approaches, or that 
facilitated a holistic framework in which biopsychosocial and relational as opposed to 
only the biomedical and behavioral aspects of adolescent mental health and illness shape 
the definition of, understanding of and response to ad lescent mental illness. Despite the 
growing assemblage of biopsychiatry via the DSM, EBPs, the growth of privatized 
managed care and big pharma within the neoliberal he lt  care economy, biomedicine is 
not an uncontested hegemonic process. Mental health pr ctitioners’ definitions of and 
responses to adolescent mental illness are shaped, but not entirely determined, by 
biomedicalization and standardization. 
Interdisciplinarity of Adolescent Mental Health Care 
 My findings suggest that adolescent mental health and illness as a scientific and 
clinical object of study and intervention has become ore interdisciplinary in both 
practice and theory and rather than subscribing to a “model of the moment” as many 




appropriate approach for each individual youth and his/her social environmental 
circumstances. I asked practitioners what they perceive to be the costs and benefits of the 
interdisciplinarity of the field, including what difference, if at all, it makes that mental 
health professionals enter therapeutic practice from a diverse set of disciplines, specialties 
and treatment ideologies (i.e., social worlds).  
 My analysis revealed that the interdisciplinarity of the mental health professions 
has become black-boxed, a taken for granted aspect of mental health care. MHPs 
perceive the interdisciplinarity of the field as necessary to fulfill different types of health 
care coverage needs. Interdisciplinarity at its best is described as facilitating professional 
collaboration and more comprehensive care, and at its worst, encouraging jurisdictional 
disputes and the devaluing of some of the profession ’ perspectives and contributions. 
The field of adolescent mental health care has beenint rdisciplinary since its ascendance 
in the 1980s and 1990s as an object of scientific sudy and clinical intervention. The 
knowledge-practice tensions of an increasingly interdisciplinary, yet specialized field of 
professionals and researchers has been discussed as creating a more fragmented mental 
health care system. Yet the benefit of this knowledge-practice tension is that mental 
health professionals currently value multiple models, clectic approaches and 
collaboration with dissimilar colleagues. All of this suggests that adolescent mental health 
care is moving away from the dominant biomedical paradigm and towards a holistic 
health care approach.   
The Standardization Movement: EBPs in Mental Health Care 
 I examined how practitioners negotiate the tensions between the simultaneous 




and Berg (2003) and the debates laid out in the coll ction edited by Norcross, Beutler and 
Levant (2006), I investigated the politics of standrdization-in-practice. The mental 
health professionals I interviewed echoed many of the thoughts and concerns raised in 
contemporary debates over EBPs. When speaking aboutthe importance of EBPs in the 
field and the role they play in their everyday clinical work, MHPs expressed a tone of 
caution and reserved acceptance. In the same way that several were adamant that there 
isn’t one best model of illness or approach to treatment, they were also quick to point out 
that therapists need freedom to be creative and try unscripted or non-evidence based 
techniques as well as EBPs. Their everyday clinical work can be understood as an art 
form as well as a science.  
Thus, the social worlds of psychotherapeutic practice value EBPs as a good place 
to start in their treatment plans, but claim it is important to maintain clinical freedom 
(professional autonomy) and flexibility with regards to theoretical orientations and 
treatment techniques. MHPs critique the way in which EBPs privilege scientific evidence 
over patient subjectivity, social context and the trapeutic relationship. MHPs take issue 
with the way MC policies have implemented EBPs in ways that have shifted the field of 
mental health care from psychodynamic towards more behavioral focused theoretical 
orientations and therapies. At the heart of this criticism is a tension over how best to 
define and measure mental health and illness. MHPs struggle with EBP standardization 
and how it privileges discrete, quantitative understanding and measurement of emotional 
well-being.  
While EBPs are almost uniformly valued, practitioners’ veryday clinical 




circumstances. Further, several mental health disorers or problems do not have 
corresponding EBPs, either because studies on thoseareas of mental illness have 
not been completed or because some types of therapeutic intervention are 
difficult to study and measure (quantify) using RCTs. My findings demonstrate 
that practitioners struggle with the definition and measurement of EBPs, 
including how the scientific assumptions and methods f EBPs define mental 
disorders and patienthood. The development and imple entation of treatment 
plans was characterized as much grayer in everyday clinical practices than the 
way that diagnosis and treatment are framed within EBP protocols such as those 
adopted by managed care companies.  
One of the key aspects of the way EBPs redefine mental ill ess that 
practitioners struggled with was the way that individual and social group 
diversity is unaddressed. When interviewing mental he lth professionals I asked 
them questions about what difference it makes that their patients are adolescents, 
male or female, Hispanic immigrants, or in the process of exploring their 
sexuality. In other words, I wanted to know to what ex ent scientific knowledge 
at the level of the population, and life experiences at the level of social status 
characteristics— what Steven Epstein (2007) has labeled niche group 
standardization in biomedical paradigms, matters for defining and intervening in 
adolescent mental health care. One of the areas of the interview where individual 
patient differences (both social group and individual subjectivity based) emerged 
was in the discussions I had with professionals about EBPs. While the push for 




processes of implementing and negotiating standard-in-practice are messy. Social 
worlds of psychotherapists’ shared assumptions about the importance of 
psychotherapy remaining an art as well as a science not only to allow for the 
heterogeneity of their own disciplinary backgrounds, theoretical orientations and 
therapeutic approaches, but because at the center of their everyday work were 
adolescents. Social worlds of psychotherapists shared in a vision of being 
advocates not only for adolescents in general (as aniche social group), but of 
adolescent difference or heterogeneity, across personhood and ways of 
experiencing various kinds of mental illness.   
In the IOM (2001) definition of EBPs, scientific evidence, clinical 
expertise and patient values were each important factors in determining diagnosis 
and therapeutic intervention. In a manner similar to Reed (2006) and Messer 
(2006), therapists did not think evidence should be privileged over clinical 
expertise or individual patient values, circumstances and difference.  In 
opposition to Kihlstrom (2006), the mental health practitioners I interviewed did 
not think it made sense to define and measure mental health and illness in a way 
that ignores the subjectivity of patients nor the social circumstances of their lives.  
The mental health professions encompass a diverse st of disciplinary 
professions, theoretical orientations and approaches to treatment. While the dominant 
paradigm is biomedical or biological psychiatry, the mental health professionals who 
practice psychotherapy largely ascribe to more holistic theoretical orientations and 
approaches to intervening in the mental, emotional a d behavioral disturbances of youth. 




While biomedicine contributes significantly to scientific understanding of epidemiology 
of various disorders, mental illness is defined in much broader terms in social worlds of 
psychotherapy. For most practitioners, it was important to adhere to the specific needs 
and presenting problems of each adolescent.  
The mental health practitioners I interviewed overwhelmingly adopted 
theoretical orientations that took a broader perspectiv  of what causes mental health and 
illness – i.e., they considered multiple aspects as cau al in the creation and alleviation of 
mental disorders. Biomedicine, meaning the biological and genetic aspects of mental 
illness as well as the potential for chemical imbalances, is viewed as one aspect and thus 
potential cause of a disturbance, as well as one potential avenue for solution. 
Contemporary mental health practitioners neither embraced nor dismissed 
pharmaceuticals or behavioral interventions but often saw them as one aspect of a larger 
therapeutic treatment plan that included the social and relational aspects of illness. 
The psychotherapists I interviewed recognized the importance of the 
interdisciplinarity of the field and the need to work towards greater collaboration. It is a 
sign of interdisciplinary professional maturation that each of the different disciplines both 
understand and value interdisciplinary contributions that are moving the field toward 
increased team-work and collaboration. With the rapid development of information 
technologies, not only will documentation, diagnosis and treatment planning be 
performed electronically, but each of the various types of health specialists and their 
information will be more easily linked, with more opportunities for collaboration.  
There has been considerable discussion of the extent to which EBM and EBPs 




content and decisions of health providers. Timmermans and Berg (2003) argue that it 
makes more sense to figure out how EBPs can be implemented in ways that enhance 
health professionals’ forms of expertise, and better connect different types of 
professionals together for collaborative opportunities. While I agree with Timmermans 
and Berg’s (2003) analysis and recommendations, I al o find that within the mental health 
field, some professionals’ theoretical orientations a d therapeutic approaches to treatment 
are valued more than others’ and that some of this is directly correlated to the hierarchy 
of evidence discussed by Norcross et al (2006). Mental health professionals are just that – 
professionals who have gone through years of schooling and certification exams and their 
clinical expertise as well as the subjectivity and social circumstances of their patients 
should be valued as much as the evidence produced from RCTs.  
It is important to MHPs that psychotherapy continues to be valued as an art 
form as well as a science. MHPs value scientific evd nce and proven techniques, but not 
so much that they value the diagnosis or disorder ov individual patient subjectivity, 
their background experiences, values, concerns and ocial circumstances. This debate 
would be easier to address if it occurred in a context where profit motives and the power 
of the insurance companies was less embedded in theway that EBPs and the DSM have 
been instituted. Mental health professionals’ clinial expertise has been called into 
question and deprofessionalized to the extent that they are significantly less able to make 
decisions about the proper theoretical orientation, diagnoses and treatment techniques in 






TAMING AND UNLEASHING THE DSM-TECHNOLOGY-IN-PRACTICE 
I employed the sociology of diagnosis and biomedicalization theory frameworks to 
illustrate that the processes of diagnosis capture how the existing mental health 
establishment defines and measures mental illness. I argue that the technoscientific 
classification system of the DSM orders ways of being and contemporary thinking about 
mental health and illness. While the DSM technology was originally designed as a 
diagnostic communication device, it heavily structures not only contemporary diagnostic 
processes, but clinical work.  
Biomedicalization theory facilitated a disentanglin of the interests and power of 
different social actors engaged in processes of diagnosis. It elucidates how the role of the 
DSM as technoscientific actant in diagnosis, and its meanings, emerge from on-going 
clinical practice interactions. Thus, the DSM is a ocially scripted technology, yet its 
significance is interpretively flexible and negotiated in concrete sites of action. The 
heterogeneities in type of mental health care provider, care setting, and patient all shape 
how the DSM is used and thus how diagnostic practices are carried out.  
Social processes of diagnosis and the interpretive flexibility of the DSM as a 
biomedical technology are different for mental health professionals who are not 
psychiatrists. The mental health professionals I interviewed interpreted the DSM 
technology as a necessary tool that sometimes enhances diagnostic clarity, permits 
reimbursement for services and can help with interdisciplinary and patient 
communication. The psychiatrists in Whooley’s (2010) study experienced diagnostic 




legitimacy upon their profession at the same time it is used by insurers to undercut their 
professional authority.  
In contrast, the mental health professionals I interviewed were ambivalent about 
the way in which the cultural authority of the DSM technology simultaneously helped 
them communicate and collaborate with patients, parents and other mental health 
professionals while hindering their professional authority. Even more significant though, 
was the way in which the biomedical model legitimated by the DSM technology 
marginalized their theoretical orientations and eclectic approaches to psychotherapy. 
While alternative mental health professionals recognized the ways in which the DSM 
technology was helpful for their work, there was much more at stake in social processes 
of diagnosis for them. Clinical interests and practices are guided by definitions and 
measurements of mental health and illness. Further, definitions and measurements 
influence societal and professional responses to, and experiences of, mental illness.  
Underdetermined Significance of the DSM-Technology 
Despite the multi-sited character of biomedical standardization, the most common 
interpretation of the DSM technology was that it was insignificant for everyday clinical 
treatment practices. MHPs had several ways of dismissing of the importance of the DSM. 
They labeled it as just a tool: as the only way they could get paid; as something that only 
facilitates diagnosis but doesn’t impact treatment; as a means to an end; and as the bible 
for the profession of psychiatry, not for their own profession(s). Mental health 
professionals’ talk about and utilization of the DSM technology undermined its authority 




Like the psychiatrists in Whooley’s (2010) study, the mental health professionals 
I interviewed employed several work-arounds, or loca  solutions to the problems posed 
by biomedical and bureaucratic standardization. First, mental health practitioners utilized 
alternative taxonomies in order to diagnose according to their own understanding of 
mental illness, and then translated those interpretations into DSM or biomedical terms 
after the fact. This workaround was more than a locl strategy that allowed MHPs to fall 
in line with standardization while maintaining some professional authority. The 
alternative taxonomy workaround enables psychologists, counselors, social workers and 
other non-psychiatrist professionals to continue to define mental health and illness in 
psychodynamic ways.  
Second, MHPs fudged the numbers or diagnostic codes in order to disguise their 
actual clinical practices while falling in line with he formal rules of insurance company 
standardization. Fudging the codes often involves practices of over or under diagnosis. 
MHPs I interviewed viewed themselves as conservative in diagnostics and when possible, 
diagnosed or punted low, thereby protecting their patients from more severe diagnostic 
labels such as depression or anxiety.  
Finally, MHPs negotiated diagnoses with adolescent patients, their parents and 
other providers. In this work-around, alternative MHPs shored up the cultural authority of 
the DSM while undermining biomedical and bureaucrati  standardization. In addition to 
employing these work-arounds, MHPs participated in a process I term cribbing. Cribbing 
signifies the on going collective knowledge building and translation work required by 
MHPs to learn the correct answers or codes that will facilitate therapeutic service 




in which alternative MHPs’ professional expertise i treated as infantile or illegitimate 
alongside the reimbursement policies of insurers. Cibbing processes reveal the collective 
knowledge building that goes into MHPs’ translation work; they must translate their 
everyday clinical goals, practices and outcomes into the preferred language of insurers. 
Thus, cribbing negotiations develop out of on-going interactions with insurance 
companies. 
Diagnostic Dissonance: Alternative Paradigms of Mental Illness  
Mental health professionals resist and reject the biomedical model of the DSM, 
and bureaucratic standards of insurance companies through workarounds and cribbing. 
For some professionals, diagnostic processes of fitting their patients and their patients’ 
symptoms into disorder categories are uncomfortable due to issues with labeling or 
problems of fit. For others, the process of diagnosis and the categories of illness 
represented in the DSM and legitimated by the insurance companies are in direct conflict 
with their theoretical orientation to mental illness and therefore also with their therapeutic 
approach to healing.  
At the heart of much of the resistance to biomedical and bureaucratic 
standardization were knowledge tensions between altrn tive paradigms in 
conceptualizing and intervening in mental illness. The biomedical DSM and profit 
oriented insurers both privilege a therapeutic focus on surface level symptoms and 
behaviors whereas the mental health professionals I interviewed were trained to focus on 
deeper communication, relational and emotional issue . This non-fungibility of the DSM 
and insurance company policies is so problematic for the MHPs I interviewed that they 




conflict between mental health professionals’ own theoretical orientations to health and 
illness and the biomedical model legitimated in the DSM technology and insurance 
company policies. The power, knowledge and experiences of alternative mental health 
professionals, in comparison to psychiatrist professionals, are marginalized by the 
assemblage of the DSM and insurance companies.  
A key example of how the theoretical orientations ad professional knowledges of 
non-psychiatrist mental health professionals are margin lized in this assemblage is the 
way in which social environmental conditions and causes of mental illness are devalued 
in the DSM and considered illegitimate diagnoses by insurers. For example, V codes, 
which represent social context conditions and/or relational disorders such as parent-child 
or sibling conflict, sexual abuse or neglect, are found in the back of the DSM under Axis 
IV. Further, insurance companies will not reimburse m ntal health practitioners for V 
codes as primary diagnoses. Yet, for the mental health practitioners I interviewed, the 
information V codes bestow is incredibly valuable and clinically relevant. Further, mental 
health professionals view social environmental and relational issues as important to the 
emotional wellbeing of all people, but especially adolescents. Thus, practitioners strongly 
disagreed with the illegitimate status of V codes. 
In re-envisioning a different way of doing psychotherapy, practitioners focused on 
three aspects of the DSM and diagnosis that needed to change. First, MHPs argued that 
the social environmental and relational aspects of mental illness need recognized and 
legitimated in diagnostic policies. Second, they argued that the DSM-V and the mental 
health field as a whole needs to develop a better understanding of the normal versus 




DSM, alone, will not be enough. The power insurance companies hold over DSM and 
diagnostic work is a major problem that needs addressed.  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE 
The power, knowledge and experiences of psychotherapeutic mental health care 
professionals are marginalized by the assemblage of the DSM, insurance companies and 
state/federal governance. This analysis of MHPs’ experiences of the countervailing forces 
to their professional autonomy and everyday work demonstrated conflicting logics at 
work in the biopolitical economy. MHPs feel threatened, over-managed and 
deprofessionalized to the extent that their professional training is questioned as treatment 
decisions are guided by financial rather than clinial motivations and ethics. Insurers 
have taken up the biomedical DSM technology and utilized it as a tool to save money. 
The privatization of mental health care in a neoliberal, capitalist political economy leads 
to incentives for MC companies and state governance systems to hold back provisions to 
save money and reap profits. These assemblages of in urance/state power co-constitute 
local health care organization and delivery systems. The system is complex with multiple 
states, insurance companies and mixed or private-public payment systems.  
The mental health professions are extremely interdisciplinary, with multiple types 
of background disciplinary training, socialization, theoretical models and approaches to 
treatment. It is necessary for professions to secure a segment of the health care market 
through lobbying and other politicking work. This applies not only to types of 
disciplinary profession such as social workers or counselors, but to various theoretical 
orientations and treatment techniques as well. The political economy shapes which 




utilized (or at least privileged). MHPs argue that MC has shifted the field of mental 
health care from interpersonal, psychodynamic, and transformative types of 
psychotherapy towards short term, behavioral and meication treatment approaches. 
MHPs recognize the complex relationships of power between the DSM, MC and state 
governance and critique the current systems administrators for over-managing and 
stepping beyond their role as funders into the role of being care directors.  
 MC was recognized for the ways in which it has enhanced professional 
accountability and improved treatment plans. The ext nt to which the MC system has 
improved treatment plans was contested though becaus  some MHPs expressed concern 
over how current treatment plans have to be worded in behavioral language whereas 
therapists need to be flexible to changing the approach and goals of treatment as mental 
illness disturbances and context emerge from the therapeutic relationship and the context 
of the patient’s life. The MC system is acknowledge for its effect on professional 
accountability and its facilitation of clear treatment goals, but MHPs argue the pendulum 
has swung too far via over-management of theoretical orientations and treatment 
practices. Thus, MHPs contest MC governance of the language of their treatment plans, 
and how some treatments are privileged or devalued, an  their overall regulations have 
reconfigured treatment plans into formulas devoid of recognizing heterogeneities across 
patients and unique personhood and social context within the care of each individual 
adolescent.  
Conflicting Logics: Professional versus Financial Ethics of Care 
 A significant criticism of MC was how there is increasingly more paperwork, 




simultaneously, fees for service have decreased. In a more work for less pay scenario, 
what MHPs struggle with the most, beyond burnout, are cost-containment strategies 
which reduce the quality of mental health care thatpr ctitioners can provide. While 
MHPs operate under professional ethics of care and are guided by clinical information of 
patients, MC bureaucrats focus on short-term need and medical necessity. MHPs argue 
these conflicting ethics lead to reduced quality of care, especially among patients with 
major mental illness. While the on-going cribbing work required by practitioners to keep 
up with shifting regulations regarding how they can t lk, write and report on their 
everyday clinical practices is frustrating, the culture of fear created by on-going 
documentation reviews and potential audits creates unpleasant, if not unethical, 
organizational work contexts. For instance, MHPs argue that new pretreatment 
assessment requirements neglect the importance of establishing a bond with new patients 
in the first session, and that many MC policies such as this one appear irrational and 
based on administrative rather than clinical expertis . In a context of oppositional logics 
where MHPs are guided by clinical information and professional ethics of care but must 
negotiate the regulations of administrative managers uided by a business ethic that 
commodifies care, it’s not surprising the results are irrational rationalization and 
increasing stratification.  
Stratification of Care 
 The privatized, over-managed care regulations of MC facilitate organizational 
work settings (contexts of care) where providers mut negotiate more guidelines or 
controlling features of their work, defend their professional expertise and get paid less for 




professionals out of the market. The MC system privileges undereducated and 
underqualified professionals for public mental health programs that focus on short-term, 
medical necessity cases. Some MHPs argue the field is being diluted, i.e. that there is 
nowhere for highly trained psychotherapists to go except private practices and out-of-
pocket markets. MHPs argue the MC agenda is to get rid of providers in order to decrease 
access to services, which lowers utilization rates nd saves money. The MC formula 
leads to seasoned professionals treating the worried well while new clinicians with the 
least professional training and field expertise treat the most intense and troubled clients.  
 At least one MHP argued that this system could be better if MHPs themselves did 
a better job at managing their practice through diversifying the types of clients they 
accept at any given time, including taking on Medicaid and pro bono client cases. Despite 
where you place the blame on the mechanisms of stratification, all MHPs agreed that the 
public sector insurance panels do not treat providers w ll. The caseloads are too high, too 
acute, while the pay and job satisfaction are too low. Yet, many MHPs would deal with 
the issues of pay and intensity of cases if there wasn’t also a culture of fear and a shift in 
the kind of psychotherapy a practitioner can provide. The MHPs I interviewed who 
stopped accepting Medicaid clients or other forms of privatized public insurance believed 
in the mission of that work and wanted to treat clients that were not just the “worried 
well,” but found they were unable to do the kind of work they were highly trained and 
skilled at doing, under the MC system. The stratification of care leads to newer therapists 
treating the most troubled, emotionally chaotic families while the seasoned professionals 




Stratification is a result of complex, fragmented, relations of state/industry power. 
MHPs resent the constant surveillance of their professional work not only because of the 
loss of professional autonomy, but because treatment pla s have been reconfigured to 
privilege biomedical and behavioral orientations and treatment practices are governed by 
profit rather than clinical expertise and a logic of care. 
In performing a psychotherapeutic approach to studying the field of adolescent 
mental health care, I asked professionals what they would change if they had a magic 
wand. The power that insurance companies have over daily care practices of providers 
was critiqued as corrupt. The MC system has unregulated power over treatment plans and 
practices and MHPs desire a system that directs care based on the best interest of each 
individual adolescent client and their families. In order to achieve this care, practitioners 
want care to be managed based on clinical rather than financial decisions. Practitioners 
want the professional autonomy and flexibility to perform the work they are highly 
trained for, to do it from the eclectic theoretical orientations and approaches to treatment 
in which they have spent time becoming skilled in, a d to utilize approaches that best fit 
each unique adolescent, their family dynamics and social environmental circumstances. 
Regulating MC to allow mental health experts the autonomy to properly treat patients’ 
mental health concerns may or may not increase shareholder value as it improves patient 





APPENDIX A: Sample Study Participant Characteristics 
 
Service Providers by Gender and Race Female Male Total 
White 30 5 35 
African American 3 0 3 
Non-White Hispanic/Latina 1 0 1 
Native American Indian 1 0 1 






















































































































































































                            
Systemic  9     x xxx xx     xxx           
Structural Strategic 
1 
        x                 
Constructivism 4       x xxx                 
Biopsychosocial 5       x     x x x       x 
Psychodynamic 1                         x 
Family Systems 12     x xxx xxx x   x         xxx 
Culture 1                         x 
REBT 1       x                   
Relationship 
Approach 7 
    xxx xx x x               




      x x                 
Future Focused 2        x x                 
CBT 8     xx xxx       xx         x 
Behavioral 2   x                   x   
Eclectic  6   x   xxx       xx           
























































































































































































Context/holistic 2       x     x x           
MST 1       x                   
Strength Based 6       xx x     xxx           
ACT 1       x                   
Medical model 1               x           
Psychoeducational 5     xxxx                     
Art and play 
therapies 3 
    x         xx           
Developmental or 
Psychodynamic 2 
              x x         
Parent-Child 
Interaction 1 
                      x   
Psychoanalytical 5     xx x       x x         
                            




APPENDIX C: Interview Consent Form 
                               Initials _______ Date ______ 
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM  
Project Title Adolescent Mental Disorders: A sociological analysis of an emergent set of 
professional knowledges 
Why is this 
research being 
done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Amber Nelson at the University of 
Maryland, College Park. She is inviting you to participate in this research project 
because you are a professional who provides mental he lth services to 
adolescents. The purpose of this research project is to learn about how different 
professional disciplines define and intervene in adolescent mental disorders. 
What will I be 




Interview:  Amber Nelson is requesting she interview you about y r role as a 
health professional as it relates to the service delivery of adolescent mental health 
care.  
The types of questions that will be asked include the following:  
What kind of educational training did you go through in order to become an 
adolescent mental health practitioner? 
How does your approach to defining and intervening in adolescent mental 
disorders differ from other professionals you work with? 
What difference does it make for intervention when professional’s practices are 
guided by different models of illness? 
 
The interview will take place at a time and place most convenient for you. 
Please Initial all that apply: 
_____ You agree to be interviewed for this study 
_____ You agree to have the interview audiotaped.  You may still participate in 
the study and decline to be audiotaped. 
_____ You agree to have your responses to questions asked in this interview “on 
the record”.  By checking this box you are agreeing to being identified in my 







Confidentiality will be maintained unless interviewee chooses to be “on the 
record,” in which case “you may choose to be on the record and your name and 
identifying information may be used in publications.”  If you choose to be 
interviewed off the record, a pseudonym will be used throughout all stages of the 
research, from data collection to analysis, through research dissemination. Non-
essential personal characteristics will be changed to protect confidentiality and 
prevent identification of “off the record” health care professionals who are 
interviewed. No personal details about particular patients or patient’s health care 
will be recorded. 
 
Furthermore, informed consent sheets, interview audiotapes, and Microsoft word 
typed transcripts which may identify study participants (by pseudonym or 
otherwise) will be stored in a locked cabinet in the primary principle 
investigator's office at the University of Maryland.  As each digital recording of 
each interview is transcribed into text via a Microsoft word document onto the 
hard drive, the digital recordings will be erased.  
If Amber Nelson writes a report or article about this research project, your 
identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible (unless you choose to be 
on the record).  Your information may be shared with representatives of the 
University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities only if you or 
someone else is in danger or if we are required to o so by law. 
  
All study participants, including you, will receive a copy of the informed consent 
document. 
            Initials_______  Date ______ 
 
Project Title  Adolescent Mental Disorders: A sociological analysi of an emergent set of 
professional knowledges 
 
What are the risks 
of this research?  
What are the costs 




Participation in this study presents no greater than minimal risk to you. You can 
refuse to answer any question Amber asks you during the interview. Participation 




Do I have to be in 
this research? 
May I stop 
participating at 
any time?   
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may choose not 
to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop 









This research is being conducted by Amber Nelson, Department of Sociology at 
the University of Maryland, College Park.  If you have any questions about the 
research study itself, you may contact Amber Nelson  at: 1103A, Art-Sociology 
Building 
College Park, MD 20742 (office location), 301.405.6417 (office phone) or 
anelson@socy.umd.edu (email). You may also contact the Principal Investigator 
of this study, Sociology Professor Dr. Bill Falk at wfalk@socy.umd.edu, or at 
301.405.6396. 
You will receive a copy of this informed consent document. 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a 
research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, 
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742;             
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu;  (telephone) 301-405-0678  
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, 
College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
 
Statement of Age 




Your signature indicates that: 
   you are at least 18 years of age;,  
   the research has been explained to you; 
   your questions have been fully answered; 





NAME OF SUBJECT 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF SUBJECT  





APPENDIX D: Interview Guide 
 
 “Diagnoses and Interventions in Theory and Practice: Adolescent Mental 
Disorders” 
 
I. PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
a. How long have you been in the mental health profession? 
b. Can you tell me about your professional training as it relates to adolescent health? 
i. What were gaps and strengths? 
ii. Is there anything you would have changed about your
professionalization? If so, what 
c. What stands out as significant about your background educational training in 
shaping your current approach to adolescent mental disorders? 
d. How has your discipline changed its professional education since you entered the 
field? 
e. How has your approach to providing adolescent mental he lth services changed 
since you left your professional training and entered the field? 
 
II.  PROFESSIONAL COMMUNITIES AND PRACTITIONER MODELS OF ILLNESS 
a. How do you view adolescent mental illness? What do you think causes it? 
b. Tell me about the model of illness you use in your approach to working with 
adolescents with mental disorders. 
c. There are so many different words used interchangeably to describe mental health 
problems such as mental illness, mental disorder, and distress.  Do these terms 
mean the same thing to you?  Do you prefer one over another? 
d. How does your approach to defining adolescent mental disorders differ from the 
other professionals you work with?   
e. Are there any particular models of illness that youdisagree with or find difficult 
to embrace? 
f. What difference does it make for intervention when professionals’ practices are 
guided by different models of illness? 
g. In what ways do you think adolescents are affected by the models of illness that 
guide their mental health treatment? 
h. What professional community, communities and organizations do you consider 
yourself a member of?  (probe) 
i. What are the models of illness of those communities or organizations?  (probe) 
j. What are the disciplinary backgrounds of the majority of the members of said 
organizations? 
k. What kinds of other mental health professionals do you work with?  How are 
their approaches to adolescent mental disorders similar to or different from your 
own approach? 
l. What is it like to work with mental health professionals from different 
disciplinary backgrounds?  
m. What assumptions about adolescent mental disorders do members of these 
communities or organizations share? 






III.  ADOLESCENT MENTAL DISORDER TREATMENT PRACTICES 
a. How do you “treat” adolescent mental disorders in your profession?  What does 
adolescent mental disorder treatment entail for you as a mental health 
practitioner? 
b. Do you think there is a “best” treatment or approach to intervening in adolescent 
mental disorders? 
c. How have the treatment plans for adolescents changed since you began your 
career as a practitioner? 
d. Do you use any particular tools, software or strategies in writing up treatment 
plans? 
a. If so, can you tell me a bit about it?  Therascribe . . . others? What do you 
think about them? What are the costs and benefits of u ing software in 
your day to day work?s 
e. What do you think about Evidence Based Medicine and Evi ence Based 
Practices? 
f. Do you use Evidence Based Practices in your professi nal work? 
g. How are your treatment practices evaluated? 
h. How do you know when a given treatment is “working”?  What does a successful 
treatment intervention look like?  What are its core p operties? 
i. Do you think the therapeutic work you do is more art or science? Why or how so? 
j. Have the type of adolescents you work with changed in any way throughout your 
professional experience?  If so, in what ways? 
k. What do you think sets adolescent mental health and illness treatment apart from 
the general field of mental health services, or from adult mental health services? 
l. Tell me about your experiences of working with adolescents.  In what capacity, 
for/at what types of organizations . . . 
m. What is unique or specific to adolescent mental disor ers compared with adult 
mental disorders?  How are their disorders and their reatments similar and or 
different? Why? 
n. Can you tell me about any major turning points, particular experiences or events 
which guided your areas of expertise and current approach towards working with 
adolescents? 
o. What ethical dilemmas have you experienced in your day to day work in the 
mental health field? 
p. How do your personal and or professional values enter i o the treatment context? 
q. How do the personal values and orientations of yourclient matter? 
r. In what ways do the social or cultural backgrounds of the adolescents you see 
matter? 
s. Do you think we do a good job treating LGBT and culturally diverse populations 
in the mental health field today?  If so, how do you think it has changed or 
improved or what is your assessment on developments in serving those 









IV.  PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES OF DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 
a. Can you tell me about the diagnostic process – whatit entails? 
b. Is there anything unique, or different about diagnosi g adolescent mental 
disorders as compared with adult mental disorders? 
c. How important is diagnosis to your everyday work with adolescents? 
d. Are there any specific tools or strategies you use in diagnosis? 
e. What disorders or presenting issues would you say you diagnose and treat most 
commonly? 
f. Would you say that most of your cases are youth witchronic recurrent 
conditions or temporary situation induced distress? 
g. What significance does the DSM hold in your work with adolescents? 
h. How often do you use the DSM in your work as a practitioner? 
i. What role does the DSM play in your everyday work practices? 
j. In what ways is your approach to intervention shaped or influenced by the DSM? 
k. How is the DSM helpful to your everyday work as a mental health practitioner? 
l. How is the DSM a hindrance to your everyday work as a practitioner? 
m. What do you think about the discussions surrounding revisions for the DSM V? 
n. What would you revise about the DSM?  How?  Why? 
o. What do you think about V codes?  Do you think they are or should be legitimate 
diagnoses, that practitioners should receive reimbursement for diagnosing people 
with V codes?    
p. What do you know about the harmful dysfunction theory or model of disorder?  I 
think it influenced the DSM IV and the way that functional impairment in daily 
living was added as a criteria for diagnosis? 
q. What do you think about the debate of discrete versus continuous categories of 
mental disorders?  Do you think one is more accurate or makes more sense?  Would 
you endorse the APA revising the DSM from discrete to continuous categories? 




V.             EVALUATION OF ADOLESCENT MENTAL DISORDER FIELD OF 
SERVICES 
a. Are there debates in the larger field of adolescent h alth among practitioners 
regarding contemporary adolescent mental health services that are important to 
your work/approach?    What do you think about those debates? 
b. What do you think is not given enough attention, research or discussion regarding 
adolescent mental health care? 
c. What do you think about the Managed Behavioral Health Care System? 
d. What are the most significant changes that have occurred in the field of providing 
adolescent mental health services since you entered he field?  What do you think 
about these changes? 
a. In what ways do you see the field developing, shifting or changing? 
b. What stands out as the most significant change in adolescent mental health 
services since you entered the field? 
c. Do you think the adolescent mental health services ar  more interdisciplinary 
now than when you entered the field as a practitioner?  (probe) What is the 




d. Do you think there is more or less integration of services than there was a decade 
ago? 
e. Do you think there is a formal or informal network in this area of who to go see 
for different kinds of needs?  For instance, is there good communication between 
therapists that so and so exists and is great for Latina women who have these 
issues or so and so is great for boys with gender identity issues? 
f. If you had a magic wand and could change the field of adolescent mental health 
services, what would you change?  That is, what about adolescent mental health 
services do you think needs the most improvement?    
g. Is there anything else you thought I would ask about ut I haven't?   
h. Is there anything you want to add, anything else you think might be important? 
i. Could you help put me in contact with other mental health practitioners who 
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